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2Abstract.
This thesis examines the professional, political and social 
composition of the Admiralty Board, its secretariat, business and 
financial methods and office routine between 1783 and 1806. 
Membership of the Board was confined to younger sons of politi­
cally powerful aristocrats and seamen of political importance or 
professional reputation. Most civil lords moved to other 
departments after short terms at the Admiralty. For seamen a 
seat at the Board was often the culmination of a career. The 
secretaries and chief clerks, possessing a life time's experience 
of affairs, were of prime importance in office routine.
The Admiralty was an executive branch of government with 
extensive patronage but limited machinery. It controlled the 
weapon the Cabinet directed, but the feeding and clothing of 
that weapon was the responsibility of subordinate offices, 
chiefly the Navy and Victualling Boards, often virtually 
autonomous, on whom the Admiralty relied for professional advice.
The First Lord was an important Cabinet minister and the 
Admiralty co-operated with the major government departments. 
Personal relationships between departmental heads and secretaries, 
often made easier by a similar social background, were all 
important to facilitate business in the web of ancient govern­
ment practice. Only occasionally did politics make the 
Admiralty a storm centre, leading to the downfall of ministries 
and the political ruin of the First Lord as in 1804-6.
n:\ :
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The Admiralty's attitude to its employees was paternalistic. 
There was an improvement in conditions of work, pay and pensions 
by 1806 and a greater emphasis on regular attendance and 
efficiency by 1806, thanks to the reports of several Parliamentary 
commissions of inquiry into Admiralty affairs, and to the work of 
individual First Lords, especially Lords St. Vincent and Barham.
4Preface.
Very little work has been done on Admiralty administration. 
There is no volume on the Office in the government publication, 
The Whitehall Series, edited by Sir James Marchant, or in The 
New Whitehall Series, edited by Sir Robert Fraser.
The studies of naval administration by Sir Vesey Hamilton 
and Sir John Briggs are mainly concerned with the nineteenth 
century. Sir W. Laird Clowes* massive The Roval Navv. A History 
(1897-1901) gives useful lists of office holders and tackles 
the broad outlines of naval administration, but none of these 
are primarily concerned with the Admiralty. The works of J.R. 
Tanner, M. Oppenheim, and G.F. James and J.J. Sutherland Shaw, 
on naval administration. Admiralty personnel etc. deal only with 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Professor M. Lewis 
devoted a section of his The Navv of Britain (1948) to the 
evolution of the Admiralty, and the prefaces to the papers of 
the First Lords of the period, published by the Navy Records 
Society, often give a useful survey of administrative problems 
and methods. The best account of the growth of the Admiralty 
is Sir Oswyn Murray's series of articles, intended as a separate 
volume, and published, uncorrected, in The Mariner's Mirror, vols 
xxiii-xxv,Jan.1937-Jan.1939. But the account is incomplete and 
only one section, vol.xxiv.,no.3, deals with the eighteenth 
century.
Special aspects of naval administration have been studied
5in R.G. Albion's Forests and Sea Power (1926), J. Ehrman's The 
Navv in the War of William III (1953), Piers Mackes&y's War in 
the Mediterranean. 1803-1810 (1958), among others, and recently 
more research work has been done into special periods of naval 
administration, especially in American universities. A complete 
list to 1963 can be found in R.G. Albion's Naval and Maritime 
History: An Annotated Bibliography (3rd.ed., The Marine
Historical Association, Mystic, Connecticut, 1963, pp.131-3.)
One of the most recent British unpublished theses on this topic 
is a controversial study of the administration of the Fourth 
Earl of Sandwich 1771-1782, by M.J. Williams (1962, D.Phil.Oxon.). 
But naval, and particularly Admiralty administration, after 1783 
has been neglected. This thesis attempts a partial remedy of 
this omission.
The years 1783-1806 have not been chosen arbitrarily. They 
mark the terms of Pitt's ministries; they include ten years of 
peace and war; they were a time when the nature and duties of
public offices were being re-examined as a result of the
administrative reforms launched in the 1780's." Though tempor­
arily interrupting those reforms, the war ultimately acted as a 
vital catalyst in this change. Old methods were slowly being 
rejected and new ones tentatively applied. The Admiralty 
provided the battle ground on which the first, inconclusive 
struggle was contested. These years saw the apotheosis of the
Navy in action and the humiliation of its administration, in 1805,
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by the revelations of fraud and corruption at the heart of the 
system, ending in the final use of the seventeenth century weapon 
of impeachment against a First Lord. Above all these twenty 
three years are marked by several commissions of inquiry which 
act as points of alignment from which to take bearings. The 
period began with a commission inquiring into expenditure in 
public offices, including the Admiralty and some of its 
subordinate offices. It ended with a commission producing 
fourteen reports entirely devoted to naval matters. Perhaps no 
better indication of the importance of naval administration at 
this period is needed.
The main unpublished manuscript sources for this thesis have 
been the extensive Admiralty records at the Public Record Office. 
The records most frequently used were the series Ad.l - Secretary's 
Department, In Letters, and A d .2 - Secretary's Department, Out 
Letters, Ad.3 - Board TÆinutes. The Chatham and Dacres Adams 
papers were also very useful, and much relevant information was 
found scattered through the series of Indexes. At the National 
Maritime Museum, Greenwich, the private papers of Lords Howe and 
St. Vincent and Sir Evan Nepean were examined and the series 
ADM/B+B.P. - Admiralty Board In Letters from the Navy Board,
ADIvV^ D. - the same from the Victualling Board, and ADM/G. - 
Victualling Board Indexes of Admiralty orders, together with the 
records of Halifax and Chatham dockyards, were consulted. The 
papers of individual seamen and politicians most frequently
7consulted were the Bridport Papers, Martin Papers, Letter Books 
of Sir Evan Nepean, Melville Papers, the Stowe Mss., all in the 
Additional Manuscripts at the British Museum. At Warwick County 
Record Office the papers of Lord Hugh Seymour, part of the 
Seymour of Raaley Mss, collection, proved an unexpected source 
of information on relations within the Board and deserve closer 
study, and individual letters at the Gloucester Record Office, 
among the Ducie, Morton, Reynolds Mss, collection, and at the 
Bury St. Edmunds and West Suffolk Record Office, among the Mss. 
of the third Duke of Grafton, also proved of marginal interest.
The main published manuscript sources consulted were the 
publications of the Historical Manuscripts Commission, chiefly 
the Dropmore, Bathurst and Cornwallis Wykeham-Martin Manuscripts, 
and the Parliamentary Papers at the British Museum which contain 
the reports of various commissions of inquiry. The publications 
of the Navy Records Society, especially the papers of the First 
Lords, Lord Spencer, Barham and St. Vincent, were especially 
useful. Other information was found in the Journals of both 
Houses of Parliament, in the Parliamentary Histories and Debates, 
in the newspapers of the period and the volumes of the Naval 
Chronicle and The Annual Register. The many contemporary naval 
histories and biographies, chiefly I. Schomberg's Nava 1 
Chronoloav and W.R. O'Byrne's Naval Biographical Dictionary, and 
J. Marshall's Royal Naval Biography were also useful.
Secondary works which I found most useful, apart from those
s
already mentioned, were articles on special aspects of admini­
stration in The Mariner's Mirror, Sir H. Richmond's Statesmen 
and Sea Power (1946), C. Lloyd and J. Coulter's Medicine and the 
Navv. vol.iii (1961), J.E.D. Binnev's British Public Finance 
and A dministration, 1774-1792 (1958), and D.M. Young's The 
Colonial Office in the Early Nineteenth Century (1961).
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this thesis, any others will be found in the bibliography.
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Brit.Mus.Add.Mss. British Museum Additional Manuscripts.
N.R.S. Navy Records Society.
D.N.B. Dictionary of National Biography.
p.a. per annum,
nte. footnote.
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N.M.M. National Maritime Museum, Greenwich.
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Ad. Admiralty Records, Public Record Office.
ADM Admiralty Records, National Maritime Museum.
H.O. Home Office Records, Public Record Office.
P.O. Foreign Office Records, Public Record Office.
W.O. War Office Records, Public Record Office.
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CHAPTER I .
The Membership of the Board of Admiralty.
The business of the Admiralty, according to the Commission
of Inquiry of 1784, which enquired into taking fees and
perquisites in public offices, was,
* to consider and determine upon all matters relative 
to your Majesty's Navy and Departments thereunto belonging; 
to give directions for the performance of all Services that 
may be required in the Civil or Naval branches thereof; to 
sign, by themselves or their secretaries all orders 
necessary for carrying their directions into execution and 
generally to supervise and direct the whole naval and 
marine establishment of Great Britain.' *
Capable administrators were fully conscious of the magnitude
S ip C h a r le s
of this task.  ^ Middleton's view was that 'a proper management A
of the Admiralty will lead to much improvement in the inferior 
2
boards.' * Even the eradication of abuses, which it v»/as admitted
prevailed in the service, was deemed possible if the Admiralty
3
Was in earnest. * But much depended on the personnel of the .
Boards if effective reforms were to be begun, or efficient
administration maintained.
1. Pari.Pap., The Taking of Fees and Perquisites in Public 
Offices, etc; Report from the Commissioners, No.III. The 
Admiralty, pp.108-9;1806.vii.
2. The Private Papers of George, second Earl SpenCer. 1794-1801, 
Vols.I,II.ed.by J.S.Corbett, Vols .III,IV.ed.by Sir H.vV. 
Richmond (London,N.R.S.1913-1924; hereinafter The Spencer 
Papers) . I.(vol.XLVI.) ,10,Middleton to Spencer, 19 Dec.1794.
3. Ibid., ..C . The Correspondence of Admiral John Markham 1801-7, 
ed. by Sir C.R.Markham, (Londôn, N.R.S.vol.XXVIII,1904; 
hereinafter Markham Correspondence), pp.12-13, St.Vincent to 
Admiral Markham, 14 Dec.1802.
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In December, 1783, when Lord Howe became First Lord in 
Pitt's first ministry, there were seven Lords Commissioners of 
whom the First Lord was the most important, but any three of 
whom could form a quorum; two secretaries; one chief clerk, 
six established and eleven extra clerks, two marine clerks, 
since the marine establishment was annexed to the Admiralty; 
one head messenger and various inferior officers. Numbers 
increased by 1796, when there were fifteen extra clerks and a 
keeper of the minutes, and by 1805 there were six senior and ten 
junior established clerks, ten extra clerks, two marine clerks, 
a hydrographer and assistant, an Inspector of Telegraphs and 
one of Naval Works, with a small office staff, and a corresponding 
increase in domestic staff, plus a secretary and special messenger 
to the First Lord, and occasional extra clerks, employed tempor­
arily and paid out of the contingency fund.
The First Lord of the Admiralty was always a Cabinet 
Minister, ranking next in importance to the Secretaryships of 
State He had a key to official despatch boxes and his own
boxes for official correspondence. *
His selection therefore depended on political considerations 
as well as professional abilities. Of the six First Lords 
between December, 1783 and January, 1806, three were civilians.
1. A. Aspinall, The Cabinet Council, 1783-1835, Proceedings of 
the British Academy, vol.XXXVIII (1952), 151 nte.
2. The Later Correspondence of George III, ii.1793-1797, ed.by 
A  .Aspinall 12 vols.Cambridge,1962-1963; hereinafter The 
Later Correspondence) 541,no.1501 21 Feb.1797, 576 no.1551 
23 May 1797. Geo.Ill to Lord Spencer.
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Lords Chatham, 1788-1794, Spencer, 1794-1801 and Melville, 
1804-5, possessing the aristocratic connections and large estates 
necessary for entry into the Cabinet. Ability, even in such an 
office, was a secondary consideration, though because it would 
have been foolish and dangerous to neglect the needs of the 
service altogether, a compromise was usually made by the 
occasional appointment of a seaman or by supplying the civilians 
with sound naval advisers.
Seamen believed a professional sailor must best know the 
interests of the service, while a civilian would have to rely on 
naval advisors, and possibly confide Cabinet secrets to them in 
his need for advice.^' But there were disadvantages in appoin­
ting seamen, chief being their purely professional outlook, their 
lack of administrative and political experience or connection 
and the professional jealousy aroused in the service by their 
appointment. Admiral Lord Keith was a possible First Lord in
1801, but was rejected because his 'juniority* cut across the
2
service records of Admirals Gardner and Cornwallis. * Admiral 
Lord St. Vincent, on his appointment as First Lord in 1801,
1• Autobiography and Political Correspondence of Augustus
Henry. Third Duke of Grafton, ed. by Sir W. Anson (London, 
1898; hereinafter Grafton Memoirs). p.259.
2. Hist.Mss.Comm. ,Report on the Mss, of Earl Bathurst at 
Cirencester Park. TLondon. 1923; hereinafter Bathurst 
M ssTT, p.46,Lord Harrowby to Lord Bathurst, 21 April 1805.
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admitted that he had known many good admirals make wretched 
First Lords.
He and Lord Howe, though desiring the best for the service, 
were the most unpopular members of their respective governments. 
One reason for this unpopularity and inability to be as successful 
as administrators as they had been admirals, may have been their 
unfitness for the cut and thrust of political life. Accustomed 
to unquestioning obedience, they had often to persuade or cajole, 
against their nature, their civil colleagues, other boards and 
Parliament. This inability to adapt to political life was the 
chief objection to Admiral Samuel Hood's possible appointment 
in 1758. Though his professional abilities were unquestioned 
he was unpopular with the House of Commons, where his indiscreet 
speeches while under Opposition attack, would have been a serious 
liability as First Lord.^*
Unfortunately few seamen had sufficiently strong political 
connections to prove an asset to the government. The three 
professional lords, Howe, 1783-1788, St. Vincent, 1801-1804, 
and Barham, 1805-6, had all been M.P.'s. Howe represented 
Dartmouth from 1757 to 1782, but was no partisan. St. Vincent,
1• Letters of Admiral of the Fleet the Earl of St.Vincent, 
1801-1804. ed.by D. Bonner Smith (2 vols.London, Navy 
Records Society,1921,1926; hereinafter Letters of Lord St. 
Vincent), L(vol.LV)377, St. Vincent to Lord Keith, 21 Feb. 
1801.
2. Memoirs of the Court and Cabinets of George III, ed. by the 
Second Duke of Buckingham and Chandos (4 vols.London,1853-5; 
hereinafter Court and Cabinets). 1.368, Mr.W.W.Grenville to 
Marquis of Buckingham, 1 April, 1788.
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a 'deadly Whig'^* sat for Great Yarmouth, 1784-1790, when Lord 
Shelburne, his friend, brought him in for Chipping Wycombe with 
his own son. Barham was a Pittite, M.P. for Rochester, 1784- 
1790. He, like his predecessors, was only involved in politics 
through his association with naval affairs and lacked 'the
o
connections which are so necessary to the support of a minister.'
All were chosen for their professional abilities and 
reputation. Howe had half a century of naval experience behind 
him, marked by rigid conceptions of duty, the remaking of the 
signal book and a humanitarian regard for the common sailor.
His acceptance of office sprang not from a desire for power, 
since he was unambitious, but from a devotion to service. The 
same might be said of St. Vincent and Barham though the latter 
had little service experience. He had, however, by the time 
he became First Lord, an unrivalled experience of naval admin­
istration and was the most valuable administrator of the period.
Lord Howe's period at the Board was a time of retrenchment 
which drew upon him the attacks of those disappointed or finan­
cially injured by such measures. He did not feel he was fairly 
supported by Pitt who was urging economies on all departments.
1. Letters and - ^Papers of Sir Thomas Bvam Martin, ed.by Sir
R.V. Hamilton (3 vols., London, N.R.S. 1898-1902; herein­
after Letters of Sir T. Bvam Martin ). III. (vol.XIX% 300.
2. Brit.Mus., Add.Mss.41365 (Martin Papers, vol.xx),f.49:
Admiral Lord Collingwood to Captain Thomas Martin, 28 Apl. 
1805; Hereinafter Add.Mss.41365.
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'Mr. Pitt' he declared, 'talked of economy, but I practised it,'^ 
but it was the practice which alienated so many. The First Lord 
did not agree well with Pitt and confidential correspondence 
between them was infrequent. The young Prime Minister and the 
old Admiral had little in common save a mutual aloofness of 
manner which enabled neither to recognise their mutual qualities. 
Between these marble figures bustled the jovial Dundas, always 
complaining 'he could never obtain any appointments from the 
Admiralty for his Scotch connections and dependants, and always 
carrying his complaints to to. Pitt of Lord Howe's intractable 
rigidity.
Isolated.in the Cabinet, Howe came into conflict not only 
with the Navy Board, where he tried to reduce the number of 
commissioners, but with the service, since he tried to restrict 
promotion and reduce the half pay lists. In view of this 
unpopularity it was doubly unfortunate that Howe's relations 
with the Comptroller of the Navy, Sir Charles Middleton, later 
Lord Barham, were cool. Middleton wrote letters and memoranda 
on various topics which Howe did not want and to which he replied
3
with cutting politeness. * A temperamental difference was
1. Sir J. Barrow, Life of Earl Howe. (London, 1838), p.192.
2. Ibid., p.191.
3. The Letters and Papers of Charles. Lord Barham, ed.by Sir 
J.K. Laughton, (3 vois., London, N.R.S. 1906-1910; herein­
after The Barham Papers). II.(vol.XXXVIII), 172-3, 179,
190 et seq.
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aggravated possibly by Middleton's relationship with Dundas, 
and certainly by a tussle over Middleton's promotion. As a 
civil officer he had ostensibly renounced flag rank and its 
attendant privileges. But he refused to do so, contested for 
promotion to rear admiral, and despite the First Lord's protests, 
and with the influence of Pitt, carried his point and was 
promoted.^*
Such differences threatened to revive the political rival­
ries of the previous years and confirmed Howe in his desire to 
leave office and Pitt in his desire to replace him with someone 
more amenable and less controversial. It was also desirable to
associate the Admiralty more closely with the administration than
2
had previously been the case in Pitt's government. * Under Howe
3
the Board was 'entirely separate from all others,' * the
technical nature of the work generally excluded outside inter­
ference and Pitt had little support from the Board.
1. Ibid., 258-9. Middleton to Pitt, 23 Sept.1787., The Later 
Correspondence. i.1783-1793. • Aspinallal355, Geo.Ill to 
Pitt, 15 Dec. 1787.
2. Court and Cabinets. Buckingham ed.. I. 368. Mr. W.W.Grenville
to the Marquis of Buckingham, 1 Apr.1788.
3. Ibid.. 385, The same to same. 16 May 1788.
4. Hist.Mss.Comm., Report on Official Mss, of J.R.Fortescue
preserved at Dropmore (10 vols. London, 1892, etc. Herein­
after Dropmore Mss.). 1.326, Buckingham to Grenville,
26 Apl. 1788.
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minisL&r; A.
Howe's resignation in 1788 was one of several^changes by 
which Pitt's first Cabinet was replaced in 1796. His brother's 
appointment was designed to strengthen his own hold on the work 
of the major government departments and Sir Charles Middleton 
and Admiral Samuel Hood were decided upon as Chatham's naval 
advisors, to reassure those who doubted the second earl's 
abilities
A confidential correspondence was carried on during Chatham's
o
tenure of office, between Middleton, the Comptroller and Pitt. * 
The Prime Minister would visit the office to discuss naval affairs
3
with the Comptroller, ' and had periodic returns of the state of 
the Navy sent to him without reference to either the Admiralty or 
Navy Boards. wTiile Middleton was Comptroller this state of 
affairs worked well; detailed letters and memoranda from him to 
Chatham were written for Pitt to see.^' Even after his resig­
nation in 1790 from the Navy Board, Middleton continued as 
unofficial advisor to Chatham and sent off his suggestions to 
the brothers alternately. "
1. Court and Cabinets. Buckingham, ed., 1.384-7, Grenville to 
Buckingham, 16 May, 1788.
2. The Barham Papers, J.K.Laughton, ed.,II.176-8, 194-208, 
213-215, 216-231, 260-263, 265-270,273-275 et seq.
3. Letters of Sir T. Bvam Martin. R.V. Hamilton, ed.. III.381.
4. P.R.O. 30/8/365, ff.38-39, 1 Oct.1788., The Barham Papers. 
J.K. Laughton, ed. 11.328-30, 24 Sep. 332, 13 Dec.1789.
5. Ibid., 351-3, 17 May, 1790., P.R.O. 30/8/365, ff.47-8,
7 Oct. 1793, ff.62-3, 27 Jan.1794.
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Personal differences within the Board prevented Middleton's 
appointment to it^" until 1794, so it was fortunate that he was 
unofficial advisor to Chatham whose abilities had been over­
rated, and who resembled his more famous father and brother in 
nothing but looks and extreme hauteur. Like many persons of 
this type he had an inflated idea of his own abilities and while 
possessing neither 'activity experience, ardour, nor any of the 
qualities that usually produce success,' was resentful when 
Wellington was given command in Spain. .To soothe these ruffled 
feelings he was given command of the Walcheren expedition in 1809, 
a costly failure, productive only of clever epigrams and bitter 
feelings. An officer at Ramsgate once remarked that 'if you 
pass his window in his hours of leisure, you will see him 
yawning or with a book over which he is sleeping.' *
Yet Chatham could not be ignored; his very faults made him 
someone to be considered. His indolence, which allowed others
3
to take control, frequently delayed business. * He often kept 
officers waiting because he found it hard to get up.^* Sir Charles
1. Court and Cabinets. Buckingham, ed., I 397, Grenville to 
Buckingham, 23 June 1788.
2. A. Brett James,'The Walcheren Failure*, pt.i. History Today, 
xiii .No.xii , (Dec. 1963), 812.
3. Hi St. Ms s. Comm. Report o n ^ M s s An_vai±oiis__Cjill&c± Ian s,, .V&1..V1. 
(London, 1909), Cornwallis Wykeham-Martin Mss.P.365. Lord 
Hood to Commodore the Hon. William Cornwallis, 2 Feb.1791.
4. The Farinqton Diary, ed. by J.Greig. (2nd edn., 8 vols. 
London, 1922-28), i.54.
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Middleton was always urging a methodical system of work which
though difficult to maintain, would be easier than leaving things
to chance.^’ Like Middleton, Admiral Samuel Hood, senior naval
lord, was often irritated by Chatham's lack of comprehension of
the urgency and energy needed in war and preferred advice from
the Mediterranean where he was commander in chief. Both he and
Middleton tried to pump some energy into the First Lord, and
with Pitt, formed a triumpXvirate at the Admiralty, of which
Chatham was the figurehead. But just as no-one imagines the
master of the ship to be the gaily painted figure on the prow,
however ferocious, so no-one was deceived by the appointment of
one whose outward mask was mere gilding on a character 'almost
2
proverbial for enervation and indolence'. * As a result of these 
faults other ministers notably Dundas, took over his functions. 
Thus it was Dundas who settled Lord Hood's instructions in 1793 
and arranged to correspond with him through Nepean. * Similarly 
Dundas and not Chatham wrote to Grenville on the unfit state of 
Portuguese ships, Britain's proposed allies, in 1793, though
4
Dundas was then staying with Chatham. ’
1. P.R.O. 30/8/365, ff.73-4, 17 June, ff.102-3, 24 Sep.1794.
2. The Annual Register, vol.LI, 1809. 223.
3. Dropmore Ms s.II.407. Henry Dundas to Lord Grenville,July
1793.“
4. Ibid.. 416, 18 Aug.1793.
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Chatham did not resent this usurpation of his duties, but 
his successor did, and his political associations made it 
difficult to ignore his views. When the war revealed Chatham's 
incompetence and a change at the Board was accounted 'indispen­
sably necessary',^*Lord Spencer was chosen as First Lord, despite 
inexperience, because of his political connections. He was not 
a brilliant debater; hard working, amenable and known to favour
Pitt, Lord Shelburne's bitter, accurate wit dubbed him an
2
'excellent chairman of Quarter Sessions." ' But he had an 
experienced Admiralty Board on whom he, and more important, Pitt 
could rely. However Spencer was not the complacent puppet 
Chatham had been; he got rid of those board members, Hood and 
Middleton, who were expected to advise and control him, and 
replaced them by weaker professional lords, more acceptable to 
him.
The Earl might have served as a model of the typical eight­
eenth century aristocrat. A Whig family tradition extending 
over a hundred years had brought large estates, great wealth 
and membership of the ruling caste. One sister was the lovely 
Duchess of Devonshire, the other the Countess of Bessborough, 
both noted V^ fhig beauties and hostesses, and Lady Spencer, 
daughter of the first Earl of Lucan, was a woman whose wit and
1. The Later Correspondence. Aspinall,ed.,ii.27S-9, No.1170, 
Pitt to George III, 8 Dec.1794.
2. Sir Denis Le Marchant, Memoir of John Charles Viscount 
Althorp. Third Earl Spencer! [London, 1878}, p.10,
23
intelligence made her house an intellectual centre. Spencer's 
interests were reflected in his magnificent library, one of the 
finest in Europe, in his trusteeship of the British Museum for 
forty years, and in his expertise in national and local politics, 
in which he took an active part until his death.
By hard work Spencer gradually achieved knowledge of naval 
affairs. As a keen politician he valued the claims of patronage 
the office bestowed and was a welcome change to Chatham in his 
courtesy and punctuality in replying personally to even the 
humblest letter. This smoothed the path for him and made him 
acceptable to and admired by the bulk of naval officers.^"
But Spencer was not a forceful character. True, it was 
difficult for any minister to stand against the dominance of the 
Army represented in the Cabinet by the Secretary of State for 
War, the Secretary at War, the Commander in Chief and the Master 
General of the Ordnance, especially a young and inexperienced 
minister like Spencer. He possessed a strong sense of duty 
which carried him through the difficulties of office, but he 
seems to have suffered from an underlying sense of inadequacy in 
professional matters and from a dislike of offending anyone.
It is significant that he fainted with relief on hearing the 
news of the victory at the Nile, the triumphal end to the
1. Brit.Mus., Add.Mss.51724 (Holland Papers vol.civil).No.9. 
f.l2: T. Lloyd to Spencer, 27 June 1795. Warwick County
Record Office, Seymour of Raoelev Mss.. The Papers of 
Admiral Lord Hugh Seymour. 1759-1801 ; hereinafter Seymour 
Papers". CRÏ14A/348^ Admiral George Berkerley to Lord Hugh 
Seymour, 2 Sept.1798.
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hazardous plan of sending a squadron into the Mediterranean
feel'.nq op V
while danger threatened at home. he gradually mastered
and by 1801 he was respected by the body of naval opinion, but
this victory was only achieved after hard work and the constant
effort was engaged in only from a strong sense of public duty.
'Public benefit,' he wrote to Lord Camden,
'can alone be the object which is aimed at by it (his 
acceptance of office), for I am very far from entertaining 
an idea that any private comfort or satisfaction can arise
from i t  I hope you will believe  that I have
not been very forward to seek my present situation, and
that if the necessity of some such measures ...... had not
appeared very urgent, no consideration upon earth should 
have tempted me to agree to it.' 1*
These are the words of a conscientious but pessimistic man, 
and Spencer's doubts and hesitancy were revealed many times 
during the war.
He leaned heavily on his naval advisors. There was a 
frequent almost daily correspondence between him and Lord Hugh 
Seymour, a junior naval lord. On 7 May 1795, he wrote to Seymour 
hoping the latter would return to London, as he, Spencer, was not 
'quite confident enough of my own information on many of these 
matters not to be fearful of getting into some scrape or other
Q
about them' In like manner he was timid of setting up his
1. The Later Correspondence. Aspinall, ed.,ii.279 nte.17 Dec.
1794.
2. SevmoUr Papers. CR114A/325, no.13.
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professional ignorance against the Navy Board’s experience.^’
In many respects Admiral Earl St. Vincent resembled Howe.
Both had earned their earldoms by famous victories, both were 
at the head of their profession, devoted to the service, 
possessed of experience extending over forty years, and unques­
tionably honest. St. Vincent’s reputation was founded on strict 
discipline, economy and a grasp of naval strategy then unequalled. 
Neither was an easy colleague to work with and both aroused 
strong political and professional enemies who drove them from 
office as a result of the stringent economies they practised.
Like Howe, St. Vincent’s relations with his Prime Minister 
were unsatisfactory. Though there was no open hostility, there 
was lack of confidence on Addington’s part. Many years later 
he considered the First Lord had been able but an ’ungenerous
minded man and a vary unsafe one to be connected with in
2
politics.’ ’ This was in contrast to Addington’s statement to 
the King that St. Vincent had, ’no political convictions whatever 
and that he would not hesitate to give a fair and firm support
3
to the measures of your Majesty’s Government.’
1. C.N, Parkinson, Edward Pellew.Viscount Exmouth, (London, 
1934), p.124.
2. Brit.Mus.,Add.Mss.,41378 (Martin Papers,vol.xxxiii).f.61; 
hereinafter Add,Mss.41378.
3. Aspinall, The Cabinet Council, 151.nte.
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Addington certainly found St. Vincent too forceful a 
colleague to be comfortable and when he became a government 
liability and the point of attack for all critics, dropped him 
with few qualms.
While Henry Dundas, now Lord Melville, was First Lord, Sir 
Charles Middleton was his naval advisor, and succeeded him in 
1805. Middleton’s appointment seemed a confirmation that Pitt 
was hostile to naval reform and caused the resignation of 
Addington, now Lord Sidmouth. Pitt persuaded him to continue in 
office on the assurance that these fears were groundless and that 
Middleton’s appointment was temporary.^"
Middleton himself was not anxious to take office but he 
thought his years of service and experience deserved a peerage. 
Between 14 and 22 April several letters passed between him,
Melville and Pitt on this topic,Middleton was prepared in return 
for a peerage, to take office and remain Chairman of the Commission 
for Revising the Civil Affairs of the Navy which Pitt had estab­
lished. This would increase the Commission’s prestige and enable 
its recommendations to be more speedily carried out. Once this 
was done and the Navy rescued from the precipice on which it
o
stood he would resign. He had never cared for outward shows of
1. Hon.G.Pellew, Life of Lord Sidmouth. (2 vols.London,1847), 
ii.364., Bathurst Mss..p.46, Lord Harrowby to Lord Bathurst,
21 Apl.1805.
2. The Barham Papers, ed.by J.K.Laughton,III.(vol.XXXIX),72-3, 
Middleton to Melville, 16 Apl.1805. P.R.O.30/58/6,f *46. 
Middleton to Melville, 14 Apl.1805, f.48. Middleton to Pitt,
15 Apl 1805.
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office and now proposed to give up the First Lord’s house and 
live with Admiral Gambler, even offering to serve without salary. 
He finally accepted office on 22 April as Lord Barham.^"
The members of the Admiralty Board can be divided into 
civilians and seamen. Between 1783 and 1793 the former out­
numbered the latter by five to two. With the outbreak of war 
this proportion was reversed at first in favour of the seamen, 
but after 1795 there were four civilians and three professionals, 
and after 1804 numbers were again reversed in favour of the sea 
lords, four to three. But there were other divisions, less 
obvious, but more important at that time, of wealth, position, 
and birth. Today, with weaker class barriers and dissolving 
family ties, membership of the same profession is a strong bond; 
it was not so in the eighteenth century. Then class and family 
were the cement which held together the social structure, so 
that men of the same social group had more in common with each 
other, even if in opposition, than with members of another class 
who held similar views.
Since political influence was a natural concomitant of 
social prestige, the Boards of this period are divided into those 
members who had political influence and those who did not; into 
those who occupied and controlled seats because of family connec­
tions, and those who occupied them on Government approval, or 
through Government support.
1. Ibid., f.53. Middleton to Pitt.
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One of the new Admiralty lords in December, 1783, was John 
Jeffries Pratt, later Viscount Bayham. He was the son of the 
first Earl Camden a famous lawyer and lifelong friend of the 
elder Pitt. As a reward for his father’s services in various 
high offices, Pratt was appointed one of the tellers of the 
Exchequer in 1780, a post he held for sixty years. Throughout 
his career in the Commons he sat as M.P. for Bath, where his 
father controlled one seat. His opinions were not highly 
regarded and Canning described him as ’useless lumber in the 
ministry.’ Even in his early career he was criticised for
hesitation. He was ’not the most decided character in public
or private matters’, and the tribute of a friend is hardly more 
flattering. In 1795 Lord Charlemont described him as ’plain, 
unaffected, good humoured man of pleasing conversation and address, 
and though in understanding not exactly his father’s son or his 
sister’s brother, yet he does not seem to be in any way 
deficient’. It seems apparent that he was chosen for his
*
family connections rather than his ability.
Henry, Lord Apsley, was appointed to the Board for the same 
reasons. Son of former Lord Chancellor and member of the
1. G.E.Cokayne, The Complete Peerage of England, Scotland.
Ireland. Great Britain and the United Kingdom: A History
of the House of Lords and all its members from the earliest 
times, New edition, ed. by the Hon.Vicary Gibbs, H.A.Double­
day, D. Warrand, Lord H.de.Walden, G.H. White, and R.S.Lea.
(13 vols.London,1910-1959; hereinafter G.E.C. Complete 
Peerage). 11.501-502.
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influential Bathurst family, he possessed little ambition and 
a firm devotion to Pitt. According to Grenville he was an 
amiable High Tory, reserved, a poor speaker, and ’greatly averse 
to changes but unwillingly acquiesing in many.’ But though well 
regarded by contemporaries, he presents a shadowy, ill-defined 
figure. He was related to the Buller family who had political 
interests in Devon and Cornwall and controlled the boroughs of 
East and West Looe, Saltash and Totnes, seven seats in all.
John Buller, a first cousin, became one of the Commissioners for 
Excise in 1790,^"and an uncle had been at the Admiralty Board 
with Lord Sandwich. Apsley himself held the family seat at 
Cirencester from 1783 to 1794, a seat represented by Bathursts 
since 1713 under a Tory banner, and after his turn at the 
Admiralty, was at the Treasury and India Boards for brief periods 
and later Secretary of State. Through his wife, Georgiana, 
sister of the future fourth Duke of Richmond, and niece of the 
Master General of the Ordnance, he was linked with another 
important aristocratic family.
Robert Grosvenor, Viscount Belgrave, was also an ardent 
supporter of Pitt and later Addington. It was as M.P. for East 
Looe that he first entered the Admiralty in 1789, but a year
1. I.R.Christie, ’Private Patronage versus Government 
Influence’, English Historical Review. Ixxi (1956),249-255,
2. G.E.C., Complete Peerage. 11.30-31.
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later sat for the family borough of Chester. Like Apsley and 
Pratt his brief stay at the Board was followed by other office, 
notably at the India Board. Nowhere were his services distin­
guished but his estates were large and they became even larger 
on marriage to the sole heiress of the Earl of Wilton. Public 
office was expected and accepted but could not claim his main 
interests which were devoted to intellectual and artistic pursuits 
and to stock breeding.^*
The Hon. John Thomas Townshend conforms to this conventional 
picture. He belonged to a family which played its part in . 
English social and political life for nearly a century. He sat 
for Newport, Hants, and then for Whitchurch which his father 
controlled and first tasted office as under secretary of state 
to his father Viscount Sydney, the Home Secretary. In the re­
organisation of the Cabinet in 1788-9 Sydney resigned and his son 
followed him out of office, but not for long. In the same year 
he became a junior lord of the Admiralty, moving to the Treasury 
in 1793. His Townshend connections alone would have been 
sufficient to qualify him for high office, but it was assured by 
the marriages of his sisters. The younger married her cousin, 
the Duke of Buccleuch, and the elder the Earl of Chatham, the 
Prime Minister’s elder brother and First Lord of the Admiralty 
from 1788 to 1794. Townshend’s own term co-incides almost 
exactly, 1789-1794.
1. Ibid.. XII.Pt.II.538-9.
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Charles Perceval, Lord Arden, is an exception in one respect,
though he had the conventional social and political background
of the others. Son of the second Earl of Egmont by his second
wife, Catherine, sister to the Earl of Northampton, he was a
member of that ruling circle and represented three seats in
o
Parliament between 178^-1802, vLaunceston, 1780-90; Warwick
1790-96; Totnes 1796-1802. His father in law. Sir Thomas Wilson,
was an M.P. for Sussex.'^* His appointment was probably the
result of a family connection with the Admiralty which his
brother Spencer, the future Prime Minister, continued when
appointed counsel to the Admiralty in 1794. The second Earl of
Egmont had been First Lord from 1763 to 1766 and though said to
have wasted between £400,000 - £500,000 on ’pompous additions’
to the dockyards, he had been a great favourite with the ship-
2
wrights, whose claims he had supported. * Arden served longer 
than any other civilian at the Board and after his resignation 
retained the position of Registrar of the Admiralty court, to 
which he had been appointed in 1790. Unlike the others he kept 
an interest in naval affairs until his death.
With the naval officers the case is much the same. Philip
1. G.P. Judd, Members of Parliament. 1734-1832.(New Haven: 
Yale University Press,1955},p302.
2. His birthday was celebrated at Woolwich and Deptford with 
great rejoicing. Port Egmont in the Falkland Islands is 
named after him. D.M.B.XllV.372.
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Affleck was not an M.P. though his brother Edmund, also in the 
Navy represented Colchester from 178^ till his death in 1788 and 
their elder brother John, had been M.P. for Suffolk 1743-1761 
and for Agmondesham 1767-1768.^' Affleck’s career had been 
reasonably distinguished though not quite as meritorious as his 
brother’s. At the siege of Louisburg he had attracted attention 
of Admiral Boscawen by his gallant conduct and had fought bravely 
with Rodney in the last stages of the American war. A  steady, 
not a brilliant seaman, after a spell in the West Indies from 
1790-1793 he saw no more active service and retired from public 
life in 1796. What then made the Government chose him as junior 
naval lord of the Admiralty in 1793? The most probable reasons 
are the outbreak of war with the necessity of having another 
sailor with political connections at the Board, who was not 
expected to serve again but was sufficiently noteworthy to command 
respect, and had practical experience of campaigns.
Despite his famous name. Admiral Drake, another naval member, 
was an undistinguished officer who served throughout the Seven 
Years and American wars, but was not employed after 1783. His 
two elder brothers had been M.P.’s for the family borough at 
Berealston and he represented Plymouth, an Admiralty borough, in
1. G.E. Cokayne, Complete Baronetage. 1611-1800. ( 5 vols. 
Exeter, 1900-1906), V.221
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1789. He was a friend of the Cornwallis family and of Admiral
Samuel Hood^* and the brother in law of General Eliot, the heroic
defender of Gibraltar during the recent war. His second wife’s
family were the Onslows of Guildford; his father in law had
been M.P. for the borough until 1784, his wife’s cousin, Thomas,
represented it until 1806. Her great uncle had been Speaker of
the House of Commons throughout George I I ’s reign and her second
cousin was first Earl of Onslow. Finally there was a naval
connection. Admiral Sir Richard Onslow was Lady Drake’s uncle.
Add to this that Drake’s elder brother, the fifth baronet, was
Master of the King’s Household and Comptroller of the Board of
2
Green Cloth and his nephew aide-de-camp to the King "and it is
not difficult to understand why Drake was appointed to the
Admiralty. But he did not long enjoy the honour. After only
two months, from August to early October 1789, he died, ’worried
3
out of his life by a wife.’ * The vacancy of junior naval lord 
was offered first to Admiral Hotham and on his refusal to Captain 
Gardner, though it was kept open for a time in case Sir Charles
1. Cornwallis Wvkeham-Martin Mss, p.345, Lord Hood to Commodore 
the Hon.William Cornwallis, 18 Aug.1789.
2. G.E.C. Complete Peerage. X.70-71., D.N.B.XLII. 216-221,225., 
Lady Eliott-Drake, The Family and Heirs of Sir Francis 
Drake, (2 vols.London, 1911 ),ii,329-31, 335.
3. Cornwallis Wvkeham-Martin Mss, p.347, Admiral J. Leveson- 
Gower to Commodore the Hon.William Cornwallis, 19 Feb.1790.
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Middleton, then Comptroller of the Navy, agreed to serve, in 
which case Gardner would have been appointed Comptroller. But 
’Sir Charles, acting a part not perfectly consistent and 
expressing a wish to retire, he was taken at his word, Gardner 
made a Lord of the Admiralty, and Mr. Martin Comptroller.’^'
Gardner, ’worthy and honourable man,’ was appointed in 1790. 
He had recently returned from a tour of duty as Commander in 
Chief at Jamaica, and served on the Board until March 1795. Unlike 
Affleck or Drake, he was still a serving officer and administra­
tive duties were not allowed to interfere with active service.
Thus during the Spanish armament he commanded the Courageux and 
in 1793 went to the West Indies on an expedition against the 
French. His position at the Admiralty was not the end of, but 
rather a stage in, a long and honourable career, and he was, 
with Gower, the only one of this naval group to be appointed 
while still a captain. This was all the more surprising since, 
unlike Gower, he had no strong political affiliations or powerful 
family connections. Plymouth served as a seat for six years 
and Westminister for ten more. Possibly his tactful handling 
while Commander-in-Chief, Jamaica of the dispute between Prince 
William, captain of the Pegasus and his first lieutenant, Isaac 
Schomberg, contributed to his appointment. Martin says that 
his good feeling for all parties and ’that propriety of conduct
1 * Ibid., p.364, Lord Hood to Commodore the Hon.W.Cornwallis, 
2 Feb.1791.
35
and decision which governed his proceedings on all occasions,* 
brought about a reconciliation which ended the affair quietly.^* 
This good feeling and conciliatory temperament did not extend to 
social inferiors since he threatened to hang one of the men’s 
delegates at the Spithead mutiny of 1797 and escaped hanging 
himself with difficulty. Ralfe admits that though an able 
officer he was ’one of the severest and most arbitrary.’ '
Admiral Samuel Hood already stood high in his profession when 
appointed to the Board in 1788, and his efficiency and devotion 
to the Navy made him a valuable commissioner. A middle class 
family, the Hoods ultimately became ’the only Naval Officers
3
who were really intimate with the Pitt household.’ * Tory in 
politics and devoted to the King, through his wife Hood was in 
touch with the civil branches of naval administration and with 
the borough of Portsmouth where he had been dockyard Commissioner. 
His wife’s grandfather had been master ropemaker in the naval 
dockyard, and her father a surgeon and apothecary in the borough. 
Several of his brothers in law were in the Navy; Captains Linzee, 
Amherst, Holwall. Hood was M.P. for Westminster 1785-88 and
1. Letters of Sirl'Bvam Martin, R.V.Hamilton,ed., I.(vol.XXIV),84,
2. J. Ralfe, The Naval Biography of Great Britain. (4 vols. 
London, 1828, hereinafter Naval BiographvTT i.4l2, See also 
Barrow, op .cit.. p.401-2.
3. D. Mathew, The Naval Heritage, (London, 1945),p.83.
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1790-96; in the intervening years he represented Reigate where 
the two seats were controlled by Lords Harwicke and Somers, the 
latter through his second wife related to the Buller family.
The Hon. John Leveson Gower was a political captain par 
excellence, and serves as a microcosm of mid-eighteenth century 
’interest*. His connections were splendid and numerous; he 
was related by blood or marriage to the great ducal families of 
Newcastle, Rutland, Bedford, Kingston and Beaufort, and to the 
BaBis of Rockingham,^Salisbury, Egmont and Leicester. His half 
brother, Granville Leveson Gower, first Marquis of Stafford and 
member of the ’Bloomsbury Gang’ controlled four seats, two at 
Newcastle-under-Lyne, one at Stafford and one at Lichfield, and 
had been a lord of the Admiralty in Pelham’s administration.
In 1783 despite his earlier political record, he was Lord President 
of the Council under Pitt, while his brother John was junior lord 
of the Admiralty and represented the safe family seats of Appleby, 
1784-1790 and Newcastle, 1790-1792.
His family circle illustrates the small connected world in
which these people moved; in that circle what mattered most was
to be in office, close to the source of places and promotions.
At night one met, at the gaming tables or assemblies, the
colleagues of the morning Board room, who were frequently close
relations. Thus Gower’s third cousin was the wife of John
Thomas Townshend, Arden’s father had married, as his first wife,
another cousin, and Gower’s nephew, the future fifth Duke of
1. ControlItcL 'oy I1ie t'arl cj- -Than.et. Goui&l’ s moti%r WAS Ù (Jùughi:&''o f  
Hit Sixth ed ri.
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Beaufort, married the daughter of his half brother, Granville
by his third wife.
A plan to make Middleton and Hood, Lord Chatham’s senior
naval advisors in 1788 foundered on the dislike Gower entertained
for the former and the impossibility of them working together.
At the time, because of Gower’s ’conduct, his professional
character, and his connections,* it seemed impossible to drive
him from office, but there were ways,^* and later in the year:
2
he resigned because of ’incivility.’ * Martin found him a 
’presumptuous overbearing man,’ and in Gardner’s recollection 
he appeared almost as a caricature of the bluff, bad tempered,
3
loud voiced captain of fiction. * Nevertheless he was an able 
officer and as befitted one of his connections was ’well 
acquainted with the character of most of the officers in the 
service; his memory in that respect was astonishing.’ This 
pre-war Board thus had a proportion of seamen who could contri­
bute practical experience, and of the scions of great families
1. Court and Cabinets. Buckingham,ed., 1.397, Grenville to 
Buckingham, 23 Jun.1788.
2. Cornwallis Wvkeham-Martin Mss..p.347. Admiral J. Leveson
Gower to Commodore the Hon. W. Cornwallis, 19 Feb.1790.
3. Letters of Sir T. Bvam Martin, R.V. Hamilton, ed.. III.
292 nte. The Later Correspondence. Aspinall, ed.,1.175,
no.232, Prince William to Geo.Ill, 4 Aug.1785., 
Recollections of James Anthony Gardner, 1775-1814, ed.by 
Sir R.V.Hamilton and Sir J.K. Laughton,(London, N.R.S. 
vol.XXXI,1906; hereinafter Gardner, Recollections), p.65-67
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whose political support it was necessary to keep. There 
remained a small group of men who did not control boroughs or 
votes but were connected through marriage or friendship with the 
aristocracy who did. Such men were Charles Brett, Richard 
Hopkins, John Smyth, and Charles Small Pybus. Not much is known 
of them beyond their brief service records, but the boroughs 
they represented implied little political power at their own 
disposal.
In Brett’s case there was already a naval and administrative 
connection. One brother, John, a captain, had been one of . 
Anson’s lieutenants, the other, Timothy, clerk of the cheque at 
Portsmouth. A  close friend of Lord Howe’s, Brett had been 
Admiral Boscawen’s flag lieutenant in 1747 and eight years later 
was in charge of Portsmouth yard.^" He was Paymaster of the 
Navy from July 1766 to January 1770 when Lord Howe was Treasurer 
and acted with his patron in all things. * He represented 
Dartmouth between 1782-1784 when he was at the Admiralty, and 
before that had been M.P. for Lostwithiel, where the nomination 
was held by Lord Mount Edgecumbe, a Pittite, and then for Sandwich
1# C.F. Aspinall-Oglander, Admiral’s Wife; life and letters 
of the Hon. Mrs. Edward Boscawen, 1719-1761.[London,1940), 
pp.57,158.;
2. Sir. L. Namier and J. Brooke, The History of Parliament: 
The House of Commons, 1754-1790, ‘l3 vols. History of 
Parliament Trust, London, 1964; hereinafter Namier and 
Brooke, Hist, of Pari.), II.114-115.
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where the patron was Philip Stephens, the Admiralty secretary. 
Brett was reckoned ’particularly conversant in naval affairs’^* 
besides serving on government committees on other topics.
Richard Hopkins is another example. On the Board from 
1784 to 1790 he sat first for Thetford from 1780-1784 where the 
seat was controlled by the Duke of Grafton. Hopkins was an old 
friend of the third duke, who had been Prime Minister, and kept 
him in touch with affairs. As such Hopkins was useful to Pitt 
who used him as a go-between to discover the duke’s sentiments 
on the India Bill and later on Parliamentary reform. Unable to 
secure the duke when he was forming his ministry, Pitt asked for 
the support of Grafton’s friends in Parliament, and though at 
first Hopkins refused to serve unless his friend and patron was 
included, he was finally prevailed upon. * His resignation in 
1790 may be a reflection of the growing strength of the Prime 
Minister with the consequent lessening of his need for a spent 
political force like Grafton and his supporters in important 
office. Hopkins sat for Dartmouth until 1790 and represented 
Queenborough, a Treasury controlled borough, until 1796, and 
Harwich, the responsibility of John Robinson, a ministerial 
supporter of George III, for a further three years.
1# Cornwallis Wvkeham-Martin Mss., p.330, Elizabeth, Countess 
Cornwallis to Hon. William Cornwallis, 12 Apl.1782.
2. Grafton Memoirs, Anson, ed., p.383,384,387,398-9.
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John Smyth though married to the third Duke of Grafton’s 
eldest daughter, was not politically dependant on him. A member 
of an old Yorkshire family, he was M.P. for Pontefract, from
1783 to 1807 and had taken an active part in the petitioning
9
movement of 1778-gi He was associated with Wyvill’s petition 
for Parliamentary reform^" but from 1791 to 1793 he sat at the 
Admiralty and later at the Treasury, was Master of the Mint and 
a Privy Councillor.
Charles Small Pybus*s family was originally a Yorkshire one 
also, though now settled in Dover. The connections were East 
Indian; John Pybus, Charles’s father, had been a member of the 
Madras Civil Service and Council. Two of Charles’s sisters were 
married to Indian Army officers, one being Brigadier General Sir 
Robert Fletcher, Commander in Chief on the Coromandel coast. 
Connected by marriage with Sir Hugh Palliser, they could claim 
a naval family interest of some importance. Pybus was M.P. for 
Dover a Treasury borough, from 1790-1802, covering a period when 
he was at the Admiralty and one of the lords of the Treasury. *
1. , Namier and Brooke, Hist, of Pari., III.455-6.
2. The Baronetage of England, ed.by W.Betham (5 vols.Ipswich, 
1801-5; hereinafter Baronetage, Betham),iii.402., J.Hutchins, 
The History and Antiquities of the County of Dorset (3rd 
edition, corrected and augmented by W.Shipp and J.W.Hodson,
4 vols. London, 1861-70), ii.238.. L.A.Mills, Cevlon under 
British Rule, 1795-1932, (London,1933), pp.1-3., See also 
The Later Correspondence, Aspinall, ed., i.542, Pitt to 
Geo.ill, 9 June 1791 on the appointment of Smith and Pybus, 
’both of whom are likely to be efficient and useful in 
business.’
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It was the decision of the Portland Whigs to join Pitt 
which brought Lord Spencer into office, first as Lord Privy Seal 
and a few days later as ambassador extraordinary to Vienna, 
where he tried to urge on Austria her unfulfilled obligations as 
Britain’s ally in Holland. On his return from this fruitless 
task he was asked to take over the Admiralty. The unfitness 
of Chatham for the office, overlooked in the rejoicings over the 
Glorious First of June, had become more obvious in the following 
weeks. The battle had failed to prevent the grain ships 
reaching France and the temporary advantage was not exploited 
because of confusion and disorganisation in the dockyards, 
shortage of ships and men and a general lack of planning. It was 
arranged that Spencer and Chatham should change places and in 
December, 1794, Earl Spencer became First Lord. The composition 
of the Board remained the same for the first three months when 
several changes took place. One was the elevation of Philip 
Stephens from the secretaryship, where his place was taken by 
Evan Nepean, to a place at the Board. Another and more far 
reaching change was the replacement by younger inexperienced 
officers, of the professional sea lords. Hood, Affleck, Gardner 
and Middleton, the last of which was particularly unfortunate.
In 1790 Middleton had resigned the Comptrollership of the 
Navy Board in dissatisfaction over the delay in implementing 
the reforms proposed by the Commission appointed to inquire into 
fees and perquisites.^" After his refusal of a place at the
1 * The Barham Papers, J.K.Laughton,ed., III.6-8.
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Board in 1789, for the next four years Middleton acted as 
unofficial advisor to the First Lord, a curious position which 
may have satisfied Dundas, Pitt and Chatham but must have been 
resented by the other sea lords. Middleton had not seen active 
service since 1763 and in 1778 had accepted a civil appointment 
which was then generally taken to mean retirement from active 
service and competition in the flag lists. After the acrimonious 
debates of 1787-8, he had been created rear admiral, an appoint­
ment which contributed to Lord Howe’s resignation the following 
year. In 1794 he joined the Admiralty as senior naval lord, 
he was second in seniority to Admiral Hood who was then in command 
in the Mediterranean, and his previous administrative experience 
was of great value, the more so since both Lord Hood and Gardner 
were actively employed at sea.
Middleton’s active career had been undistinguished. Most 
of it had been spent in West Indian or North American waters 
during the Seven Years War. On the outbreak of the American 
war he was captain of a guardship at the Nore, but saw no more 
active service and in 1778 was appointed Comptroller. While on 
half pay he had married, in 1761, Margaret Gambler, one of whose 
brothers became an admiral, another lieutenant governor of the 
Bahamas, while a sister married Vice Admiral Cornish. Middleton’s 
family origins were Scots, legal and academic. His father’s 
family was connected with the Earls of Middleton, his mother,
Helen Dundas, was a first cousin to Henry Dundas, while a niece
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married the Prime Minister’s cousin. Influence of a powerful 
kind had therefore played a part in his career and was used to 
help younger relations. His nephew, Robert Gambier Middleton 
became an Admiral, his wife’s nephew Admiral James Gambier, 
became a lord of the Admiralty, another, Samuel Gambier was 
commissioner of the Navy.
Middleton’s appetite for work was immense^'and Pitt thought 
him the best man of business he ever knew. He was an evangel- 
ical * and though this brought him support and respect from
3
Wilberforce and the like * in other quarters his religious 
principles made him suspectf* His zeal for the service was no 
less whole hearted for being frequently advertised, but he was 
not an easy colleague to work with; even Dundas, his cousin, 
learnt that ’he requires to have a great deal of his own way of
1. Memorials, personal and historical of Admiral Lord Gambier, 
ed.by Georgiana, Lady Chatterton (2 vols London,1861), 
i.265, Hannah More to Mrs,Bouverie, 20 Oct.1794.
2. Namier and Brooke, Hist, of Pari., 1.116.
3. See Hannah More’s comment, ’What a comfort it is to have a
Cabinet Minister who prays for the success of his measures.’
M. Jaeger, Before Victoria, (London, 1956),p.50.
4. The Creevev Papers, A Selection from the Correspondence and 
Diaries of the late Thomas Creevev, M.P•, ed.by Sir H . 
Maxwell^ (2 vols.London,1904), i.36, Creevey to Dr.Currie,
11 May 1805.
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doing business in order to do it well.’^* When at the Navy
Board he criticised Admiralty sloth and corruption and jealously
guarded the subordinate board’s privileges, but when at the
Admiralty he adopted its view of his one time responsibility#
This was less of a volte-face than it seemed. Middleton had
come to the conclusion that no reforms introduced at the Navy
Board would ever be really effective until the Admiralty was
re-organised to enforce them. Because of this he was suspected
by his colleagues of double dealing and inordinate ambition,
though his experience was missed in the difficult days after 1795.
The remaining sea officers during these years were Admirals
James Gambier, William Young, Robert Man and Lord Hugh Seymour.
Of Admiral Man little is known and why he should have been a
2
member of the Board is a mystery. * His service was undistin­
guished and his connections unimportant. A former shipmate
3
considered him a ’thick headed fellow,’ *. Lord Bridport’s high 
opinion of him was general until his conduct in the Mediterr­
anean, in 1796 showed lack of nerve. Admiral Jervis, his
1. The Spencer Pacers,J.S.Corbett, ed., 1.5-7, Dundas to 
Spencer, 14 Dec. 1794,
2. There may be a link with the Mann family of Linton, Kent, 
see Baronetage  ^Betham,ed. iii.254-6.
3. The Tomlinson Papers, ed. by J.G. Bullocke,(London,N.R.S.. 
vol.LXXIV, 1935),p29l, Captain R. Tomlinson to Nicholas 
Tomlinson, 19 Oct.1799.
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commander there, wrote that for nine months Man had been 
’afflicted with such a distempered mind that imaginary ills and
■j
difficulties have been continually brooding in it.’ It is 
amazing that after serious errors of judgement which led to his 
being ordered to strike his flag in January, 1797, he should, 
within two years, be called to a seat at the Admiralty. '
According to St. Vincent, Man and Young ’never knew what 
discipline was and they will never acquire it; the former from 
nervous weakness the latter from conceit and presumption.’
William Young became rear admiral after serving in the Mediterr­
anean with Lord Hood. He was a close friend of Gambier and 
though little is known of his background, he had sufficient 
influence to get command of the Crescent during the Spanish war 
scare in 1790. Appointed port admiral of Plymouth, he lives in 
Marryat’s Frank Mildmav as Sir Hurricane Humbug and achieved 
later fame as an enemy of Lord Cochrane.^* St. Vincent disliked
1. 0. Sherrard, Life of Lord St. Vincent, (London, 1933), p.87.
2. The Naval Miscellany, ed.by Sir J.K.Laughton, (London,N.R.S. 
vol.XX,1901), 1.253, Lord Bridport to Lord Hood, 12 Sep.1798. 
For an article defending Man see Commander A.M. Sheffield,
’In Defence of Man,’ The Mariner’s Mirror, xx.no.2 (April, 
1934), 187-198.
3. The Spencer Papers, H.W.Richmond,ed., IV(vol.LIX), 4., Also 
The National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, The Jervis Papers, 
JER/21 Admiral St. Vincent to Nepean, 3 Apl.1797.
4. D.N.B. LXIII.400-01.
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him and wrote that when he was a captain his ship was a disgrace
but that when elevated to the Board he set himself up ’as the
pink of Naval experience and ability.’^' Lord Spencer however
thought well of his professional abilities * though Young took
took a pessimistic view, unsupported by general naval opinion,
in February, 1797, when there were discussions in whether to send
re-inforcements to the Mediterranean in view of a possible French 
3 •invasion.
James Gambier is quite a notable figure. He was the son of 
a Lieutenant Governor of the Bahamas and a nephew of Vice Admiral 
Gambier, under whom he first entered the Navy. He had only five 
and a half years sea experience when he got his flag in 1799 
and thereafter preferred life ashore. The Basque Roads affair 
was still in the future, but the tactlessness was already apparent 
when he replaced Affleck in 1799. Known throughout the service 
for his strict religious views, he was considered by some Method- 
istical and hypocritical,. Gambler’s West Indian connections 
were reinforced by marriage into the Mathew family of Antigua, a 
powerful association in a society which paid close attention to
1. Jervis Papers. JER/24. St. Vincent to Nepean, 22 June,1800.
2. Dropmore Mss .^  IV.320, Spencer to Grenville, 21 Sept.1798.
3. The Spencer Papers. J.S. Corbett, ed.,Ilivol.XLVIII),228-232.
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the ’sugar interest* and one which he shared with Gardner. A 
quiet, kindly man Gambier did not deserve St. Vincent’s harsh 
comment that he was ’a compound of paper and packthread.’^"
His uncle was Sir Charles Middleton, a powerful patron. Gambier 
became senior naval lord on Middleton’s retirement, but he was 
ill qualified to sit there; his service experience was short, 
his ability questionable and his rigid principles made him 
unpopular with his colleagues.
There remains Lord Hugh Seymour, resembling Gower in his 
aristocratic connections and the ’interest’ at his disposal. 
Seymour’s political background, like Gower’s, was Whig. His 
father was the first Marquis of Hertford, his mother the daughter 
of the second Duke of Grafton. His brother, the second Marquis, 
was a follower of the prince of Wales. Lord Hugh, his brother 
George and their friend John Willet Payne, were close friends 
of the Prince and though a marriage in 1785 to Lady Ann Waldegrave, 
daughter of the Duchess of Gloucester by her first marriage to 
the second Earl Waldegrave, had rescued him from ’an irregular 
and convivial life,’ he remained master of the robes and privy
o
purse to the Prince. His wife’s two elder sisters were 
married respectively to the fourth Earl Waldegrave and the 
fourth Duke of Grafton, an intimate friend of Pitt. In 1783
1 • Mathew, op.cit., p.184.
2. D.N.B. LI,324. The Naval Chronicle. 1799,11.357-373.
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the Earl of Hertford had had five members in the Commons, his 
four sons and Whitshed Keene. The amount of interest commanded 
by such a family was very great; and even if, as O ’Byrne later 
claimed. Lord Hugh was, ’an officer of surpassing excellence,’^* 
his influential connections had assured him of a speedy rise in 
his profession.
After serving in the Spanish crisis, a head injury caused a 
temporary retirement ashore for three years but with recovery 
and on the outbreak of war, he was again employed in the 
Mediterranean under Lord Hood. He fought in the battles of the 
First of June and L ’Orient and in 1799 having been created Vice 
Admiral went out to Jamaica as Commander in Chief. The capture 
of Surinam enlivened an otherwise uneventful command which ended 
in his death from yellow fever in 1801. His appointment to the 
Board as junior naval lord from 1795 to 1798 did not prevent him 
serving at sea for most of that time. At this period considered 
one of the ’rising men in the Navy,’ "the comment of his contem­
poraries and his own letters reveal him as a stern but just 
officer whose death was regretted by everyone. * St. Vincent did
1. W.R.O’Byrne, Naval Biographical Dictionary.(3 vols.London, 
1849),iii.1052 nte.
2. Hist .Mss .Comm., Supplementary - Report on the Mss, of
Robert Graham Esq. of Fintry.(London. 1942; hereinafter 
Graham Mss.).p.14. Thomas Graham to Robert Graham,10 Oct.1798.
3. Gardner.Recollections . R.V.Hamilton & J.K.Laughton,eds., 
p.237.
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not share this view and blamed the decay of naval discipline on 
the bad example the ’fashionables’ such as Seymour and his 
friend George Berkeley, had set their men by their continued 
absenteeism.^*
Three civilians, Philip Stephens, Thomas Wallace and the 
Hon. William Eliot, make up the total. Leaving Stephens until 
later consideration, let us examine the now familiar pattern to 
which Wallace and Eliot conformed. Thomas Wallace’s father 
was Solicitor and Attorney General tp=Geo-rge=T-TX- and the miïeu 
of this old Cumberland family was legal and commercial. Wallace 
sat as Tory M.P. for Grampound and at the time of his appoint­
ment to the Board in 1797, for Penrhyn. He was a consistent 
supporter of Pitt throughout his political life. Like other 
commissioners his brief period of service was followed by more 
lucrative government posts. In his case commerce and admin­
istration absorbed his talents and he served for long periods 
at the India Board, was Master of the Mint and finally Vice- 
President of the Board of Trade.
Eliot too was a Tory and M.P. for St. Germans, one of the 
family seats, from 1791 to 1802. Like Pratt, Townshend and 
Apsley he belonged to the circle of ruling families which then 
formed English society. He was the youngest son of the first 
baron of St. Germans, who controlled six seats, two at Liskeard,
1* Jervis Papers. JER/21. St. Vincent to Nepean. 21 May,1797.
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two at St. Germans and after 1758, two at Grampound, By his 
wife, the daughter of the first Marquis of Stafford, Eliot might 
claim acquaintance with the Whig interests. His eldest brother, 
Edward, was Pitt's brother in law and close friend. Between 
them the Eliots represented St. Germans%^Liskeard from 1780-1823 
and not surprising^other plums of office fell to them. Both 
William and Edward became lords of the Treasury and though the 
latter took the almost inevitable step to the India Board, 
William's talents were expressed in diplomatic fields. Between 
1791 and 1793 he was secretary of the legation at Berlin, a year 
later secretary of the Embassy and in the absence of the 
ambassador, minister plenipotentionary at the Hague, holding 
the same position to the elector Palatine and the Diet of Ratisbon 
from 1796-1798. Since these posts required tact, patience and 
fortitude in handling delicate situations, his appointment to 
the Admiralty in 1800 was a sensible one. Yet foreign affairs 
reclaimed him after four years at the Board and in 1804 he 
became under-secretary of state for that department.
All these men belonged to one social group and in many cases 
were related by blood or marriage. Some of them were further 
linked by East or West Indian connections to the world of trade 
and commercial interests. Of the fourteen civil lords during 
this period, five later became Lords Lieutenant or Deputy for 
their county and commanders of their local militia. The posse­
ssion of political influence or access to it was what primarily
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gained them a seat at the Board. The Administration appointed 
them to placate or satisfy powerful political groups or indiv- 
uals. Ability, even suitability, were secondary considerations.
The immediate cause of Pitt's resignation in 1801 was his 
failure to get George III to agree to Catholic Emancipation.
The King chose Henry Addington, Speaker of the House of Commons,
1789-1801, as Pitt's successor with the letter's full approval, 
and during February the ministry was gradually formed. Since 
Lord Spencer had resigned, the Admiralty was vacant. Addington 
suggested St. Vincent to the King supported by Pitt and Dundas 
and an official order was made on 9 February. St. Vincent 
accepted on certain conditions. Only the 'entire concurrence 
and approbation of Mr. Pitt, Mr. Dundas and Lord Spencer,' he 
wrote, would make him agree to such 'a momentous undertaking.'^" 
On February 14, the anniversary of the battle from which the 
earl had taken his title, he had an audience with the king and 
over the week-end the composition of the Board was decided. On 
the 20th it met for the first time and started work before most 
of the other departments.
Since only two members of the previous board, Stephens and 
Eliot, had agreed to remain, there was an almost complete change. 
St. Vincent brought with him two naval colleagues whom he parti­
cularly admired; Sir Thomas Troubridge and John Markham and
1* Letters of Lord St. Vincent. D.Bonner Smith,ed., 1.14.
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they were reinforced in 1804 by.Sir Harry Burrard Neale who 
replaced Eliot. Though more efficient, capable and conscien­
tious than their immediate predecessors, politically and in 
seniority the professional element was weak. All three were 
captains and only Troubridge was a famous seaman. Uninterested 
in politics, he was M.P. for Great Yarmouth in 1802, sharing the 
seat with Thomas Jervis, the First Lord's cousin. But it was 
a lifetime's devotion to the service and his acknowledged 
professional ability which brought him to the Board. His 
origins were humble, he had no influential relations or political 
'puli' and it is to St. Vincent's credit that he chose such a 
man to be his senior naval lord. It also reveals that patronage 
and 'interest' were not all important nor^ability always go 
unrewarded.
By contrast with Troubridge's obscure beginnings, Markham 
Was the second son of an Archbishop of York who had been a royal 
tutor, and a brother to the M.P. for Caine. One brother in law 
was the third Earl of Mansfield, the other was the third Baron 
Dynevor, M.P. for Carmarthen, 1790-1793. Markham himself 
became M.P. for Portsmouth in November 1801 on Lord Hugh Seymour's 
death and the Admiralty representative in the Commons. Like 
Troubridge, Markham had served under St. Vincent and a mutual 
respect had developed, reinforced by Whiggish sympathies.
Markham was a good committee member, who served at the Board 
again from 1806-7, and it was he who, on 13 December, 1802,
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brought in the bill to appoint a Commission to inquire into
frauds and abuses in the naval departments which ultimately
led to the downfall of Addington's ministry in 1804 and the
later impeachment of Lord Melville.^"
Neale was a son of the governor of Yarmouth castle, Isle
of Wight and succeeded to the baronetcy on the death of his
uncle in 1791. His 'interest' showed itself in continuous
employment through peace and war and in lucrative appointments
to frigates in which he captured French prizes and to royal
yachts in which he frequently entertained the Royal Family,
when they were at Weymouth. Before and after his appointment
to the Board he was so employed and pursued a successful naval
2
Career, respected by his contemporaries. * That this career 
was founded on royal favour appears from a letter from St.Vincent 
to Sir Charles Grey. The First Lord was eager to advance the 
career of Grey's son, George, who had been the admiral's first 
captain. George, he wrote, must make the 'Campaign of Weymouth', 
to gain royal favour and early promotion. * As in Neale's case, 
the King's good opinion had its effect; appointment and honours
1* J. Marshall, Royal Naval Biography. (XII vols.London,1823- 
30)., i.266-268., D.N.B. vol.XXXVI, pp.171-4.
2. Add.Mss., 41378,ff.88-89.
3. Letters of Lord St. Vincent, D.Bonner Smith,ed.,IL(vol.LXI), 
134-5, St. Vincent to Sir Charles Grey,12 May,1801.
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were bestowed on the Grey family and George Grey ultimately 
became resident commissioner at Portsmouth. It is significant 
that in the invasion scare of 1803, Grey and Neale were consi­
dered for the defence of the Thames.^'
Neale seems to have been without strong political affilia­
tions and served from January to September 1804 under St.Vincent 
and his successor and political opponent. Lord Melville. He 
represented Lymington, where he controlled two seats. The 
civilian element at the Board was politically weak and Neale's 
political attributes were an additional recommendation in his 
favour.
The new civilian members of St. Vincent's Board were James 
Adams, William Garthshore and John Lemon. They were undist­
inguished and reflected the general difficulty that Addington 
faced in getting able and well known men to serve in his ministry. 
This was one reason why the proportion of sea officers rose to 
four to three by 1804, and of the three civilians Stephens might 
almost be counted a professional sea lord through long experience. 
Adams's father had been an Exchequer baron and Adams was a lawyer 
by profession, but the fact that he was also the Prime Minister's 
brother in law was of more importance to his appointment. From 
1796 to 1802 he was M.P. for Bramber, from 1803 to 1806 for 
Harwich.
William Garthshore, like Addington, was the son of a
Ibid., 379-80, St. Vincent to Sir H.Burrard Neale, 9 Sep. 
1803.
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fashionable doctor. His father's powerful clients and his ovm 
virtues secured his appointment as tutor to the Marquis of 
Dalkeith with whom he made the Grand Tour.^* Later on the 
recommendation of the Duke of Buccleuch he became Dundas's. 
private secretary. It was this Scottish connection, for 
Garthshore's father was a Scot, which helped to bring him to the 
Admiralty in 1801. He had been M.P. for Launceston in 1795 and 
later in the same year for Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, and his 
marriage to the daughter of a wealthy wine merchant ensured a
connection with commerce. Unfortunately the death of father in
law, wife and child, all within a few days, in August 1803, so 
depressed him that he resigned at the end of that year and his
o
place was taken in 1804 by Colonel John Lemon. *
At this time Lemon was M.P. for Truro, 1794-1814, controlled 
by Viscount Falmouth, a Tory, and eldest son of the late Admiral
Boscawen. Lemon was brother to Sir William Lemon, M.P. for
Cornwall in eleven Parliaments from 1774 to 1824, John Lemon's 
sister in law was Jane Buller, sister of Sir Francis Buller and 
and daughter of James Buller of Morval by his first wife, the 
daughter of the Earl of Bathurst. * John Lemon represented
1. He was also a great friend of the Paget family and one of
the Prince of Wales' 'set'. Rt,Hon.Sir.A.Paget, The Paget 
Papers : diplomatic & other correspondence of Rt.Hon.Sir.A. 
Paget.1794-1807. (2 vois.London,1896^i.120 nte.
2. D.N.B. %%Il32-3.
^ ' G.E.C. Complete Baronetage. V.173. The Buller-Apsley
connection with the Board had thus been maintained.
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West Looe, 1784, Saltash 1787-1790, both in the Buller interest 
and Truro. Little more is known of him and as he only served 
from January to April, 1804, it is difficult to judge his 
capabilities or regard him as more than a politically useful 
stop-gap, whose Parliamentary influence got him his post at a 
time when the ministry needed every vote.
Addington's ministry was committed to peace and retrench­
ment. With these policies St. Vincent was in agreement but soon 
added the reform of the Navy to the programme. This was made 
possible by the peace of Amiens in 1802. Between 20 August 
and 10 October, the Admiralty had inspected the dockyards and 
were so dissatisfied at what they saw that a Parliamentary 
Commission was appointed to enquire into abuses. The reforms 
which St. Vincent initiated raised a storm of abuse and 
opposition which weakened Addington's ministry to a point where 
Pitt was once more able to take over office. In his new Cabinet 
Dundas, now Lord Melville, a former Treasurer of the Navy, was 
First Lord and with the exception of Neale and Stephens a 
completely new Board was once more appointed in May, 1804.
Including Melville, it consisted of three civil lords, 
Stephens and William Dickinson being the other two, and four sea 
lords, the senior of whom v\ias Vice Admiral James Gambler, while 
the new professional lords were Admiral Sir John Colpoys and 
Vice Admiral Philip Patton. This was something of a triumph 
for Sir Charles Middleton, whose friendship with Patton and
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relationship with Dundas and Gambier had in the past been mutually 
useful. The triumph was completed the following year when on 
Melville's retirement, Middleton, now Lord Barham, became first 
Lord on 2 May, 1805. Though only holding office for a year it 
provided the culmination of his life's work - the campaign of 
Trafalgar.
Melville's resignation to defend himself against the charges 
of corruption arising from the Tenth Report, on the office of 
Treasurer of the Navy, of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry, 
did not break the continuity of the Board whose membership 
remained essentially the same. Neale had been replaced by Sir 
Evan Nepean in September, 1804 and Colpoys by Captain Viscount 
Garlies in May, 1805. This last appointment revived Scots 
influence at the Board and strengthened the weak position of the 
ministry.
Neither Neals nor Colpoys had served long and according to 
his nephew, if the latter had been allowed to choose he would 
have preferred to keep his lucrative appointment as Commander 
in Chief at Plymouth since he lost the prize money due to the 
post.^" Melville's flattering letter of 19 May, 1804, that he 
and Mr. Pitt wanted 'men of respectable characters, of acknow­
ledged talents, and popular manners,' at the Board, persuaded 
Colpoys to agree to the appointment and when in 1805 he resigned
1* Which fell to his successor. Sir William Young, see above,p.45
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Melville saw that he was compensated for possible financial 
loss by appointing him Treasurer of Greenwich Hospital at £1500 
p.a. and later Governor.^"
As a seaman the admiral's experience was wide and he was 
respected in his profession. But his subsequent appointments 
were civil ones and though there was a rumour of probable 
appointment as Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean, he was 
never again in active command. Considering Colpoys's unpopu­
larity with the lower deck after the 1797 mutiny, in which he 
was almost hanged, Melville's phrase was infelicitous. Though 
no blame was openly attached to him for the incident on H.M.S. 
London, the Admiralty thought it better not to employ him 
actively and his appointment to the Board may have been a partial 
compensation for an unmerited and compulsory retirement, none the 
less actual for being unofficial. If so it cannot have raised 
the opinion of the Board held by the lower deck. This was 
balanced by the appointment of Vice Admiral Philip Patton, whose 
career and friendship with Middleton extended over forty years. 
Though his origins were comparatively humble and his career had 
not been distinguished by spectacular engagements, he was a good 
seaman, popular with all ranks for his kindness and attempts to 
improve conditions of pay and service. He had been one of the 
first to warn the Admiralty of the impending danger of mutiny in
1* J. Ralfe, Naval Biography, iii.180-181.
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1797. His work on the improved signal code and at the Transport
Board was highly r e g a r d e d . L o r d  Chatham had found him so
useful as Chief Commissioner for Transports that he tried to
persuade Patton to remain at that board rather than take his
flag. This Patton refused and though made a rear admiral was
not employed until 1803. He was then given command of the Downs
squadron under Lord Keith, commander in chief of the North Sea
fleet. Despite a strong threat of invasion Patton did not
actually go to sea and was allowed to command from the shore.
While here he met Pitt, then in retirement at Walmer. This
acquaintance may have influenced Pitt to appoint Patton to the
Admiralty in the following year, where he continued to serve until
the change of ministry in 1806, By his contemporaries Patton
Was considered the authority on transport and the lower deck,
2
and his choice was a good one. '
William Dickinson is an unknown quantity. At the time of 
his appointment he was M.P. for Lostwithiel, 1802-1806, where 
the two seats were controlled by Lord Mount Edgecumbe. His 
father was M.P. for Somerset until his death in 1806 and 
Dickinson was a firm ministerial supporter who took an active 
part in the work of the Commons. He served at the Admiralty 
from May 1804 until January 1806, when he became M.P. for Somerset.
!• P.R.O. 30/8/365,ff.62-64, Middleton to Chatham, 27 Jan.1794.
2. D.N.B. . . .XLIV. 65-66., J.Ralfe, op.cit.Jii.. .387-400.
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Finally with Captain George Stewart, Viscount Garlies, we 
return to the great world of political and social connections, 
already familiar from the careers of Gower and Seymour, Son 
of the seventh Earl of Galloway, he had achieved a distinguished 
career in the Navy. He was a Pittite and M.P. first for Saltash
1790-1795, then for Cockermouth 1805-6 and Haslemere, October to 
November 1806, both in the Lowther interest. He was connected 
with former board members also; his aunt had married the first 
Marquis of Stafford, half brother to John Leveson Govi/er, and 
father by her of Georgiana, wife of the Hon. William Eliot. 
Garlies* own wife was the daughter of the first Earl of Uxbridge 
and sister to the future first Marquess of Anglesey, then 
beginning his army career, and likewise M.P. for Caernarvon 
boroughs, 1790-1796, and for Milbourne Port, the family borough 
from 1796 to 1804. Garlies* younger brother, William Stewart, 
Was an excellent soldier, founder of the Rifle Brigade and a 
close friend of Lord Nelson. In addition he was M.P. for
Saltash 1795 and for Wigtownshire, the family seat, 1796 to 1816.
The amount of political patronage and influence engrossed by this 
family was considerable, since in addition to those already 
mentioned the Earl of Galloway controlled three seats, at Orkney, 
Kirkcudbrightshire and Stranraer boroughs. Such importance 
could not be ignored and Garlies became Lord of the Admiralty
from 1805-6, when he succeeded his father.^* He was one of a
G.E.C. Complete Peerage, V.606-7. The connection with the 
Admiralty was renewed when his nephew, Sir James Graham 
became First Lord.
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Scottish group at the Board during these years, comparable to 
previous close alliances, based on blood and marriage. In this 
case race was the vital catalyst and one which bound Melville, 
Barham, Patton and Garlies together in the particularly 
'clannish* way of exiled Scots, which Englishmen find so irrit­
ating.^*
The infiltration of Scots into the highest ranks v;as 
unpopular, but acknowledged and possibly contributed to the 
resentful feelings of naval officers in the mid 1790*s when they 
felt the service was being dominated by Dundas. Nelson disliked 
Scots and his feelings were shared by St. Vincent. These 
feelings were a mixture of racial and political resentment since 
the Scots often voted together and worked their friends and 
relations into office whenever possible. Captain Thomas Hardy, 
the sturdy embodiment of English commonsense and English 
prejudices, expressed regret at Dundas*s impeachment, 'for I 
believe it was much his wish to befriend the Navy, in spite of 
his being a Scotchman.* * When in 1805 there was some talk of 
Lord Keith for First Lord he was rejected as too junior an 
admiral, 'Exclusive of consideration of his country*, that is 
because he was a Scot.^*
1. There was another section bound by similar religious and 
moral principles and composed of Barham,Gambler and Patton, 
who 'attended no clubs and associated only with the most 
respectable company.* J. Ralfe.oo.cit..iii.399.
2. 0.Warner, A Portrait of Lord Nelson.(Pelican Books,1963)^16, 
Bathurst M ss. 46.Lord Harrowby to Lord Bathurst,21 Apl.1805.
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Why did these men become Lords of the Admiralty; was it for 
material reward, power or prestige attached to Government office? 
The first were not inconsiderable. When the Commission on Fees 
and Perquisites investigated the Admiralty of 1784, it found
that the First Lord had a total net salary of £2872 p.a. the
greater part of which came from allowances from the fund for the
sale of old naval stores, coal, candles. He and the next four
senior lords had a house at the Admiralty; though the two junior 
lords did not, nor any allowance for rent. Apart from the First 
Lord, all the other commissioners had a net salary of £775 p.a. 
which, with their allowances for coal, candles, etc., amounted 
to £872 p.a. The financial aspect was a powerful one then for 
relatively poorer members of the Board, but though not to be 
despised, this salary was not large to men of Camden, Belgrave, 
Apsley or Spencer's wealth. It did not, for example, compare 
with Camden's emoluments as teller of the Exchequer, which in 
1780 were £6740. 3. 6%. and frequently over £7000.
Membership of the Board bestowed power; it also implied the 
existence of power or political influence. Those members with 
relatives in the Navy do not seem to have advanced their careers 
in an outstanding way. This was the field most open to them, 
yet few achieved brilliant careers; it may be said to have 
given them a good start and no more. The reason was that the 
Navy was a profession which required some years of rigorous 
training. If a boy possessed good family connections, or
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influence at the Admiralty he might get his commission at a 
very early age and be a captain before twenty, but thereafter 
promotion was by strict seniority. Influence could secure better 
ships and the chance of employment, while those without remained 
on half pay, it could even obtain the most profitable stations 
for prizes, but it could not overcome or bypass seniority.
Only three of the civil lords during this period had family 
connections with the Navy; Apsley, Arden and Smyth. One of 
Apsley's numerous cousins was an officer, Smyth's third son, 
Thomas, became a captain, and Arden had a step brother, Philip 
Tufton, who was a captain. Arden's son born at the Admiralty 
in 1794, entered the Navy in 1805 and ultimately became an 
Admiral in 1863. Arden had persuaded Lord Chatham in 1794 to 
appoint his brother, Spencer Perceval, Counsel to the Admiralty, 
a post with a meagre salary but a sign of Government favour 
and often the beginning of a Parliamentary career; Perceval 
was elected M.P. for Northampton in 1796.^*
The sea officers were in the same position. Before 1801 
only Gower, Affleck, Gardner, Hood and Seymour had younger 
relatives who sought promotion and of these only the three latter 
attained any prominence. After 1801 only three of the sea lords
1 • D.Grey , Spencer Perceval. T he Evangelical Prime Minister,
1762-1812,(Manchester. 1963T,p.l2. Townshend's cousin, 
Mr, Thomas Broderick, was Counsel to the Admiralty from 
1792 to 1794, The Later Correspondence. Aspinall,ed., i. 
386.nte.
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had immediate relations who were in the Navy. Troubridge*s son 
became an admiral, Patton's two younger brothers, Charles and 
Robert became captains and Colpoys' nephew, Griffith, a rear 
admiral. There were connections with the civil administration 
too. Markham's brother, Osborne succeeded Sir William Belling­
ham as Comptroller of the Storekeeper's accounts and Samuel 
Gambier, a brother of Admiral James Gambler, had been a Navy 
Commissioner.
There was nothing especially sinister in this and much 
that was, at that time perfectly natural, and grosser examples of 
perquisites for the family are usually missing. There was no 
further instance of an appointment similar to that of Spencer 
Perceval, who when one year and ten months was granted by his 
father, then First Lord, the reversion in succession to his eight 
year old brother Charles, of the sinecure of Registrar of the 
Admiralty Court, 'in consideration of good and faithful service 
already performed.'^* But the advice given to Frank Mildmay 
still held good; 'if you could make yourself out cousin-german 
to the old tom cats at the Admiralty, you would fare all the 
better.'^*
Lastly prestige - for the naval officer in the days before 
1* D.Grey.op.cit., p.3.
2. F.Marryat. Captain Frank Mildmav; or the Naval.Officer,
),P.(London, l829j,p.l66.
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1801 a seat at the Board meant that he had reached the head of 
his profession. It was often the culmination of years of 
faithful service. With the exception of Howe and Middleton it 
was the first and for most the only civilian government office 
they held. For the civil lords it was an introduction to 
rather than a consumation of public life from which they went 
on to other important government posts.
In part this was due to the youth of the civilian lords. 
Since government was the occupation of their class they had to 
begin somewhere and the Admiralty offered a good starting point. 
There were always sea officers to give expert counsel and 
presiding over it was a man of experience and distinction under 
whom it would be no disgrace to serve. At worst they could do 
little harm and at best they learnt something of how a govern­
ment department was run.
This is further borne out by an examination of the age and 
length of service of commissioners. The youngest civilian 
appointment was Lord Apsley*s at twenty-one, though before 1793 
none of this aristocratic group was older than twenty-seven.
The age limit increased during the war; the youngest was Pybus 
at twenty-five, the oldest Spencer at thirty-seven. The lesser 
known members were always older, Smyth forty-three, Hopkins
Pratt had held only the sinecure of a teller of the 
Exchequer previously. Townshend was under secretary 
of state when his father was Home Secretary and left 
to go straight to the Admiralty.
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fifty-six and the veteran Stephens seventy-two. Nevertheless 
the average age on appointment of these men was twenty-seven-and- 
a-half, even if we include Hopkins, Smyth, Stephens, Haywood and 
Brett, it is only just over thirty-eight.
The average age of the seamen on appointment was considerably 
higher, fifty-two years, assuming Drake and Mann to be approx­
imately fifty-five. The youngest naval officers, Gower, forty- 
three and Seymour thirty-six, were the ones with the most 
powerful political connections; the oldest and with the least 
was Affleck, sixty-seven. This was in accord with the higher 
average age of seamen in Parliament, thirty-nine on first election
Cornrnons
as compared with the n^sptbomaA-average of thirty-four to thirty- 
five ^ ' Judd says that members of the aristocracy first
entered Parliament much earlier than those with less patrician
backgrounds, and this is true of the Admiralty Board. After
1793 the professional lords were younger though they were still
generally above the national average. Before the war there was
a gap of twenty-five years between the average ages of civilian
and sea lords, that is fifty-six to thirty-one, after 1793 it
narrowed to ten years, from forty-eight to thirty-eight. *
1 • Judd, op.cit. p.25.
2. This excludes Arden whose first appointment comes before 
1793 and includes Middleton and Stephens who were in their 
late sixties or early seventies when first appointed. If 
they are left out the average drops and the gap narrows to 
forty-three to thirty-one.
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War and the lack of it was responsible for this. The war 
removed the older officers to active service; isfefe of war in 
which to distinguish themselves before 1793 had prevented some 
officers from reaching the Board by merit if not by influence; 
what were left after 1793 were young 'politicals' or cautious 
mediocrities.
For these young and inexperienced civilians a seat at the 
Board could never have the same prestige as it did for the 
seamen, and there must have been friction and disagreements 
arising from differences in age. The seamen had given their 
lives to a service, of which membership of this Board was the 
highest honour. There could be little in common with men, half 
their age, who occupied a seat at the Board for a few years 
before passing on to higher office and more lucrative posts.
V/hy then did these young men take the job? The answer is 
not a simple one. The Navy was an expensive service, often the 
largest public spender, especially in war, and always one of the 
three most expensive services. But by employing * gentlemen'at 
the Admiralty and by appointing them as commissioners at the 
heads of subordinate boards, the country was able to take 
advantage of a system which was individually cheap and based on 
noblesse oblige. The spoils of office were undoubtedly sweet and 
sought after, but they were not the primary reason why gentlemen 
took office. Office was a source of patronage, a possible 
source of income, but it was also the tradition of this class
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and a patriotic duty. The government could rely, in return 
for some rewards, on the sense of personal honour and loyalty, 
and on the personal standing, which itself bestowed power, of 
the upper classes who staffed these offices. The gentleman 
was individually cheap and a safeguard against the expert and 
could be relied on not to push 'professional zeal to inconven­
ient or dangerous lengths.'^" Despite their comparatively 
short terms in office there is an air of permanence and 
continuity about these men which derives from a similar social, 
educational, political and vocational pattern and which in turn 
contribute to the conservative traditions and methods of the 
Board.
The attitude of Earl Temple to office was probably a typical 
one. In May, 1800, he wrote to his uncle. Lord Grenville, the 
Foreign Secretary, referring to a junior lordship, vacant at the 
Admiralty by the resignation of Wallace. Though desirous to 
follow the family tradition of public service, he was deeply
o
hurt at the offer of such a junior post. * In reply Lord Grenville 
justified the Cabinet's arrangements on the grounds of election 
convenience and offered the vacancy again, holding out the bait
1. W.L.Burn, The Age of Equipoise . (London,1964),pp.263,264.
2. Dropmore Mss. VI. 235-6, 20 May, 1800.
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that Lord Granville Leveson-Gower had been inquiring for it.^" 
Family pride compelled Temple to refuse 'the very lowest 
situation in office' * he had wished to enter public life, but 
could not do so in a 'situation beneath that in which other 
young men of my own rank have been placed.' Several points 
are notable here; the genuine desire to enter government as a 
public and family duty, second the 'family' connection of some 
houses with the Admiralty such as the Leveson-Gower's , and the 
overwhelming pride of the Temple family. Lord Grenville, in 
a letter to the young man's father, the Marquis of Buckingham, 
expressed his view and that of his class. His nephew must 
begin in a subordinate office, he declared, to gain 'habits of 
office and familiar acquaintance with the subjects and the topics 
of public debate.' Nor must he regard the comments of enemies 
who would attribute his acceptance of office to greed for 
emoluments. To Temple's claim that his position was too 
important to be wasted on subordinate office, Grenville quoted 
the cases of Lords Arden, Camden, Bathurst and Belgrave who began 
in this way and 'if there have been lately fewer persons of that 
description it is because the war has filled the Admiralty with 
naval men.
1. Ibid.. 239-240, 28 May, 1800.
2. Ibid.. 240-241, 31 May, 1800.
2. Court and Cabinets. Buckingham ed.,III« 77, Lord Grenville 
to Marquis of Buckingham, 4 June, 1800.
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An important factor in the formation of this elite was 
education. Of a strictly formal pattern, it was the best
available, though its suitability for naval administration was
doubtful. The general rule was a private tutor or public school,
followed by the University and then by the Grand Tour or a period
the Inns of Court. The public schools and universities retained 
a strong classical bias, the teaching varied and the amount of 
formal instruction was small. One of the advantages of this 
seeming haphazard system was a facility in classical quotation 
in debate, though none of the Admiralty Board at this period 
so distinguished themselves. Lord Belgrave's maiden speech, 
when he quoted from Demosthenes to an astonished House and 
earned himself the name ’lord of G r e e k , " g a v e  assurance of 
'senatorial talents' according to The World "and it may be
3
that the difficulties of reporting debates "have lost good 
speeches, but judging by what remains, this is unlikely.
Of the eighteen civil commissioners during this period, 
excluding Stephens and Nepean, ten were educated at famous 
public schools, usually Harrow, and twelve proceeded to the 
University, usually Cambridge. Such an education as they 
received there, classical and literary, gave them an appreciation
1. D.N.B. XXIII.282.
2. The World. 12 June, 1788.
3. A.Aspinall, Politics and the Press. 1780-1850, (London,
1949),p.36.
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of literature, music, and the arts upon which some improved to 
become patrons and connoisseurs. Lord Spencer was the out­
standing example at the Board, with his magnificent library, but 
Lord Belgrave added to the fine collection of pictures at the 
Grosvenor gallery.^*
The Grand Tour on which many an aristocrat embarked, was 
asumed to broaden his knowledge of other countries, bestow 
fluency in language, especially French, the lingus franca of 
diplomacy and polite society, and provide the finishing touch 
to his education. These designs were sometimes frustrated.
When the third Duke of Grafton's son. Lord Euston and John 
Jeffries Pratt went abroad, they soon became bored with Paris 
and set out for Switzerland, with French, 'just sufficient to 
bespeak a dinner or order their post horses and conceive that a 
complete knowledge of the language to carry them through the
country, and so the whole purpose of their expedition will be 
' 2frustrated. * Lord Belgrave made two Continental tours with
1. He had a taste for private theatricals of ambitious order. 
See G.E.Minqav.English Landed Society in the Eighteenth 
Century (Studies in Social History, ed.by H.Perkin,London, 
1963),p.145. For a brief idea of Spencer's library see 
J.B. Hedderwick, The Captain's Clerk,(London,1957),pp.145-6.
2. Bury St. Edmunds and West Suffolk Record Office, The 
Correspondence of the third Duke of Grafton in Mss. 428/805, 
Lord Camden to the Duke of Grafton, 29 July 1783; herein­
after Grafton Mss.
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his tutor, William Gifford, later editor of the Quarterly 
Review,^* Lord Hugh Seymour toured France in 1785^" and 
William Garthshore made the tour, in a less exalted capacity, 
as tutor to the Marquis of Dalkeith. At least two of the Board, 
Pybus and Wallace, were members of Lincoln's Inn and James Adams 
was a member of the Inner Temple, after passing through the 
University.
But this education did not provide a practical or technical 
preparation and was not meant to. For the civilian commission­
ers the Admiralty was an introduction to public office for which 
no special training was necessary. The professional lords 
supplied this and with the exception of Lord Howe, none had such 
education as the public school or university offered. Not that 
the sea lords resembled the seventeenth century 'tarpaulins', 
and if the older seamen at the beginning may have been like 
Admiral Thomas Pye, whose university was a man of war ’that was 
not true of all. The majority were well connected, several were 
aristocrats themselves. At least two of them, Admirals Young
1. See a letter from Gifford to Hoppner, Brit.Mus.,Add.Mss. 
38510,Miscellaneous Papers 15th.Century to 19th Century, 
(D)f.31. 31 Aug. 1786, on meeting John Thomas Townshend 
at the Hague and of the gay international social life 
there.
2. Seymour Papers, CR114A/299.
2. Namier and Brooke, Hist.of Pari..1.145.
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and Seymour, spoke French fluently.^* Seymour had attended
a French school when his father had been English ambassador 
and moved easily in the court circle of Louis X V I . M o s t  seamen 
presumably had sufficient knowledge of that language and of 
Spanish picked up from frequent service overseas.
The average length of service for civilians was about six 
years, though Lord Arden was an exception serving from 1783 to 
1801; sea officers, though serving individually longer periods 
averaged four to five years. This was a period of sufficient 
length to become familiar with the working of the Board, but 
hardly to be of any value in its deliberations. Indeed from 
this point of view Arden was in an unrivalled position by 1801, 
and those permanent civil servants, the secretaries to the Board 
were more important to the efficient functioning of the depart­
ment than the Board members themselves.
Hovy regular was the attendance at the Board? This can best 
be answered by examining the records to see how often certain 
members attended. Gower, though attending fairly regularly 
when in England, spent the summer of 1785 on a cruise around the 
British Isles with Prince William. In 1787 he was at the head of
1. A Memoir of James Trevenen. ed.by C.Lloyd and R.C.Anderson, 
[London, N.R.S., vol.CI,1959),p.69, James Trevenen to his 
mother, 24 Aug.1784.
2. Sir WüuDillon's Narrative of Professional Adventures. 
1790-1839, ed.by M.Lewis,(2 vols.London,N.R.S.,1953-6; 
hereinafter Dillon's Narrative). I.1790-1802(vol.XCIIl),191.
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the Channel fleet preparatory to the Dutch armament. Hood 
spent most of his time at the Board between 1788 and 1793, 
though in the Russian crisis. Drake served for only two months, 
Affleck for three years, but Gardner between 1790 and 1795 was 
in the Spanish armament and in February 1793 went to the West 
Indies, returning in time for the First of June campaign.
Brett, Hopkins, and Arden's signatures recur frequently 
between 1784 and 1786, Apsley's and Pratt's less so. A typical 
year like 1788, taking August and November as average months 
containing ordinary business may serve as an example. Out of 
eleven days when the board met in August, from 1 August to 
1 September, Hood attended seven times, Arden six, Gower five, 
Apsley and Pratt t w i c e . I n  November out of nine business 
days, from 4 November to 29th, Hopkins attended eight times, 
and Hood nine; of the others Gower was present three times and 
Apsley twice, while Arden and Pratt only came once. "
Admittedly much of this business was dull routine, but even 
when there was a possibility of war with Spain in June 1790, 
figures were comparable. The Board met twenty-six times in that 
month; out of this total Hood attended twenty-six times,
Townshend nineteen, Gardner ten, Hopkins thirteen, Belgrave and 
Arden five times, and Pratt not at all.^'
M..2/118 ,pp .386-403.
2. Ibid.. pp.466-480.
3. Ad_.2/120,pp.111-196.
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AS senior naval lord Hood was especially busy at this time. 
He wrote to William Cornwallis that as Gardner was with the 
Grand Fleet, his head and hands were full. He was also put in 
charge of a Baltic squadron of sixteen sail and except for a 
three day inspection of them, 'I was not out of the Admiralty 
Court five hours, from the beginning of May until towards the 
latter end of last month.
Hood was again the most regular attender, thirty-five times 
in all, during the preparations for war with Russia the follow­
ing year. Of the thirty-five days between 28 March and 9 May, 
when important decisions were being made, he was always there. 
Gardner was present thirty-three, Arden thirty-one and Hopkins 
twenty-four times. Of the remainder Townshend and Belgrave were 
present five times. In 1795, June, a typical war year, the sea 
lords again proved their efficiency and sense of responsibility. 
Gambier was present twenty-four times and Stephens, just promoted 
to the Board, also twenty-four times out of a total of twenty-six
The two other civilians, members Pybus and Arden, eighteen and
2
eleven times respectively. * Two years later, though the
1. Cornwallis Wykeham-Martin Mss., pp.363-4, Lord Hood to 
Commodore the Hon.William Cornwallis, 20 Dec.1790., 
Brit.Mus., Add.Mss.35202 (Bridport Papers,vol.XII. 
Private Correspondence, 1755-1800},1.153, 8 Dec.1790, 
Lord Hood to Alexander Hood.
2. M .  2/128, pp . 259-368
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situation had worsened, this record was largely unchanged. In 
December 1797 only a few months after the mutinies, Gambier 
and Young were the most frequent attenders, twenty-four to 
twenty-five times out of a total of twenty-six days. The rest 
attended approximately half the meetings.^' The last Board 
before 1801, meeting in October 1800 shows the same trend. In 
twenty-six days Admirals Young and Man were present at twenty- 
five and twenty-two meetings, Eliot and Stephens at approximately
o
half5 Gambier a quarter and Arden only once.
In the greatest crisis, the naval mutinies, from 10 May to 
10 June, 1797, when the Spithead * breeze* was just blowing 
itself out and the more serious irruption at the More was at its ■ 
height, members of the Board had gone down to the delegates at 
Sheerness, as they had done at Portsmouth. , Gambier and Young 
were present twenty-five out of twenty-eight days, Spencer 
twenty-three, Arden for only thirteen, but he, Spencer and Young 
with Marsden, the second secretary, had been the delegation to 
the mutineers. Stephens was present only fourteen and Pybus 
only ten times, while Seymour came only four times.'
1. Ad.2/134,p p .427-502. Middleton was present only twice and 
Seymour only four times in this month, but both had been 
very frequent in May.
2. Ad.2/140,pp.264-346.
3. Ad^2/133,pp.256-376, : '
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This should not be considered in vacuo; due allowance 
should be made for age and illness. Moreover members of the 
Admiralty Board were frequently members of Governmental commi­
ttees, such as select committees on privilege, and a survey of 
some of the Commons Journals shows that civil lords, and 
especially the older ones, such as Brett or Hopkins, were regular 
committee members. Out of eight Parliamentary Committees 
formed in the Commons between IS May, 1784 and 18 May 1785, on a 
variety of topics, ranging from the state of British fisheries 
to the East India trade, Brett served on all eight, Pratt on 
four, Hopkins and Apsley on three and Arden and Gower on two.^' 
Likewise it was Brett and Hopkins who introduced the Navy 
estimates from 1784-1791. None of the members of later boards 
were as regular as this.
Two things are notable here; in peace the board's work was 
not exacting and provided ample leisure, especially to civil 
lords. Second, the more important politically and socially the 
member the less frequent was his attendance, either because he 
had more to do, or, his place, gained without merit was a sinecure 
requiring only perfunctory performance. Thus Pybus slipped 
away at weekends leaving work unfinished, much to Middleton's
9
annoyance. Earl Camden, outlined the carefree existence of
1. Journals of the House of Commons,XI.4-889 ;'hereinafter 
Commons Journals.
2. P.R.0.30/8/365, f.73-4, Middletonlto Chatham, 17 June, 1794?
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his son and others like him; 'They go to bed about three in the
morning: rise at eleven, breakfast, ride to the park, till it
is time to dress - then dinner, and the evening of course
dedicated to amusement ...... They talk a little of politics
at their clubs ..... but with respect to the real state of the
country they neither know nor care about it.'^'
It was all the easier to follow this pleasant mode of life;
until the reorganisation of the, office in 1805 there was no
specific duty for the individual lords to perform. There were
no votes taken at the Board, the First Lord conveyed the
Cabinet's decisions to them, and while there were discussions
on technical points the civilians contributed little to these.
Three members only were necessary for a quorum or to sign
documents, and the anonymous critic of 1790 who declared the acts
of the Board to be those of the First Lord and the other members
'mere Automatons. placed there for the purpose of tracing the
characters of the names on papers, to give them a formal validity,'
2
Was voicing a general opinion. "
Measured by this standard the professional seamen come out
well and took their duties seriously, but they had often had
cause to curse the sloth of the Admiralty when captains, and
were well aware of the dangers of delay. But these figures,
1* Namier and Brooke, Hist.of Pari.Ill, 324 nte.
by an Old Sailor.
2. Letters to the Right Honourable Earl of Chatham  ^ (London. 
17901^44.
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based on selected months and special incidents, do not tell the 
whole story. St. Vincent who considered his board 'well formed 
and disposed to work hard'^' thought the 'constant hard work at 
the Admiralty when the board performs its duty is quite enough 
and in truth much more than is done by any other public office.'^" 
Marsden remembered long evenings spent at the office with Lord 
Spencer, and Admiral Young dropping in after 11.0.p.m. when 
Marsden remarked that it was 'the only public board whose members
o
were so actively employed at that hour.' Barham assured Pitt
in 1805 that the duty of the sea lords 'will not bear an idle 
lord to be one of them'f*
It was not only the ministry which changed in 1801, the 
membership of the Board altered its political complexion and 
less obviously, its social and professional atmosphere also.
These differences are revealed in several ways. Between 1801- 
1806 Garlies was the only member to become Lord Lieutenant, 
between 1783-1801 there were 4^^men who ultimately filled that
1. Letters of Lord St. Vincent, D.Bonner Smith,ed.,1.380.
St. Vincent to Rear Admiral Sir George Home, 19 Mar.1801.
2. Markham Correspondence. C.R.Markham,ed., p.50, St.Vincent 
to Admiral J. Markham, 16 May, 1806.
3. William Marsden, A Brief Memoir of the Life and Writings 
of the late William Marsden by himself, iLondon,1838; 
hereinafter Marsden's 'Memoirrlo.99 nte.
4. P.R.O. 30/58/6,.f: .56, 24 Apl.1805
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office. The proportion of civilians at the board was reversed 
in favour of the seamen and after 1801 two of the three first 
lords were seamen. An examination of the age of board members 
from 1801 - 1806 not only confirms previous generalisations on 
that point but supports the idea that 1801 was a climacteric 
year. Those sea lords with influential connections were 
younger than those without them. Garlies at thirty-seven and 
Neale at thirty-nine were the youngest seamen, followed by 
Markham at forty.Excluding the First Lords, Patton and Colpoys, 
sixty-five and sixty-two, were the oldest. Neither of these 
men had a Parliamentary seat or any political influence and for 
them the post was the end of their career. For the seamen it 
was still the first and for most the only government appointment 
and like their predecessors they did not generally go into other 
government posts. But it was no longer for all the culmination 
of a career but rather a useful stage on the way to further 
advancement. This was inevitable when distinguished captains 
were appointed as sea lords, as were St. Vincent's three 
'Neptunes.' But it is also true of Gambier, who returned to 
the Board for the second time in 1804 and saw active service 
after 1806, and of Garlies who did not get his flag promotion 
until 1810. It is noticeable that while the average age of 
seamen on first appointment after 1801 remained constant between 
fifty-two'and fifty-three, the age gap between them and the 
civilians had narrowed to five years. The average age of the
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latter has risen, as might be expected since they were drawn 
from less distinguished backgrounds than their predecessors.
The youngest was William Dickinson at twenty-three, Garthshore 
was next at thirty-seven, Adams, Lemon and Nepean between 
forty-five and fifty-three. The average age of the eight 
civilians between 1801-1807 was forty-seven, forty-five exclu­
ding Stephens and Eliot. This was in contrast to the boards of 
1783-1793, when the average age of civilians was twenty-seven 
and from 1793-1801 when it was thirty-seven.
This being so, a greater sense of duty might be assumed in 
members. Stephens, Nepean, Gambier and Barham all had previous 
associations with the Board. St. Vincent, Troubridge, Markham, 
Patton and Colpoys all had long practical experience and out­
numbered the non-professional politicals. Administration of 
government departments thus showed signs of becoming the 
business of professionals, not only of the secretaries and clerks, 
but of the Board itself. Too much can be made of this; in the 
mid-nineteenth century junior lords were accused of being 'paid 
by the country to learn their bureaucratic profession and they 
are all paid retainers to vote for the government right or 
wrong,' "but in the late eighteenth century even the idea of 
them learning their 'bureaucratic profession' would have been 
novel.
1. Captain J.R. Burton, The Past and Present State of the _
Navy. (London, 1850 j,p. 7.
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Over a period of five years, 1801-1806, the average length 
of service for civilians was one year and six months, and for 
seamen one year and ten months. The similarity is less signi­
ficant than it seems. St. Vincent, Troubridge and Markham all 
served three years but the average was reduced by men like 
Garlies and Neale, with the brightest prospects, who only served 
seven months. In any case, these particular comparisons are 
hardly fair since in both cases after 1801 a serious political 
crisis cut short the lives of both boards.
Nevertheless the frequent changes civilian and professional 
between 1801-1806 were not good for the department. The compa­
ratively short periods of service.allowed no time for members 
to get to know each other or the work of the department, at a 
time when work was increasing and efficiency was increasingly 
necessary. Stalwarts like Stephens, with over forty years 
experience, were invaluable though Stephens was old, and in the 
last two years age prevented his regular attendance, especially 
in the winter months.
One thing is especially noticeable. In contrast with 
earlier boards the sea lords did not spend time at sea during 
their terms in office. Was their attendance likely to be more 
regular? This is evident from an examination of the records 
of selected months in certain years. In September, 1801, out 
of a total of twenty-three days, Troubridge and Markham attended 
twenty-three times, Stephens and St. Vincent thirteen, Adams
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twelve, and Garthshore once, though he improved in November
and December, and Eliot not at all. In the following January
of a total of seventeen days, Troubridge and Markham were
present over twelve times, Stephens and Garthshore eight, Adams
and Eliot six.^^ In November 1803 the same tendency was notable;
Garthshore, whose wife had died in August, was present five
2
times, and Eliot only once. * Eliot had in fact wished to 
resign in 1801 and his attendance at and attitude to the new
3
Board was never satisfactory. * He spent much of his time at 
Bath and the whole winter of 1803 at Port E l i o t , a n d  this 
behaviour finally led to his resignation. In the following 
January.when Neale and Lemon had been appointed, the first was 
only present nine times and the latter not at all and this poor 
attendance was typical. *
1. Ad.2/142,p p .144-216,464-491.
2. M i2/146, pp. 223-324.
3. Letters of Lord St. Vincent. D.Bonner Smith,ed.,L368,II. 
228-9., St. Vincent to Hon.W.Eliot, 15,26 Dec.1803.
Eliot to Pitt
4. P.R.O. 30/58/4,f.113,/14 Nov.1803.
5. A d .2/146,p p .216 et seq.
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The seamen were thus the most regular attenders and this 
regularity continued under Lord Melville. Garlies, Colpoys 
and Gambier were most frequently members of the board; in 
December 1804, out of twenty-three days, Colpoys and Patton were 
present for twenty-two and Gambier for twelve, though he had been 
very frequent earlier. Though Dickinson was present for twenty- 
one times neither Nepean nor Melville appeared at all.^* Five 
months later in May 1805, Nepean was present only nine.times
o
when the rest of the board attended regularly.
While former civil lords had been active in the Commons, 
serving on Committees and introducing bills, those serving 
between 1801-1806, were noticeably absent from such activities. 
Eliot presented the naval estimates until his resignation in 
1804 • when Adams took his place. William Dickinson and Nepean 
were the Admiralty spokesmen in the succeeding administrations.^’ 
Occasionally the whole board with the first secretary, were 
summoned to committees of priviledge, as in 1801 or 1803. These
R
meetings were on Monday, Wednesday and Friday afternoons, ’
1. A d .2/148.D P .476-552.
2. Ad.2/149.DP.249-325.
3. Commons Journals. LVII, 11, 4 Nov.1801,440,12 May 1802
4. Ibid.. LX.12, 23 Jan.1805.
5. Ibid.. LVll. 5, 30 Oct. 1801.
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though probably not all attended. On specifically naval topics, 
such as the Seamen's Desertion Bill of 1803 or the Bill to 
regulate the conduct of marines ashore, the committee was made 
up of the Admiralty lords and the first secretary.^* But in 
general their attendance at the routine Commons business was 
irregular compared with that of boards between 1783 and 1801.
One of the reasons was an increase in business; the administr­
ation of a war-time Navy and the whole scale reforms which St. 
Vincent's board undertook, left little time for anything else.
The Committee which inspected the dockyards was composed of St. 
Vincent, Markham, Garthshore and Marsden. In a letter to a 
friend St. Vincent wrote that because of Marsden's, Stephens'
and Adams' absence the visitation was impossible before 20 
August 1802 These arrangements were further upset in
September when St. Vincent asked Adams' help in the inspection 
of Chatham and Sheerness. Garthshore was needed in his 
constituency of Weymouth to influence the election of a mayor, 
but Adams was promised he would not be needed for the examina-
3
tion of the Thames yards. * This confirms that the civilians
1. Ibid., L1X.12, 25 Nov.1803., 48, 12 Dec.1803.
2. Letters of Lord St. Vincent, D.Bonner Smith,ed., 11.191, 
St. Vincent to Hon.George Grey, 6 Aug.1802.
3. Ibid., 11,194, 13 Sep.1802
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were nonentities whose political interests were of supreme 
importance but whose lack of professional skill was unimportant, 
Barham told Pitt that no naval lord could be spared for the 
Committee inquiring into the methods of procuring ships for 
convoy duty as their constant attendance from 9 to 5 at the 
Board was needed to keep pace with the work.^*
It should now be possible to draw some conclusions. Of
2
the twenty-seven "commissioners between 1783 and 1801 only 
seven had no Parliamentary seat and these, with the exception 
of Heywood, were all seamen, Middleton, Man, Young, Gambier, 
Affleck and Drake. Only Middleton and Gambier went further 
with the help of powerful friends. The situation after 1801 
was similar; excluding Eliot and Stephens, of the eleven 
commissioners between 1801-1806 only two, Patton and Colpoys 
had no Parliamentary seat. If we accept that 'interest* was 
necessary at all levels and that Parliamentary interest was
1. The Barham Papers. J.K.Laughton,ed., III.84, Undated.
2. 26 have been mentioned, the 27 was James Modyford Heywood,
who served from December 1783 to April 1784 in a temporary 
capacity. A  Devonshire landowner he was brother in law of 
Lord Howe, (The Later Correspondence.Aspinall. ed.,i.no.l5, 
Pitt to George III, 30 Dec, 1783., Namier and Brooke, Hist. 
of Pari 11.622), M.P. for Fowey 1768-74 and a friend of 
the Marquis of Buckingham who controlled several seats and 
this, together with a connection with Pratt, earned him a 
seat at the Board. Pratt had married a niece of Sir 
Francis Molesworth of Pencarrow with v/hom Heywood was 
connected. He was also a grandson of Governor Heywood of 
Jamaica and Grace Modyford, sister of a previous governor
of that island. F . Cundall, The Governors of Jamaica in the 
Seventeenth Century, (London,1936),p.30., Hist.Mss.Comm., 
Report on the Mss, of the M arquess of Lothian preserved at 
Bllcklinq Hall TLondon.lÇOST.p d .289.293.332. Sir J.B. and 
J. Burke, History of the Extinct and Dormant Baronetcies. 
(2nd.edn.,London,1844),pp.359,490.
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the most potent of all, these men, lacking a seat themselves, 
were able to draw on powerful support or possessed exceptional 
ability, to become commissioners. But apart from Middleton, 
who was too efficient to be ignored none of these men was more 
than a competent seaman, and since to have political interest 
was more important than to have ability, powerful political 
support was the key to success. The appointment of such 
mediocrities, while it did little ^ood to the professional 
standing of the Admiralty, at least did not revive the bitter 
political rivalries so recently apparent in the Keppel Palliser 
affair. It cannot have been easy to chose admirals at once 
sufficiently distinguished to be useful at the Board and free 
from political passions which would imperil its smooth working. 
But since placid temperament and outstanding ability rarely go 
together the choice was even more limited, and always tended to 
fall on the side of peace, if possible with honour. Only five 
seamen of undisputed ability served at the Board during these 
years, Howe, Hood, Middleton,- St, Vincent and Troubridge, and 
none were without their enemies or particularly easy to work 
with.
We must leave the first lords out of any further calcula­
tions at this point, as when they took office, all were members 
of the House of Lords. But of the remaining seventeen 
commissioners before 1801, who were M.P's, fourteen had seats 
before appointment to the Board. For two, Apsley and Gardner,
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the seat and the appointment came together, and for only one, 
Gower did the appointment come first. With the letter's 
political connections a seat could always be found and Pitt, 
whose ministry was not expected to survive the Christmas season, 
must have thought it necessary to placate the 'Bloomsbury gang,' 
to which Gower belonged, by a seat at the Board.
Because acceptance of office meant members of Parliament 
must seek re-election, junior ministers or office holders, more 
often sat for close boroughs, which were more likely to elect 
them, than for popular boroughs with a wide franchise or for the
I
county seats. * Without exception the Admiralty lords who were 
M.P's conformed to this description. The Government's numerical 
influence was weak, but in fact many seats nominally owned by 
private patrons were sold to or placed at the disposal of the 
Government by individuals holding offices or pensions. Before
pcitpons op fcne
1801 five of the^boroughs which returned the commissioners, 
were supporters of Pitt, another six were acknowledged Tories 
and several independents, prepared to accommodate the Government. 
Six of them^were family seats, like Apsleysat Cirencester, or 
Belgravesat Chester, and after 1801 this was still true though 
the number of such seats had dropped to two, Neales at Lymington 
and Garlies\ Their permanence in government was thereby assured 
and this enhanced their value in administration, not simply for 
the sake of permanence but for the consistent power of the vote
1. Betty Kemp. King and Commons. 1660-1832» (London,1957),p.62
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they possessed. Of the eleven commissioners between 1801 and 
1806, seven had a seat before appointment, for Troubridge and 
Markham the appointment came first and a seat was then found 
from those in the Government interest. Thus Troubridge was 
elected for Great Yarmouth and Markham for Portsmouth, Lord 
Hugh Seymour's old seat.
Whenever possible commissioners were elected for Admiralty 
boroughs; the naval centres or dockyard towns where the Board 
was one of the chief employers and where Admiralty contracts 
were valuable. Such places were Plymouth, Portsmouth, Rochester, 
Sandwich and Queenborough, though even here because of large 
electorates, no seat was safe and Admiralty control, never 
stringent, depended on personal contact. In 1784 they contr­
olled seven seats compared with thirteen in 1754, and in Sand- 
which, ' a borough of contests,* it was only the patient work 
of Philip Stephens, in the face of strong private interests, 
which increased the Board's control from one to two seats.
The Admiralty Board over which the First Lord presided was 
a heterogeneous body, which did not necessarily hold his 
political or professional opinions. William Eliot, one of 
Lord Spencer's board who reluctantly remained under St. Vincent, 
considered Addington's ministry a national misfortune and 
offered to support Pitt whenever he returned to power."' Evan
1. Namier and Brooke, Hist, of Pari.. I. 54-56.
2. P.R.O.30/58/4,f.113, 14 Nov.1803.
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Nepean, the Board's secretary, found it increasingly difficult 
to work with the new Board, despite his friendship with St. 
Vincent, and resigned in 1804 to become chief secretary of 
Ireland^'and Canning declared that the bill to investigate 
naval abuses was the product of the Admiralty against the
n
opinion of 'all the old admiralty people.'
In such cases when the subordinate and the First Lord could 
not agree, the former always resigned. In 1795 Admiral Sir 
Samuel Hood, senior naval lord and commander in chief in the 
Mediterranean, was recalled and no longer employed, because of 
disagreements over the conduct of the war in that sphere.
In the same year Sir Charles Middleton resigned through diss­
atisfaction with the First Lord's methods of work. Middleton's 
relations with Spencer were never as smooth as they had been 
with Chatham.^' The board to which Spencer came was the one 
left by Chatham. All his professional lords had several years 
experience and were older than he, and the majority of the
1. M arsden',8 Memoir, pp. 103,108.
2. P.R.O.30/58/4, f.87.Canning to Pitt, 18 Dec, 1802.
3. The Naval Miscellany.1. J.K. Laughton, ed., 243-247., 
Seymour Papers. CR114A/325/10, 30 Apl,no.ll, 2 May 1795, 
Spencer to Seymour.
4. P.R.O. 30/8/364, i.f.36, Chatham to Middleton, 18 Nov,1795.
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members had been appointed when Chatham was in office. It was 
an awkward situation, more especially as, by the nature of the 
appointment, Spencer had been called to rectify the mistakes 
of a board whose membership remained the same, for the first 
three months. Then the replacement of his two senior naval 
advisors. Hood and Middleton, by junior admirals was a serious 
loss to the Board and had Cabinet repercussions. Middleton 
had wanted to resign in 1794. Persuaded that the office would 
be organised as he wished, the 'loose and irregular manner in 
which business was executed,* where everything was left * to the 
memory and discretion of clerks,* disgusted him. He was told 
that his opposition to several schemes sprang from annoyance at 
not having thought of them himself. Lord Spencer talked of 
confidential discussions but Middleton found the real business 
was settled before the board met by * an interior cabinet of 
admiralty,* and that except for half an hour or less a week, he 
rarely spoke to the First Lord alone. *The business to be 
done came generally to me in the shape of letters and notes, 
without any other explanations, as though I had been the mere 
secretary of the office, instead of that confidential communi­
cation which might have been supposed to exist between a First 
Lord new to the duty and an old professional member of the 
board ....... '^ ' The difference in age was only one reason, but
1 .The Barham Papers. Sir J.K.Laughton, ed., 11,428, . 
Middleton to Dundas, 9 Nov, 1795.
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a powerful one. Spencer was thirty years younger than 
Middleton, an aristocrat, disinclined to listen to the didactic 
phrases of self made men. He preferred to consult Lord Hugh 
Seymour, whose family was as splendid as Spencer's own and as 
politically important.
During the 1797 mutinies there was a difference of opinion 
with Lord Arden who had accompanied Spencer to Portsmouth as 
one of the committee of conciliation a month previously. Arden, 
who had then served longer than anyone else at the Board, may 
have pressed his advice for speed in passing the Seamen's Bill, 
too hard. On 10 May he offered his resignation to Pitt, giving 
as reason his difference of opinion with Spencer.^" But on that 
day Lord Howe set out to reconcile the mutineers and Arden's 
resignation was not accepted. Despite an earlier friendship 
Lord Hugh Seymour also resigned in 1797 over a naval matter.
His opinion on a professional question, now unknown, received
2scant attention and he deemed it necessary to withdraw. *
Though Lord Howe may not have been an active participant in 
Cabinet affairs, his attendance at the Admiralty was regular,
3
hardly missing a day. ’ Neither St. Vincent nor Barham equalled
1. P.R.O.30/58/2,Bundle 2,ff.9,10. Arden to Pitt, 9 10 May,1797 
J.S.Corbett,ed., The Spencer Papers.II.126-7. Arden to 
Spencer, 10 May 1797.
2. Seymour Papers. CR114A/321, Seymour to Spencer, 7 Nov,1797.
3. Ad.2/116. June,1784-April,1786.
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him. The former attended thirteen times out of twenty-three 
in September 1801, only once in the following January.^" In 
November, 1803, he attended fifteen out of twenty-six days and 
in the following January eight out of twenty-eight days.^"
True, for much of that time he was occupied in reforms and from 
August to October 1802 in the visitation of the dockyards, but 
from 1803 onwards there were increasing pleas to be allowed to 
resign because of ill health * and more frequent excuses for 
Cabinet and Parliamentary absence.^" Barham's signature was 
even less frequent in May 1805, he only signed twice. * Yet 
the Board's work did not suffer unduly from their absence nor 
did they neglect their duties. Despatches followed St.Vincent 
regularly to Essex and though Barham sat apart to conserve his 
strength and only worked in the mornings he was fully in control.^
1. Ad.2/142 pp.144-216,464-491.
2. Ad.2/146 pp.223-324,431-548. , •
3. Letters of Lord St.Vincent.D.Bonner Smith,ed.,11.209,
30 Mar,1803., 212, 19 May,1803. St. Vincent to Addington.
4. Ibid..212. 16 May,1803, St.Vincent to Addington.,213,23 May 
1803,St.Vincent to Lord Hawkesbury.
5. Ad.2/149.pp.250-et seq.
6. P.R.0.30/58/6,fb.63; 2 May,1805, Barham to Pitt. 
His day was;-11.0.am attend the reading of letters, 1.0.pm. 
work with his private secretary, 2.0.pm. exercise, 4,0.pm.
at Admiral Gambler's for the rest of the day.
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Melville's attendance was irregular but the composition of the 
Board remained virtually the same under his successor, so that 
the work of the office v^ /as undisturbed. Nevertheless the 
impetus of a board headed by elderly invalids and, with the 
exception of Barham, unversed in departmental administration, 
could not be very vigorous.
The two remaining civilians before 1801, Chatham and 
Spencer, thirty years younger than their successors, served 
longer than them and their attendance was more frequent. One 
thing is notable, even surprising in view of his reputation - 
the high attendance rate achieved by Lord Chatham. In August 
1788, out of eleven days he was present eleven times, in 
November out of nine days he attended six.^* In June, 1790, he 
was present for twenty-one out of twenty-six meetings. * His 
successor. First Lord at one of the most difficult periods of 
the war, was as regular. In June 1795 Spencer was present
3
twenty-two out of twenty-six meetings. ' In December 1797, just 
after the mutinies, he was present ten out of twenty-six times
1. Ad.2/118.DP.386-403.466-480.
2. Ad.2/120.pp.111-196.
3. A d .2/128.pp.259-368.
4. Ad.2/134.pp.427-502.
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and in October 1800 towards the end of his period in office he 
shewed the same regularity.^*
All Admiralty decisions were the ultimate responsibility 
of the First Lord; a heavy one when it is remembered that until 
Barham's reorganisation of the office in 1805 the naval lords 
had no special duties, sometimes were on active service abroad, 
and that the civilians were primarily concerned with politics.
The First Lord controlled all naval patronage and salaried 
appointments, and his influence was thus enormous within the 
service. Outside it was also of great importance to the 
Government in the control of seaport boroughs, and the inter­
relation of votes and office. The patronage annexed to the 
office was of considerable importance to politicians. * Admiralty 
appointments were one way of rewarding government supporters; 
in 1792 Admiral Sir Richard King urged the satisfaction of the 
claims of two men at Chatham yard as a reward to the freemen of 
Rochester for support at the last election. ’ Howe wished to 
know the result of the Portsmouth election of 1784 to find 'the 
extent of the obligations we may be under to our different 
friends.*^* In 1805 Pitt asked that if Barham, then First Lord,
1. A d .2/140,p p .264-346.
2. Court and Cabinets. Buckingham, ed., I. 369, Grenville to 
Buckingham., 1 Apl.1788.
3. Ad.1/472,King to Stephens, 24 Dec.1792.
4. Cornwallis Wvkeham-Martin Mss., p.339, Viscount Howe to 
Capt. the Hon. William Cornwallis, 31 Mar.1784.
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gave a ship to Captain Codrington he might gain the credit
with Codrington*s brother, the M.P. for Tewkesbury, who had
not recently attended the Commons because of the inattention
his brother had received.^*
No First Lord could afford to neglect this duty, but it
was one which especially appealed to politicians like Spencer
or vain cyphers like Chatham, who used it to create an illusion
bf importance, and responsibility. Some examples of the extent
of the First Lord's patronage will illustrate this.
His good offices could supply good ships, stores, equipment, 
2and even crews. * Spencer, for example, arranged for young 
Byam Martin to command the new frigate, Tamar, partly because 
he liked him and partly because his father was Comptroller of
3
the Navy. * But this patronage could sometimes be wrongly used, 
and while willing to oblige their friends, First Lords, being 
human, were also ready to hamper those they disliked. When Lord 
Howe was appointed in 1793 to command the Channel fleet he had 
most of the men entered for his flagship, the Queen Charlotte. 
taken by Admiral Hood, for the Mediterranean squadron, which 
also had the better ships. Likewise 64*s and inferior ships
1.ThRBarham Papers.Sir.J.K.Laughton.ed.. III.83-84., 8 May,1805.
2. Dillon's Narrative. M.Lewis,ed., 1.66.
3. Letters of Sir^Bvam Martin. R.V.Hamilton,ed., I. 270-271.
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went to Howe and this seriously delayed the Channel fleet. The 
injury was further illustrated by Captain Barlow, appointed by 
Howe to the repeating frigate, being given the Pegasus. 'the 
worst sailing ship when he ought to have had, as repeater of 
signals, one of the fastest.'^*
On the other hand favoured commanders were sometimes allowed 
a choice of vessel. In 1790 Chatham asked Cuthbert Collingwood, 
then a junior captain, whether he would prefer command of a 
frigate or a 64. In 1793 a similar situation led to a canvass 
among his friends, among them Mr. Brandling, M.P. for Newcastle. 
Collingwood disapproved of Brandling's letter to Chatham which 
urged no stronger claim than that Collingwood had a vote for a 
Parliament man. * Though he might dislike such obvious methods 
it was a strong recommendation; he himself write to Sir Edward 
Blackett in 1793 that there v/as 'scarce a ship in the Navy that 
had not an instance that political interest is better argument 
for promotion than any skill.*
1. Memoir of the Life of Admiral Sir Edward Codrington. Lady 
Bourchier,ed."J \2 vols.London,1673) ,i.l4.
2. The Private Correspondence of Admiral Lord Collingwood,
E. Hughes, ed., [London N.R.S.,vol.XCVIII ,1957,;.. \  
hereinafter Collingwood Correspondence)^p.2A
3. Ibid.. pp.33-4, Same to Same, 17 Feb.1793.
4. Ibid.. p.35-7, 22 July, 1793.
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Chatham paid particular attention to arrangements which
enabled him to employ aristocrats or their proteges.^'Middleton
urged the appointment of sound officers against Chatham's easy
promotion of politically importunate aristocrats, though without 
2
much success. "
Spencer too was inundated with similar requests with which 
he dealt courteously. A  Captain Thompson wrote repeatedly for 
employment between May, 1795 and August, 1796 to which Spencer 
replied in polite terms, recommending him to have 'patience a 
little while longer.'^* All this was in the greatest contrast
R
to Howe's coldness or St. Vincent's brutal frankness. * (Bhoug# 
According to St. Vincent Spencer's numerous family connections
1# Hist.Mss.Comm., Eleventh Report.Appendix.Part V . The M ss.
of the Earl of Dartmouth .. (London.1887; hereinafter 
Dartmouth M ss.J.. 425, 4 Oct.1788, 22 Nov.1790, Chatham to 
the Earl of Dartmouth., Cornwallis Wvkeham-Martin Mss., 
pp.362-3, Chatham to Commodore the Hon.W.Cornwallis, 19 Dec 
1790., Gloucester County Record Office, The Ducie.Moreton 
and Reynolds Papers. 1 bundle, D340a/C32, nos.35,38,
31 July, 9 Dec.1790, Chatham to Lord Ducie.
2. P.R.O. 30/8/365, ff.42-3, Middleton to Chatham, 31 May 
1793?
3. Brit.Mus..Add.Mss.,46119 (Correspondence of Sir.T.Thompson, 
1st.Bart.}, ff.29-55; hereinafter Add.Mss.46119.
4. Ibid.. f.41, 19 April 1796.
5. Letters of Lord St. Vincent. D. Bonner Smith, ed., 1.326, 
St. Vincent to Rear Admiral Dacres, 3 May, 1801.
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helped to fill up flag vacancies,^* When St. Vincent had been 
commander in chief in the Mediterranean he had expressed the 
same opinion more forcibly to Nepean. He had then accused 
Spencer of grasping at patronage 'which is the only stimulus to 
great actions,in a manner, that Sandwich would have been ashamed 
of.* * This was a typical exaggeration, but his argument that 
patronage had always been badly managed by the Admiralty, echoed 
Middleton's opinion.^*
But when St. Vincent became First Lord he changed his 
opinion. In a letter to Lord Keith, then commander in chief in 
the Mediterranean, he apologised for the necessity of trespass­
ing on a commander's patronage.^* His letters show the 
difficulties of a 'just disposition of patronage' which would 
provide for meritorious but neglected officers as well as young 
aristocrats. By attempting a more even distribution of places 
St. Vincent raised great opposition amongst the aristocracy who 
thought their birth entitled them 'to promotion in prejudice to
1. Ibid.. 329, St.Vincent to Vice Admiral Bazeley, IS Feb., 
330 to Vice Admiral Dod, 22 Feb., 331 to Sir John Carter, 
17 Feb.1801.
2. Jervis Papers. JER/21, 3 Aug, see also 21 May 1797.
3. The Spencer Papers. J.S.Corbett,ed., I.10.
4. Letters of Lord St.Vincent. D.Bonner Smith,ed., 1.333,
21 Feb.1801.
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men of better services and superior m e r i t . I t  also made him
unpopular with borough and dockyard interests; an unpopularity
which was soon increased by his attacks on the abuses in the
civil branches.
When Lord Barham became first Lord he experienced the s^me
difficulties. His remarks are worth quoting in full as they
are the sentiments of First Lords at this period.
*With regard to patronage, the service has been too 
extensive to make it any longer an object; and I declare 
to you that since my coming to this board. I have made 
but one master and commander and when I read over the 
claims before me - from admirals and captains for their 
children, from the king's ministers, members of Parliament, 
peers, and eminent divines - I do not see when I am to make 
another. Under these circumstances it is impossible that 
any person in my situation should give satisfaction. If I 
steer clear of injustice I shall think myself fortunate.
To conclude, in all matters of patronage, I execute it as 
I would any other duty belonging to this office, I hope
with impartiality.'2.
Though the First Lord controlled the greater share of 
Admiralty patronage there were 'Admiralty vacancies' 'and the 
collective patronage of the Board was supervised by one of the 
commissioners,^' and was jealously guarded by them. On appoint­
ment to the Newfoundland command Admiral Sir Richard King was
1. Ibid.,338, 28 Mar.1801, St. Vincent to Sir Charles Grey.
2. G.Cornwallis West, The Life and Letters of Admiral Cornwallis, 
(London, 1927), p.494.
3. JER/22, 11 Jan., 20 June, 1798, St. Vincent to Nepean.,
A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of 
Lord Collinqwood. ed. by G.L.Newnham CollingwoodJ (2 vols. 
London, 1837), i .221-222,Barham to Collingwood, 8 Nov.1805.
4. The Spencer Papers. J.S. Corbett, ed., I. 10, Middleton to 
Spencer, 19 Dec.1794.
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allowed to choose his Captain and a lieutenant, not the first, 
but the remainder of the patronage the Admiralty kept for 
themselves.^' Individual commissioners, usually the profess­
ional lords, recommended their friends or proteges to commanding
o
officers or used their influence to obtain appointments.
Likewise the civil lords used their influence though it was 
more intermittent and aimed at satisfying specific requests which 
were often quite simple. Thus Mr. Pybus recommended a lieut­
enant to command the Dover cutter. Flora, to Lord Hugh Seymour,
3
when a vacancy occurred. *
There were six secretaries to the Board between 1783 and 
1806. Until 1804 Philip Stephens and Evan Nepean were the 
respective First Secretaries and Henry Ibbetson and William 
Marsden their assistants. After 1804 Marsden became First 
Secretary with Benjamin Tucker and John Barrow as his deputy.
If it is true that the status and authority of the office 
depended on the men who filled it, the secretaryship to the 
Admiralty was moulded by these men and received the stamp of
1. Memorials, personal and historical of Admiral Lord Gambier, 
Georgians, Lady Chatterton, éd., ii.4-5, Admiral Nelson to 
Admiral Gambier, 2 Oct.1805.
2. Add.Mss.46119,ff.54-5,T.Thompson to Admiral Young, 16 Sept. 
Ï796, f.58. Admiral Seymour to Thompson, 21 Oct.1796., 
Seymour Papers. CR114A/348, Captain Pakenham to Seymour, 
July, 1796.
3. Ibid. CR114A/309, 1 Jan.1795.
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their virtues and limitations.
Because his was a political appointment which was often 
temporary the head of a department depended on his permanent 
staff of secretaries and clerks who thereby assumed greater 
importance. He could not always familiarise himself with the 
department since his term in office was limited and further 
curtailed by lengthy periods spent in consultation with other 
Ministers. Moreover, just because it was a political appoint­
ment the man chosen would frequently be someone ignorant of the 
department's work who would need to reply on what his staff told 
him. In this case not only the official head, the First Lord, 
but the six other commissioners were continually changing for 
political and professional reasons so that the position of the 
secretaries was even more important.
Like many others in the naval service, Stephens was 'a son 
of the rectory,' in this case at Alphamstone, Essex. Both his 
elder brothers were in the Navy; the younger a captain, the 
elder a Victualling Commissioner who brought Philip into his 
office as a clerk, whence he rose to be assistant secretary.
But it was when Lord Anson 'took him by the hand', that 
Stephen's career began. Anson made him his personal secretary 
and from there it was a short step to assistant secretary at 
the Board in 1761. He had already found a seat at Liskeard at 
Anson's request of Edward Eliot, (See abovep.4%nd by 1763 was 
First Secretary, a post he was told to hold for thirty-two years.
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Five years later he was established in the Government borough
of Sandwich which he represented for the rest of his career.
In 1795 he was created a baronet and promoted to membership of
the Board he had served so long, finally retiring in 1806 when
he was over 80, with a handsome pension of £1500 p.a.^"
His successor's beginnings were equally humble though his
later career was more spectacular. A Cornishman, like many of
his kind he took to the sea, entering the Navy, possibly because
two cousins were already in the service. He was a clerk first
and then purser to various ships on the American station from
1776 to 1780. Though there is no indication of a family naval
connection, some powerful interest must have been at work, since
from now on his career took a sensational turn.
In 1782 after a brief speU as Admiral Lord Shuldhara's
secretary, Nepean became under secretary of state for home affairs,
in Lord Shelburne's ministry. His early appointments have been
credited to St. Vincent's patronage and in 1800 the Earl thought
him the best secretary 'since the days of old Pepys of Immortal 
2
memory.' * Jervis was a friend of Shelburne and the circumstan­
ces suggest Whiggish sympathies, but if so they were not very 
strong since the change of government did not affect Nepean's
steady rise. Perhaps by this time he had been noted as a useful
1. Burke, Extinct and Dormant Baronetcies, p.506.
2. Jervis Papers, JER/24, . . St. Vincent to Nepean
22 June, 1800.
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man whom it would be foolish to dismiss, probably he was too 
devoted a civil servant to be a strong party man. He was M.P. 
for a Government borough, Queenborough, from 1796 to 1802, and 
for Bridport from 1802 to 1812.^" In 1794 he became the under 
secretary for war, to succeed Stephens a year later at the 
Admiralty where he served for nine years. Like his predecess­
or he was created a baronet in 1802, and after a brief spell as 
secretary of state for Ireland returned to the Board in 1804 as 
one of the Commissioners. If there is any truth that St.Vincent 
was responsible for his professional beginnings this debt was 
paid since it is probable that Nepean helped to select St.Vincent 
for the Mediterranean command. The success of the Trafalgar 
campaign was a fitting conclusion to his work and he retired 
from the Board in 1806.
Beyond the brief record of his service nothing is known 
about Henry Ibbetson but William Marsden is a more notable 
figure. His family was Anglo-Irish, of Derbyshire origin but 
settled in Dublin since the reign of Queen Anne. Here his 
father's business interests as shipper and merchant had flouri­
shed. A promoter and director of the Bank of Ireland he formed 
part of the commercial class to whose interests Pitt was highly 
sensitive. Marsden's career showed great business acumen,
Q
besides 'strong sense, truthfulness and caution.' * Through
1. Judd, op.cit.. p.287.
2. D.N.B.XXXVl. 206-7.
105
the offices of an elder brother he joined the East India Company 
at Bencoolen, Sumatra became assistant and then principal 
secretary to the governor and on leaving the island invested 
his savings in his own business, an East India Agency in Gower 
Street, in 1785* Ten years later he became second secretary 
to the Admiralty, assuming Nepean's place in 1804 for two years.
Marsden had wide cultural interests and was a famous orient­
alist and numismatist.^* Among other things a member of the 
Royal Society, the Royal Irish Academy and a fellow of the 
Society of Antiquaries, he was one of those men who not only 
administer empires, but as scholars and academicians, enrich them. 
This wider circle of acquaintance helped and made him a congenial 
subordinate to Earl Spencer, under whom he was first appointed, 
but his business training and ability also qualified him for the 
post •
The careers of Nepean and Tucker are very similar and the
former helped the younger man in his profession. Both were
2
Cornishmen of a middle class background. * Tucker's father had 
been a warrant officer in the Navy and a brother was a foreman 
of the shipwrights at Plymouth so that the sea was an accepted
1. He presented his collection of Oriental coins to the
British Museum in 1834 and his books and mss. to King's
College.
2. In the Stowe Mss, there is a note of Nicholas Nepean's
admission as burgess of Saltash, signed 1774, Brit.Mus.,
■' Stowe Mss, 813,f.48b.
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Career for the family. From 1792 to 1798 Tucker was purser 
to various ships in the Channel and Mediterranean fleets and 
at one time secretary to Lord Shuldham, He became St.Vincent's 
secretary and protege and when the Earl became First Lord, was 
appointed first, clerk of the cheque at Plymouth yard, then a 
naval commissioner and finally second secretary to the Admiralty 
in 1804, He was a warm supporter of his patron's reforms and 
his practical knowledge of the yards made him invaluable, though 
unpopular with St. Vincent's enemies, during these y e a r s . / 
Though he left the office with St. Vincent he was appointed 
Surveyor General of the Duchy of Cornwall in 1808 and retired 
with a comfortable income to an estate near Saltash.
John Barrow's origins were equally humble, but by his own 
merits he rose to the position of second secretary in 1804. He 
was especially interested in science and mathematics, but had 
no further formal education and at fourteen became timekeeper in 
a Liverpool iron foundry. A trip in a Greenland whaler which 
introduced him to sea life, and a job as mathematics instructor 
in a Greenwich school, broadened his outlook and led to an 
introduction to Lord Macartney then on the point of his embassy 
to China. Barrow became comptroller of his household and, some 
years later, his private secretary when Macartney was governor 
of the Cape of Good Hope. His services here in mapping out
1. D.N.B.LV11.279.
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unknown territory and partially reconciling Boers and Kaffirs, 
earned him the auditor-generalship of accounts. Barrow would 
have settled down in South Africa but the peace of 1802 meant 
the evacuation of the Cape by Britain and he returned home.
He had become a friend of General Dundas while in Africa and 
through this connection was now introduced to Lord Melville.
When the latter became First Lord in 1804 he appointed Barrow 
second secretary, a post which he held for the next forty years, 
and which he had gained through his ability and hard work.^'
It was a good choice and confirmed a career which could serve 
as a model for Samuel Smiles' precepts, and which was typical 
of the new century.
The secretaryship of the Admiralty was an important office. 
An act of 57Geo.III, fixed it next to the Secretaries of the 
Treasury and above the under secretaries of state. The first 
secretaryship was then in the patronage of the Treasury, the 
second, created in 1784 a separate office, under Admiralty 
control • though the former often chose his assistant, informing
3
the head of the department in case he had any objections. *
1. D.N.B. . .III. 305-307.
2. Marsden's Memoir.p.107.
3. English Historical Documents. X I .1783-1832. A.Aspina11 and 
E.Anthony Smith, eds., (London,1959), 245. Lord Liverpool
to F .J.Robinson, 9 Mar.1811.
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Ibbetson may have been Stephens' choice, but Marsden v;as Lord
Spencer's as Tucker was St. Vincent's. The latter Marsden
accepted reluctantly but had put himself in a position where he
could not refuse.^" When Lord Melville became First Lord he
consulted Marsden on the choice of the second secretary, but
made it clear that John Barrow was his preference to which
2Marsden acquiesced. *
The first secretary was not a modern civil servant but an 
eighteenth century politician. Both Stephens and Nepean were 
M.P's before they were appointed to the post, both represented 
Government boroughs, or those in the Government interest, though 
there is no record of Stephens having spoken in any of the forty 
six Parliaments in which he sat, while supporting each admin­
istration.^'
But that the secretaries were becoming modern civil servants 
and permanent heads of government departments is partially 
confirmed by Stephens' career^" and by the third report on the 
Admiralty, issued in 1788 by the Commission appointed to enquire 
into the taking of fees and perquisites in Public Offices, which 
noted with approval that the secretaries were 'stationary officers.''
1 • Marsden's Memoir,pJLO7,
2# Ibid.. p.110,
3. Namier and Brooke, Hist, of Pari.,111.475. ,
4. Ibid..1121. :
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The divorce between politics and permanent office v/as 
incomplete. Marsden was not an M.P. and found it easier to 
keep aloof from party politics and carry on the business 'with 
the entire confidence of successive administrations....'^' He 
was not desired to resign on the change of ministry in 1804, 
when political passions over the Admiralty were running high.
But the resignation of Nepean, and the removal of Tucker in 
1805, once his patron fell from power, were proofs that political 
bias was present. The change which affected the Admiralty 
between 1801 and 1804 was thus reflected in the secretaryship. 
Nepean resigned because he found it increasingly difficult to
work with the new Board, though its head was an old friend.
2 3He was roughly treated by Markham. * and soon resigned
4
Marsden nearly following his example. * The new reforming 
attitude and different political opinions of the Board were 
uncongenial to both men and were reflected in the appointment of 
Tucker, a man who aroused as strong feelings as his master. In 
the growing political animosity of those years it was inevitable 
that, the secretaryships should become a means to triumph over 
political opponents.
1* Marsden's Memoir, p.87,
2. Dropmore M s s ..VII.137. Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville, 
20 Jan.1803.
3. Ibid., 206.T.Grenville to Lord Grenville, 12 Jan.1804.
4. Marsden's Memoir, pp.103-105.
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Though some interest was necessary to gain entry to the 
service it was such as could be commanded by reasonably prosper­
ous middle class families to which these men belonged, and later 
appointment to the Board was the reward for past services. None 
of these men owed their position to their families but in the 
first instance to the notice of some great man and then to their 
own efforts. Such conclusions are confirmed by examining their 
ages on appointment. When chosen as First Secretary Stephens 
was forty, Nepean forty-four and Marsden fifty, though when 
second secretary he was forty-one. Presumably Ibbetson was the 
same age as he served thirty-one-and-a-half years, Tucker was 
forty-two, and Barrow was forty. This is just what v-jq should 
expect from men who have been given a good start by their 
families or been fortunate enough to attract the attention of 
a patron, but must then make their own way. It takes time to 
build up a reputation for industry and reliability and gain 
experience and, an important point in the days when Government 
service was stil^ regarded as a privilege, to build up some 
private means.
The families of these men were in a fortunate position and 
achieved respectable positions for themselves. One of Stephens' 
nephews, Philip, after a quick rise to captain, and constant 
employment in the Navy, became vice admiral of the Blue; another, 
Stephens Howe, was aide-de-camp to the King, lieutenant colonel 
of the sixty third regiment and M.P. for Yarmouth but died in
Ill
1796, in Jamaica. Stephens* illegitimate son was killed in a 
duel. A daughter, who died in childbirth at the Admiralty in 
1805, had the year before married Thomas Jones, sixth Viscount 
Ranelagh, on whom Stephens* estates ultimately devolved.^*
Nepean's two brothers were in the Army ; Thomas the elder, 
in the Royal Engineers, Nicholas the younger, a lieutenant 
colonel. Nepean's sons married the daughters of naval officers
9
and his nephews entered the Navy and did well. * There is a 
monument in Bath Abbey to Thomas Nepean, commemorating his 
fifty years service, 'highly cultivated talents and uncorrupted 
integrity.' Marsden's brother Alexander was appointed under 
secretary to the Chief secretary to the Lord lieutenant of Ireland 
in 1801.
Their patronage and influence extended to friends and made 
them consequential. A constant stream of petitions for employ­
ment, promotion or support came to them in friendly or deferential 
terms.
1 .
2.
3 .
G.E.G.Complete Peerage. X.736., Complete Baronetage. V.294., 
J.Marshall, Royal Naval Biography, ii.576. For a full account 
of the family see Baronetage,Betham.IV.264-270.
J. Burke, Peerage and Baronetage of the British Empire.
(London,1828),p.444., Baronetage Betham, V .494. W .0'Byrne, 
op.cit .. ii.808.
Ad_. 1/492,f. 130,Admiral R.Hughes to Stephens, 20 Sept.1790., 
sJER/22, St .Vincent to Nepean, 9 June,1798., A d . 1/166 .Admiral
E.Hughes to Stephens, 22 Dec.1783.
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In return for such support^*or in anticipation of it, favours 
were given by commanding officers. Admirals had opportunities 
of patronage which could be used in this way. Sir Richard 
Hughes informed Stephens of the appointment of 'your young friend 
Mr. Sayer,' "as lieutenant and commander of one of the schooners 
which the Board had allowed him to buy and to which he might 
appoint lieutenants. It was quite new, and 'if Master Sayer 
keeps anything of a lookout he will pick up sufficient prize 
money to make a purchase in the neighbourhood of your borough.'
At this time there was no civil service examination and no set 
qualifications or requirements, even for such an important office 
as secretaryship, and none who held it had a public school or 
university education. William Marsden after a classical training 
in Dublin, was preparing to enter Trinity College when his brother 
intervened, but Marsden came from a wealthier and probably more 
cultured background than the others and was a scholar all his 
life. He Vvfas an authority on oriental languages and coins.
Some of his books, such as the Travels of Marco Polo, the 
Dictionary of the Malay Language, and a History of Sumatra, which
1. Add.Mss. 46119,f .59., Thompson to Nepean, 26 May,1795.
2. Ad.1/492. f.130, 20 Sep.1790.
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went into three editions and was translated into French and
German, became standard works and were produced while he was
at the Admiralty,^"
Sir John Barrow, was an equally industrious author, mainly
on eastern and arctic travel or naval affairs; his life of Lord
Howe is still an authority. Barrow was educated at Ulverston
Grammar School, but left at fourteen and thereafter was largely 
o
self taught.
Though these men were exceptional, the remaining secreta­
ries were 'educated* men in the best sense. Stephens, though
only receiving an elementary education in the free school at
Harwich ’ and entering the Navy in his early teens, became an
F.R.S. and F.S.A. in later life. Tucker had a good education^* 
though no details are known, and both he and Nepean, 
had attended an elementary and possibly a local grammar school,
4
within the financial limits of their families. Nepean seems to 
have been unfamiliar with French * though Marsden, who had toured
1. D.N.B. XXXVI.207.
2. D.N.B. III.307.
3. D.N.B.54, p .LIV.179., Victoria History of the C ounty of Essex  ^
W.Page and J.H.Round, eds., TLondon 1907 hereinafter 
Victoria County Hist.)ii.556.. Namier and Brooke, Hist of 
Pari. III.475.
4. D.N.B.LVII.279.
5. C.R.Fay, Huskisson and his A g e. (London,1951), p.66.
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France several times, spoke it fluently.^*
A conventionaleducation was not as important however as hard 
work, lucid exposition of orders, a clear hand, though Stephens 
fell sadly short in this respect, and the ability to keep the 
office working well. None of the secretaries found the lack 
a barrier to social or professional advancement. The education­
al attainments of the remainder of the office w r e  presumably 
adequate. The chief clerks were Sir Harry Parker and Mr.Charles 
Wright, both trained in the office for over thirty years. The 
former, eldest son of Admiral Sir Hyde Parker the elder, 
probably attended the ancient grammar school of Bury St.Edmunds * 
which regularly sent scholars to Cambridge and provided an 
excellent education which included French, Spanish and Italian.
In addition there were a number of legal officials connected 
with the Admiralty such as the Judge of the Admiralty Court, the 
Solicitor of the Admiralty and the Receiver General and Comp­
troller of Rights and Perquisites. The current holder of the 
laiier office in 1784 was Claude Champion de Crespigny and of the ojfice. 
Comptroller, James Dyson. Between them they received and 
accounted for all ships, their cargoes and equipment, condemned 
as the perquisites of the Admiralty. Crespigny*s salary was
1. Marsden * s Memoir, pp.50-53.70.
W. Tagged.,(1907)
2. Victoria County Hist.. Suffolk.Ji.É06-324.
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£350 p.a* Dyson who was also Solicitor to the Admiralty, was
financially better off. His salary was £250 p.a. as Comptroller,
but he was occasionally employed by the Sick and Hurt board at
£40 p.a. and was assistant to the Council for the affairs of
the Admiralty and Navy Boards, which brought an additional £370
p.a. plus £200-£300 as a share in the profits of the Attorney
and £40 p.a. in occasional fees. Both these positions were cjuo^ i-
sinecures, though in war there was more work attached to them,
but the prize courts were notoriously corrupt. Crespigny*s
appointment, at least, was in the nature of a political one.
His family controlled two seats at Aldeburgh^" and a brother
2
in law was one of the important Commissioners of Excise. *
1. English Historical Documents. XI.1783-1532. A.Aspinall 
and E.Anthony Smith, eds., 229.
2. J. Burke, Genealogical and heraldic history of the Commoners 
of Great Britain and Ireland , ^ 4  vols .London,1835-8), 
iii.133.
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The remainder of the establishment consisted of nineteen 
clerks in 1784; two marine clerks, eleven extra clerks and 
six established clerks. The latter were assisted in the tasks 
by the extra clerks and supervised by the chief clerk, in work 
which was purely manual and contained nothing original or 
requiring initiative in it. The clerks prepared papers, letters, 
orders and memoranda, as directed, and each of them had a 
separate branch of the business in his care. The background 
of these men is unknown; presumably it was middle class, or from 
the lower ranks of the gentry. Sir Harry Parker, son of a 
Suffolk squire, and later J.P. for Westminster while chief clerk^* 
and Joseph Belson, one of the established clerks, who had served 
in the Navy and Sick and Hurt Offices before coming to the 
Admiralty illustrate this assumption. Anthony Trollope gives 
a vivid picture of office staff in his novel The Three Clerks 
culled from his first hand experience as a clerk at the Post 
Office in the mid-nineteenth century. Trollope's maternal 
grandfather, a clerk in the VJar Office around 1800, came from a 
Hampshire parsonage, and no doubt many clerks were drawn from 
this and similar backgrounds.
It is logical to assume a family connection among several 
clerks with the same name, since young men were introduced into
1. Ad.2/374.p.437, Nepean to Lord Chancellor, 12 May, 1795.
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the office in their late teens and trained there as assistants
to their fathers or uncles or brothers* In this way Charles
Wright may have introduced a son or nephew, Henry Wright, as
fifth extra clerk. Mitchel Hollingsworth may have entered one
of his family as eleventh extra clerk, and Robert Maxwell, a
younger brother, Basil, in the same way. There was nothing
wrong in this, the customary method of entry into office, but
the very lack of requirements meant the acceptance of a low
standard of attainment. The only necessary qualification was,
seemingly, the ability to write clearly^" and even this was too
2
often neglected.
1. Letters of Lord St. Vincent. D.Bonner Smith,ed., 1.303, 
St.Vincent to Marquis Townshend, 25 Apl.1801,
2. Markham Correspondence. C.R.Markham,ed.,p.ISO, Admiral 
B.S. Rowley to Admiral Markham, 6 Jul.1806,
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CHAPTER II
Methods of business and relations with the Cabinet
and other departments.
Through a government office, valuing economy and efficiency, 
the Admiralty enjoyed a pleasant working atmosphere. The 
First Lord often took a personal interest in his staff and 
Marsden remembered the happy family atmosphere at the Board.
Yet the secretaries worked extremely hard, since all the 
business of the department passed through their hands and 
their attendance was constant. They brought all letters and 
memoranda to the Board, received and made note of orders, sent 
out replies and in cases where business was urgent, and it was 
impossible to get the Lords Commissioners together to do so, 
signed orders subject to a covering letter from the Board as 
soon as possible. All letters and despatches from subordinate 
boards or other officials came to them as well as all letters 
from other Government departments, and all out going letters 
were drafted by them before the Board signed them. . That 
they were conscientious is proved by the regularity of their 
signatures and the comparative smoothness with which the 
office was run. Scrawled on the turned up bottom corner of 
letter or despatch, was the date it was received, the date of 
the answer, usually the day after, with appropriate comments.
1. Marsden's Memoir, p.97 nte. 2 June, 1800.
119
Under Nepean the habit of asking questions by minute and 
obtaining answers in the same way, increased, and a virtual 
'running commentary' was recorded on certain documents.
Parts of letters were sometimes marked in the margin where 
they concerned other departments. These parts were then 
copied out and sent to the departments concerned.
The chief clerk prepared all memorials and letters to 
the Secretaries of State and orders to the Navy Board and 
Ordnance Board, cared for the maps, charts etc and paid the 
contingent expenses, according to the Board's directions.
He obtained money for this from the Navy Board with whom he 
accounted annually. He was helped by the youngest of the 
established clerks and one of the extra clerks.
The second clerk dealt with Admiralty books and made 
out all the licences, the third prepared correspondence 
with the public offices, commanders of ports and squadrons 
and commissions and warrants to officers. The fourth pre­
pared a list of officers entitled to half pay every six months, 
indexed correspondence between the Admiralty and other public 
boards, took care of official papers and checked the fees 
earned by his colleagues and the messengers' bills. The 
fifth clerk entered the Board minutes in a book, the sixth 
took charge of the common letter book, containing letters of 
commissioner! and warrant officer, and the Greenwich Hospital 
letter book. The seventh clerk helped the chief clerk and
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prepared monthly lists of ships in commission with the names 
of their officers and their station, and entered a fair copy 
of the Board's minutes into the minute book.
All the extra clerks were attached to the established 
clerks to assist them in these tasks by copying, indexing and 
margining the papers. In addition some of them had special 
duties of their own. Thomas Kite second extra clerk, 
collected the weekly returns of ships in commission at home, 
entering them into a ledger. Robert Maxwell, seventh extra 
clerk, translated and copied all French and Spanish documents, 
and extracted and arranged all foreign reports. All the 
extra clerks copied papers for Parliament and occasionally 
the minutes of courts martial, for which they were paid small 
fees. The two marine clerks prepared and wrote all letters, 
orders and commissions concerning the Marine Corps, the half 
yearly lists of half pay officers, and checked all relevant 
bills J "
This staff was competent to deal with peace time business^
thejy
and often were then under-employed,but^were overwhelmed in war.
(h -5  VJÔS not: J u t  to L u k  bo
any inefficiency on their part thirS-=wa:9=^the=feult 
the piecemeal system which had grown up gradually as paper 
work increased and still bore the marks of a smaller department.
1. Pari.Pap., The Taking of Fees and Perquisites in Public 
Offices etc; Reports from Commissioners, No.III. The 
Admiralty, pp.107-116; 1806,Vii.
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There was still much emphasis on the keeping of records with 
too many clerks duplicating or overlapping each other's work 
and there was little delegation of authority. The First Lord 
had to see personally and confirm every warrant commission, 
victualling and transport licence, and press exemption as well 
as his own orders and despatches.
It was to deal with the increasing volume of work through­
out the war, that the number of clerks had increased by 1806, 
when there were six^cferks, ten junior established and ten 
extra clerks, excluding the secretaries, the chief clerk, and 
the private secretary to the First Lord. Murray Young 
compares the granting of a clerkship to a young man to that of 
presenting him with a small estate for lifeJ* Certainly 
employment in the civil service was one of the profitable 
avenues open to gentlemen. Clerks had security of tenure, 
being attached to the office rather than to the person of the 
First Lord or the Admiralty Board, and could expect compensa­
tion if their place was abolished after some years. The more 
senior clerks, including the secretaries, could hold^sinecures, 
which added to their income, and provided one way of rewarding 
the more diligent and useful. Thus both Stephens and Nepean, 
while first secretary, also held the secretaryship to the
1. D.Murray Young, The Colonial Office in the Early Nine­
teenth Century. ^Imperial Studies Series, no.XXII, 1961), 
p.24.
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Commissioners for the relief of Poor widows of commissioned 
and warrant officers, at a salary of £200. Ibbetson was 
secretary to Greenwich Hospital at £221/5/10, and Parker 
secretary to the Board of Longtitude at £74 p.a. Nepean
also held the clerkship of the crown and courts at Jamaica 
at an unnamed amount and Marsden was naval officer for 
Dominica and St. Vincent at £116/4/11 p.a. When Charles
Wright became chief clerk he retained the pursership of a 
third rate in ordinary which he had taken when a clerk and 
which brought him £30 p.a. He was also Registrar of the 
Vice Admiralty Court at Halifax, Nova Scotia, a profitable 
sinecure in wartime. Joseph Belson, another established 
clerk, was secretary to the Privy Seal Office at £30 p.a. and 
deputy to two clerks in that office from each of whom he 
received about £80 p.a. He was likewise purser to a ship 
'in ordinary'. James Dyer, an extra clerk, was deputy 
secretary to Greenwich Hospital, and both he and James Cutforth, 
reading clerk to the Board, were pursers of ships 'in ordinary'. 
Several clerks had also been agent for prizes or naval and 
marine officers during the American war, though this was 
later forbidden.
Promotion among clerks was slow but certain; when a 
vacancy occurred all the clerks moved up one place. Nor was 
this the absolute bar to efficiency it seemed, since the 
Admiralty could discharge those clerks who were too inefficient
1. I kai" is \.o 3n u iicom m fssroned sVn p^idid up cioeR i
skelcfon treo j,
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or pension them off before their period of service ended.
It was thus possible for clerks to rise from extra to
established positions and possibly to the chief clerk or
secretaryship, and thence, in rare cases, to the Board itself.
Hopes of promotion thus stimulated efficiency.
Conditions of service were reasonable. Work began at
eleven a.m. and finished at five p.m. though the established
clerks were expected to stay later, in rotation, if the work
was unfinished. During the war Sunday was also a working
day if pressure of business was great, and the last four
extra clerks on the establishment attended every other evening
to help with letters and orders. The marine clerks’ hours
were even less, from twelve till four.^* It is possible
that like other government offices the Admiralty clerks
received refreshment of food and drink though there are no
2
recorded payments in the office accounts. *
Since the Admiralty was a war department its working 
hours were more erratic than most, and much work was done in 
great spurts in answer to some emergency or to hasten an 
expedition already begun. Despatches arrived, or orders were 
sent, late at night in such cases. Thus when the Trafalgar
1. Pari.Pap., The Taking of Fees and Perquisites in Public 
Offices etc.. Reports from Commissioners, No.III. The 
Admiralty, pp.96-106; 1806, v ü •
2. See Murray Young, op.cit.. pp.26-27.
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despatches arrived at 1.0.a.m. on 6 November, 1805 Marsden 
was just going to bed after finishing some work. He then 
sat up with some clerks till 4.0.a.m. writing official letters 
and a special gazette informing the public of the news, 
besides dealing with various early callers.^*
•Sod beeiT
With êix of the clerks, including the s e c r e t a r i e s i n  the
"Thus
office for thirty years in 1786,^the department had enough 
long service members to ensure a sense of continuity invaluable 
in a government department. Thus Stephens was *a senior
Admiralty official before Nelson was born, and he was still
2
at the Admiralty when Nelson died*. * Of the rest all but 
six junior clerks had served for over eight years and most for 
over sixteen. Ten years later Ibbetson, the second secretary, 
Parker, the chief clerk, Thomas Fearne, the senior established 
clerk, and James Freshfield one of the extra clerks had 
resigned, and William Bryer, an established clerk had died, 
while another had been discharged. * Ibbetson, Parker and 
Bryer had served for over forty years, and retired on good 
pensions, Fearne, after thirty-four years, and Freshfield, 
after eighteen years, may have been compelled by ill health
1. Marsden’s Memoir,pp.116-118.
2. Namier and Brooke, Hist.of Pari., I. 121.
3. M - 2 2 / 5 ,  pp.9,10.
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to retire, but were also granted small pensions.^* There­
upon the remaining clerks had all been promoted one place, 
permitting the extra clerks to be placed on the establishment. 
By 1806 this process had further advanced them, death and 
resignations weeding out the original clerks of 1784, though 
only after long periods of service. But there were still six 
of the 1784 establishment left, though all were now established 
clerks, and one, Charles Wright, had become chief clerk.
Only three had been discharged throughout the period; no 
reason was given, nor were their ages disclosed, so it is 
impossible to deduce whether they were inefficient or merely 
moved to a more profitable place. Though in 1786 several 
clerks had given evidence to the Commission of the resigna­
tion of their colleagues because of poor wages, only two 
resignations among the junior clerks are recorded after 1790. 
The reason for such permanence was the improved salaries the 
Admiralty had introduced.
1. M * 2  2/17, p.206,231.
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Though the office ran smoothly enough in peace time 
the immense amount of work which accumulated after 1793 
called for a reorganisation of office practice. The creation 
of an orderly office routine was largely the work of Sir 
Charles Middleton, though his severe criticism of the working 
methods of the board to which he was appointed in 1794, should
He OJO.S
not be taken too literally.  ^Always a man to see things in 
black and white and in his own way as emphatic and didactic 
in expression as Lord St. Vincent,^it is doubtful if the 
office could have carried on with all the faults he imputed 
to it. Middleton declared he found clerks 'extremely 
defective in attendance', with no dependence on anything 
being done. Lord Chatham's leisurely habits had delayed 
work. Marsden says that 'many hundred packets, carried into 
the house of the First Lord were found there unopened',^" 
and Middleton suggested to Lord Spencer that he should begin 
to read letters at 1 1 .0 .a.m. rather than at 1 2 .0 ."^^.“ *
The regulations Middleton drew up for office work give 
an interesting glimpse of working methods before 1794.
Letters were read at intervals throughout the day, as they 
arrived and in no set order of importance. Consequently
1. Marsden's Memoir, p.llS.nte.
2. The Spencer Papers. J.S.Corbett,ed., 1.8-9, 19 Dec.1794.
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Board members were inattentive^* or attended only in the
morning, or for occasional hours during the day. Messengers 
were not prompt, and clerks were often late in arriving and 
left while the Board was still transacting business. The 
lack of arrangement in the Board's work left them unoccupied 
at some periods, while a mass of papers to copy often kept 
the Board waiting. Moreover visitors came to see the clerks 
while at their desks and delayed them still further.
To remedy these failings Middleton proposed some changes 
and was able to introduce a more orderly method of work into 
the office for the short time he was there. The resignation 
of several senior clerks at this time may have been occasioned 
by these changes, and must have accelerated them. A fixed 
time, from 1 2 .0 .p.m. to 2 .0 .p.m. was set aside for reading 
letters which were now opened at 10.a.m. Town letters 
received after 2 .0 .p.m. were read before 1 2 .0 .p.rçi. the 
following day. Clerks were to be at their desks by 10.30. 
not to receive visitors at any time, and remain in the office 
until the Board had finished its work. A minute book which 
did not exist when Middleton came to the Board, and which he 
had created only after 'inconceivable perseverance* was to be
1. Seymour Papers. CR114A/325/5. Spencer to Seymour, 10 Jan. 
1795, 'Having a moment's time while some uninteresting 
letters are reading at the Board .....'
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kept up to within two days and ready on all occasions.
Minutes were also sent out to clerks at intervals, to keep 
them employed in copying, and to have papers ready to sign 
so as not to keep the Board waiting. Press warrants 
protections and Mediterranean papers were kept on a side 
table and not mixed with other business, and a list of warrant 
officers who were candidates for employment, with their cases 
and lists of vacancies, were kept on the table with relevant 
dates.^ *
The impression is of a department in chaos before 
Middleton appeared and neither this nor the extra work or 
advice he suggested can have made him popular. Nor is it a 
true picture; the habits of work in the office were leisurely 
but not therefore wholly without order. Middleton's advice 
to the secretary to enforce the clerks' attendance and see 
that the day's business was finished in the day, suggests that 
Stephens had not taken care. Combined with the Commission's 
recommendation that he should live in the house provided, 
this allegation may have some foundation. But it should be 
remembered that the first secretary was an elderly man, 
possibly not as meticulous as in his youth, but from the very 
length of experience in office able to run the department in 
what seemed like confusion to an outsider.
1. The Spencer Papers, J.S.Corbett,ed.,I. 12-14, Middleton 
to Spencer, 19 Dec.1794.
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On the other hand Middleton was not a complete outsider. 
He had long experience of office routine, had been a most 
successful Comptroller of the Navy and was responsible for 
the recommendations of the 1784 Committee of Inquiry. He 
was the only man to appreciate that conventional habits and 
methods would not serve in the war, though even he did not 
realise hov; long it would last, or how great a strain it 
would impose on naval administration. Middleton was an 
exceptional man, with a talent and passion for organisation 
and he attempted to introduce new, business like methods.
He was unable to do more in the short time he was a commiss­
ioner, and found it impossible to reorganise the duties of 
the Admiralty commissioners on the lines he wished;
Thus matters rested until he became First Lord in 1805, 
when he was at last free to re-distribute the duties of the 
Commissioners and so prevent the increased work from over­
whelming the Board in the succeeding war years. In May 1805 
he drew up a schedule of commissioners' duties.^" The First 
Lord was to have the general arrangement of work; the first 
sea lord, formally the senior naval lord, was to act in the 
First Lord's absence and also deal with the day's letters, 
especially those from the ports and the secret services, which
1. The Barham Papers. J.K..Laughton, ed.. III. 76-79, 
May 1805.
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he was to minute and send on to the secretary. With the 
agreement of the First Lord he was to dispose ships on all 
stations, giving the necessary orders, attend to the 
distribution of men and marines as necessary and to the 
equipment of ships. He was to check the logs with the orders 
issued for any deviation and note promotions, and to pay 
the utmost regard to the "justice and other circumstances 
attending it, as also to the character of the claimant". The 
second sea lord would receive from the secretary, once read, 
all letters belonging to subordinate boards', minute them and 
return them to the secretary to be sent. The third sea lord 
was to superintend the appointment of all commissioned and 
warrant officers under inspection of the First Lord who would 
sign all such commissions and warrants. The civil lords 
were to sign all orders and assist with their advice, and any 
absentee had to assign his duties to another member.
This schedule marks an important step in the work of the 
office and the development of the Board. Not only were 
specific duties assigned to each commissioner, but there was 
increased responsibility for the sea lords and a recognition 
of their importance, while the civil lords were depressed 
almost to the level of cyphers. There was a stricter attitude 
to work and the days of leisure disappeared. Another signi­
ficant order of the same year which struck a blow at
1. Ibid.III.79.
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political interference in Admiralty affairs and naval inter­
ference in political matters, refused leave of absence to a 
captain who was also an M.P. and whose ship was under sailing 
orders•
Though there was practically no government department with 
which the Admiralty did not correspond at some time, the Board's 
most regular correspondents were their own subordinate offices 
and the more important departments of the Treasury, War, Foreign 
and Home Offices. Correspondence between the Admiralty and 
Lloyds, the East India and Africa Companies, the Stationery and 
Post Offices was small. In 1785 the Foreign Office sent twelve 
letters to the Board, receiving double that number. There was 
a sharp rise ten years later, each office receiving well over 
one hundred, and the same is true of the Home and War Offices 
until 1805, when there was a marked, though temporary decrease.
Contact with minor departments was sometimes maintained 
indirectly; with the Stationery Office through the Treasury, 
with the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland through the Home Office. 
Relatively few letters passed direct between these offices ; 
and the Admiralty except in times of crisis. Complaints of
poor quality stationery came direct from the Board^'and were
2
answered equally directly. * Information about attempted
1. Stat.1/3, p.87, Nepean to Lewis Wolfe, 24 Dec.1803.
2. Stat.3/57, p.61, 7 Oct., p.73, 27 Dec.1803, Wolfe to 
Nepean.
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French invasions of Ireland was generally passed from the 
Admiralty via the Home Office,^"and only when invasion seemed 
imminent did Nepean write direct to Castlereagh to warn him the
o
French had sailed from Brest. * With the Secretaries of State 
there were two types of correspondence; that between the 
departmental secretaries, concerning routine topics and the 
rarer, more formal one between the Secretaries and the First 
Lord. The volume of correspondence increased throughout the 
period, but especially after 1793, when each year's letters 
occupied three, and after 1803, four volumes. But except on 
matters of urgency or delicacy departmental heads rarely wrote 
to each other in their official capacity.
This large correspondence with major offices of state was 
on a limited number of topics. With the Treasury the Admiralty 
discussed the problem of combating smuggling, the numbers of 
cutters employed in the excise service, the re-imbursements of 
naval officers, or consuls for assisting British seamen or 
collecting information, the delivery of naval estimates, the 
transport of specie abroad to pay overseas establishments, 
the bounty paid to English counties for supplying seamen
1. The Memoirs and Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh. 
ed. by the Marquess of Londonderry, [A vols. London, 
1848), I.318-9,399-403,451-455.,II.199.)
2. Ibid.. 1.380-381, Nepean to Castlereagh, 27 Sept.1798.
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according to quota, the import of duty free wine, tobacco and 
spirits into store for the use of the Victualling Board, or the 
cost of prisoners of war.
Letters to the Home Office concerned the care of prisoners 
of war, the care and transport of convicts, and until the 
establishment of a Secretary of State for War in 1794, of 
troops.^* Major causes of disputes between the two departments 
and their local officials were the activities of the press gang, 
and local magistrates from Falmouth to Campbelltown protested, 
or hindered them. * The transport of colonial governors to
3
their appointments * and the defence of the colonies and of 
Britain were also discussed. All addresses and petitions to 
the King, including seamen's petitions, passed through the Home 
Office, which also made out the warrants for letters patent by 
which the Admiralty Board was appointed.
With the Foreign Office the Admiralty discussed salutes 
to the British flag, the release of American seamen in British 
ships and of British sailors in American vessels, complaints 
of punitive actions by British sailors or evidence of hostility 
by any power against Britain.^' Once the war began the support
1. H^O.29/2,p.46-48, 10 Nov., p.48-9, 7 Dec., p.50, 20 Dec.1785, 
Home Secretary to Admiralty Commissioners.
2. Ad.2/609,p.209, Nepean to William Wickham, 21 Feb.1795.
3. Ad.1/4152.f.19, Home Secretary to Admiralty Commissioners,
1 Aug.l78o.
4. A d 01/244, Admiral P. Affleck to Stephens, 11 June,1791.,
Ad.2/ 3 7 4 , p.239, Stephens to Grenville, 2 6 July, 1791.
134
of allies, naval intelligence, the treatment of neutrals, and 
the duties of admirals as representatives of Britain, were more 
important. Correspondence with the War Office was primarily 
confined to transport of troops, conduct of the war and joint 
co-operation on combined expeditions. Other departments were 
sometimes drawn into these discussions, notably the Ordnance 
and Transport Boards.
Relations between the Admiralty and the major government 
departments revolved around the inter-action of the problems 
of divided responsibility, the supply of raw material and 
equipment and the furnishing of transport. In the departmental 
maze which formed the antiquated administrative machine small 
difficulties could be magnified, jobs taking days stretched to 
weeks and original letters or proposals of unwelcome projects 
shelved. A single topic, such as the fitting out of an Irish 
revenue cutter could involve the Admiralty, the Navy Board, the 
Treasurer of the Navy, the Home Secretary and the Irish Treasury.^" 
A complaint raised in one department embroiled all other offices 
remotely connected with it. Thus a complaint, by the commander 
of the forty-fifth regiment of foot, of poor quality bedding, 
supplied by the Navy Board's transport agent in Ireland in 1786, 
drew in the Secretary at War, the Home Secretary, the Lord 
Lieutenant's secretary, the Admiralty and Navy Boards, and
1. H.0 .28/5. p.254, Admiralty Commissioners to Home Secretary, 
15 May, 1786.
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1
occupied their time for over a month. * The need to consult 
so many offices on even trivial matters wasted valuable time 
and provided plentiful grounds for disputes and for holding 
up unpopular projects.
Nowhere was confusion greater than among the war departments. 
The Admiralty, Navy, Victualling and Sick and Hurt Boards 
administered the Navy. The Army was administered by the 
Secretary at War, the Secretary of State for War, after 1794, 
and the Commander in Chief, after 1795. Of these only the 
Secretary of State was a Cabinet minister, though while William 
Windham was Secretary at War he was in the Cabinet, through 
force of personality and ability. The Ordnance was a separate 
department, controlled by the Master General. The clue to /
smooth working among such administrative confusion was personal 
contact, which was more easily made then than it would be now.
All departments were small and ministers, secretaries and chief 
clerks knew each personally and even intimately, and had often 
worked in each other's offices. Lord Grenville and Lord 
Hawkesbury were Home and Foreign Secretaries for several years, 
Dundas was Home Secretary, Secretary for War and First Lord. 
Chatham and Spencer were First Lords and later occupied the 
Ordnance and Home Offices respectively and a former Admiralty 
lord, Pratt, when Lord Camden, became Secretary for War. Evan
Ado 1/4152,f .10, Home Secretary to Admiralty Commissioners, 
14 Apl.1786., H.0 .28/5. p.268, Admiralty Commissioners to 
Home Secretary, 25 May, 1786.
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Nepean had been under secretary in the Home and Vvar Offices 
before joining the Admiralty. Secondly there was a strong 
social bond between them to reinforce the professional one.
V^ e have seen how this affected the Admiralty lords. It also 
concerned the secretaries. Nepean's successor at the War 
Office, William Huskisson, was a personal friend, as was Robert 
Brownrigg, military secretary to the Duke of York. Nepean's 
eldest son married Mrs. Huskisson's n i e c e . T h i r d l y  Pitt 
intervened in many offices personally. Besides the Treasury 
he virtually directed foreign affairs until 1791, the Admiralty,
UAL,
through his brother, after 1788^ the Board of Trade and the 
India Board.
The heads of departments, though political appointees, 
were still powerful. They were heads in fact as well as name 
and often managed much of the routine office work personally.
The amount of power wielded depended on them individually,
ComIcL nob be .
but however mediocre, they ignore! It was
part of constitutional practice that all government orders 
were transmitted by the Secretaries of State to various depart­
ments and this formal notification of royal commands was 
necessary before anything could be done officially.
1. J. Burke, A Genealogical and Heraldic Dictionary of the 
Peerage and Baronetage of the British Empire, p.444., 
C.R.Fay, Huskisson and his A g e .p p .67.68.184.. See also 
Chapter I.pp.110-111.
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Yet though departmental heads were important, their under­
secretaries were even more so. At the Admiralty they had been 
in office longer than the commissioners and good personal 
relations between them and their colleagues in other offices 
were desirable. An informal network of communication,embodied 
in friendly notes which passed between them and often secured 
by personal friendship outside the office, could smooth the 
official path. Where it existed everyday routine ran 
efficiently, but if it was lacking between offices already 
estranged at Cabinet level, then difficulties and delays were 
almost insurmountable.
Relations with the War Office secretaries were good and
helped to overcome the friction which exacerbated feelings
between ministers. . Dundas frequently used Nepean, a former
under-secretary, as a private channel of communication with the
Admiralty^'both when the latter was at the War Office and after
2
he became Admiralty secretary. ' It is possible, in the 
general re-shuffle of departments in 1794, that Dundas secured 
Nepean's appointment to the Admiralty to continue close co­
operation with that office.
Both Stephens' and Nepean's relations with their colleagues 
in the Home Office and the Treasury were equally good. Whenever
1* Dropmore M s s .. V.206, 29 July, 1799., VI.301, 19 Aug.1800, 
Dundas to Grenville.
2. P.R.0.30/8/368, Dundas to Chatham, 14 Sept.1794.
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possible routine channels were by-passed by private arrange-
1 2 
ments, 'documents were sent unofficially, 'and Admiralty
despatches occasionally delayed or hastened to suit the
3
convenience of the Secretary of State, * but these indirect
methods had to be used tactfully lest departmental chiefs took
offence.^' There was no such friendly communication with the 
Ordnance Office and relations between the two suffered 
accordingly. When a present of twelve carronades was sent to
the King of Sicily, the Ordnance first heard of it when the
master of the storeship appointed to carry them applied to their 
office for the guns. * Similarly, cool relations between the 
War and Foreign Office secretaries mirrored those between their 
chiefs, Dundas and Grenville. In 1800 Dundas had to ask 
Grenville to order someone in his office to send Dundas a daily 
intelligence report, since Huskisson, the under-secretary, had 
found the Foreign Office secretaries, George Aust and Bland
1. Ad.1/4289, Thomas Steele to Stephens, 8 Nov.1786.,
Ad.1/4152,f .4, Nepean to Stephens, 15 Feb.1786, H.0 .28/25, 
p.189, Nepean to Wickham, 17 Apl.1799.
2. H.0 .28/33,p.150,Marsden to John King,30 Apl.1805, Ad.1/4330, 
Lewis to Stephens, 20 Nov.1790.
3. Ad.1/4152,f .11. Nepean to Stephens, 26 Apl.1786., H.0 .28/25. 
p.40, Wickham to Nepean, 23 Jan.1799., p.52, Nepean to 
Wickham, 27 Jan.1799.
4. Ad.1/4152,f .54, Nepean to ?Stephens, 11 Mar.1787.
5. Ad.1/4014, A. Rogers to Stephens, 30 Nov.1784.
Burgess, reluctant to do so.
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1.
In this close-knit circle unofficial warnings were 
discreetly given," favours exchanged and appointments solicited 
for friends and protegees. Stephens urged his protegee as
o
provost marshall for St. Johns in 1785; George Rose success­
fully forwarded a request for the judgeship of the Admiralty 
court at St. K i t t s . N o t  all applications were successful; 
other claims might be stronger or external factors intervene.
Thus though Nepean strongly recommended Mr. Logie for the 
Algerian consulship in 1799, Mr. Falcon was actually appointed.^* 
Finally this system of informal communication supplemented the 
intelligence passing between departments. News that was too 
imprecise to be committed to formal despatch, or too recently 
acquired to have been included in the previous one, was sent 
in this way.^'
1. Dropmore M s s ., VI.253, Dundas to Grenville, 21 June, 1800.
2. Ad.1/4072, Francis Freeling to Nepean, 20 Apl.1797.
3. H.0.28/5,p.11,Stephens to Nepean, 1 July, 1785.
4. Ad.1/4291, Rose to Nepean, 20 June, 1797.
5. H.O.28/25, p.94, Nepean to King, Undated letter, probably
end of February or beginning of March, 1799., p.205,
22 Apl., p.386, 10 Oct.1799, Nepean to Wickham.
6 . Ad.1/4291, Charles Long to Nepean, 20 Feb. 29 March, 1797.
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The ties which linked the secretariat joined ministers 
also and provided underlying strength for Pitt's first Cabinet. 
The successful "inner" Cabinet system which Pitt had established 
by 1791, with Grenville at the Foreign and Dundas at the Home 
Office, should have been especially useful in war. But the 
outbreak of war and the inclusion of the Portland Whigs in 1794 
led to new 'alliances' being formed in the Cabinet, the result 
of divergencies about methods of waging war.^* Each minister 
urged his own plan as the one best suited to end the war 
quickly and advantageously and clamoured for available resources. 
Pitt, who was no war minister, had to decide between them and 
plumped for trying all in turn, a fatal decision with the 
limited resources available, and one which led to the failure 
of many schemes. Unable to direct autocratically, Pitt had 
to control and drive an illmatched team of aristocratic amateurs 
of varying ability and differing temperaments, who often 
quarrelled among themselves. *
Dundas and Pitt favoured a colonial, imperialist war, in
1. Brit.Mus., Add.Mss.4QlQ2(Melville Papers,iii),ff.79-82,
Dundas to Pitt, 22 Sept.1800; hereinafter Add.Mss.40102.
2. Court and Cabinets. Buckingham, ed.,11.155, Lord Bulkeley 
to Buckingham, 27 Apl.1789., The Political Memoranda of 
Francis Godolphin Osborne. Fifth Duke of Leeds, ed.by 0. 
Browning (Camden Society Publications, New Series.,xxv,1884.), 
pp. 155-0, 166.
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which the capture of French colonial possessions and ships 
would cause French trade to wither, while chaos at home would . 
make peace inevitable. While this early eighteenth century 
view was partly true it could never have won the war. The 
mere collection of naval bases, while commercially useful, 
could not destroy an enemy imbued with political rather than 
economic principles, and naval victories, however brilliant, 
could not defeat a military empire. The war continued unabated 
for ten years after Trafalgar, and some of Napoleon's greatest 
victories were to come after his greatest naval defeat.
Grenville, who assumed a more independent line in foreign 
policy after the inclusion of the Portland Whigs, was a supporter 
of the French Royalists in Toulon, La Vendee and Brittany, and 
wished for a knock out blow against the central French govern­
ment by such means and by invasion from Flanders. It was 
Grenville who persuaded Pitt to support the French Royalists 
when the Prime Minister would have dropped them, on Dundas's 
advice and his own belief that the money could be better spent 
in the West Indies. Grenville was also opposed to peace 
negotiations with France, an attitude which brought the first 
real split in the war Cabinet in 1797, when only the crisis 
following the naval mutiny prevented his resignation. *
1. Dropmore Mss.,111. 329, Grenville to George III, 16 June,
1797., E.D.Adams. The Influence of Grenville on Pitt's 
Foreign Policy. 1787-1798TTCarnegie Institute of Washington 
Publications, no.13,1904), p.57,nte.
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The ablest man in the Portland group, William Windham, 
supported him. To Windham, the disciple of Edmund Burke, and 
in some measure to Grenville too, the French war was a crusade 
whose purpose was the extirpation of Jacobinism. To Pitt it 
was an unnecessary evil to be finished as quickly as possible. 
Between these views there could be no real harmony and Windham 
and his friends were reluctant allies of a Prime Minister whose 
principles they distrusted. Into these dissensions Lord Spencer, 
an eminent Portlandite, was drawn.
There had been Cabinet quarrels before in which the Admiralty 
had been involved, notably between Lord Howe and the Duke of 
Richmond.^" Howe had aroused strong personal antipathy in the 
American war, both in the service and Parliament, where he was
o
bitterly attacked in 1788 over unpopular flag promotions.
He was a Cabinet liability and was blocking the naval reforms
q
which Pitt, through Middleton wished to promote. There were 
equally bitter quarrels between Chatham and Richmond, whose 
usefulness in the Cabinet and in Parliament had waned by 1792.^*
1• Hist.Mss.Comm., Fourteenth Report,Appendix.pt.I . The Mss. 
of His G race the Duke of Rutland preserved at Belvoir 
Castle. %4 vols.London,1888-1905; hereinafter Rutland Mss.). 
III.299,T.Orde to Duke, 13 May,1786, 301, D.Pulteney to 
Duke, 16 May, 1786., A.G.01son, The Radical Duke. The 
Career and Correspondence of Charles Lennox. Third Duke of 
Richmond, TOxford, 1 9 6 1 ), pp^85-87,'
2., Barrow, op.cit.. pp. 179-187., Parliamentary History. 1786-8. 
xxvi.648.. The Morning Post. 22 Feb.1788.
3. See Chapter I pp.16-18.
4. Olson, op.cit.. pp.88-91.
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Neither Howe nor Richmond had been regular attenders at Cabinet 
meetings, both were personally unpopular and neither possessed 
sufficient political "interest" to overcome these faults. Pitt 
was ruthless about jettisoning his liabilities and dropped both 
men without a q u a l m . B u t  none of these arguments applied 
to Lord Spencer. He was too important politically to be 
pushed aside, he attended Cabinet meetings regularly and took 
an interest in them, partly because he was conscientious but 
even more because he enjoyed politics. * Unlike Howe, he 
eventually won the support of his own board and the bulk of the 
service. At first, while Spencer was still inexperienced and 
under War Office pressure, there was resentment over the 
predominance of the Army and War Office in naval affairs. The 
cause of this resentment was the appointment of a junior, admiral 
to the Leeward Islands expedition of 1795.
This combined operation formed part of Dundas*s plan for 
conquering the French West Indian islands and he was largely 
responsible for its organisation. The Army commander was Major 
General Abercromby. Spencer, who had just come to the Admiralty,
1# Ibid., p.101., Dropmore Mss.. Buckingham to Grenville,
2 Sept.1793.
2. Add.Mss.,40102,ff.10-11, 7 Sept.1795 Cabinet Minute.,
Dropmore M s s.. 644,646, Cabinet minutes for 14,18 Nov.1794., 
Ibid.. ill.35,36,261,283,310,330, Cabinet minutes for 19 
March, 1795, 19 Oct.1796, 10 Dec.1796, 9 Apl., 16 June,
1797., Ibid., IV.95,329,Pitt to Grenville, 2 Jan. 21 Sept. 
1800.
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was influenced by Dundas to choose Rear Admiral Sir Hugh 
Christian, who had gained the letter's approval by his work 
at the Transport Board, as the naval officer. Unfortunately 
there was already an admiral in the Leewards, Sir John Laforey, 
considerably senior to Christian. It was not clearly defined 
what would happen when the expedition arrived but Dundas and 
Abercromby assumed, and Spencer's memorandum of 25 August 
confirmed,^* that Laforey would be removed to the Jamaica 
station, leaving Abercromby free from the interference of a 
senior naval officer.
The confusion of these orders was not apparent to Spencer 
until Sir Charles Middleton returned to the Board after some 
days absence. He objected strongly to the removal of Laforey, 
a personal friend, and protested at the implied snub to a 
senior officer. Christian was therefore ordered to put 
himself under the over-all command of Laforey. It was not until 
11 October that Dundas learnt of the change. An angry meeting 
took place. It ended in a patched up solution by which 
Christian was to remain under Laforey's command but be given 
the sole charge of the naval side of the expedition. This 
satisfied Spencer and Dundas, but not Abercromby. The West 
Indies were notoriously unhealthy and there was a possibility 
that Christian might die and that Laforey, hurt by the original 
snub would refuse to co-operate. What, the General reasonably
1. The Barham Papers. J.K.Laughton, ed.. III.2-5.
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asked, would happen then?
Spencer tried at first to shift responsibility for choosing 
a naval commander onto the Cabinet, but on Dundas's accusation 
that he was shirking his responsibilities he capitulated, agreed 
to the recall of Laforey, and to overcome the seniority problem, 
nominated Admiral William Cornwallis a Commander in Chief of 
the Leewards expedition, though the latter was in the Home 
Fleet and about to sail on another mission.^* The Admiralty 
Board were indignant at the harsh treatment of Laforey.
Middleton preferred to resign as a protest against the over­
weening influence of the War Office in naval concerns, rather 
than sign the order for Laforey*s recall, and the rest of the 
Board were not silent. Lord Hugh Seymour, in an undated 
memorandum, referring to this crisis, regarded the treatment of
Laforey as 'the harshest. that ever was shewn', and the
appointment of Christian as one 'fraught with much inconvenience 
and difficulty to the Naval service as well as to the Minister 
presiding over it.' Dundas seemed oblivious to these dangers 
and 'dispos'd to render the Admiralty an appendage to his office 
by thus indirectly dictating to it in its choice and selections 
of officers to fill the first command.' Seymour did not doubt 
Dundas's ability to select Army officers but thought 'it would
1. For further details see Lieutenant-Commander J.Stewart,
'The Leeward Isles Command, 1795-6*, The Mariner's Mirror. 
xlvii.no.4, (November,1961],270-280.
146
be but fair to allow the same power of selection to those 
to whom responsibility equally attaches itself*, at the 
Admiralty.^*
Spencer was disheartened by the whole affair. In a letter
to Windham he expressed his regret at,
'the situation into which I suffered myself to be drawn 
in a great degree contrary to my own judgement, and 
entirely against my inclination and from my entrance 
into which to this moment I have experienced little but 
a continued series of vexations and anxiety, unaccompanied 
by the consolation which I flattered myself would have 
counterbalanced them, and the satisfaction of its 
producing considerable public benefit.'
His depression had some justification. In the first years of
office he had driven several admirals whose experience could
ill be spared, to retirement, shaken the confidence of naval
officers in the Board, seemed to confirm their suspicions that
the Board was subordinate to the War Office and that their
future promotions might depend on the friendship or approval of
Dundas. This could have created a situation for Spencer
similar to that under Lord Sandwich, when many senior officers,
touchy about the promotion of juniors for political and other
reasons, united in opposition to the First Lord and refused to
1. For the full memorandum see Appendix I., The Barham Papers.
J.K.Laughton,ed., III.6-9, Middleton to Chatham, 8 Nov.1795., 
The Spencer Papers. J.S.Corbett,ed., 1.131-229.
2. The Life and Correspondence of the Rt.Hon.William Windham , 
1750-1810, ed. by the Earl of Rosebery^2 vols.London,1913; 
hereinafter Windham Correspondence), 1.314, Spencer to 
Windham, 10 Nov.1795.
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serve under Spencer avoided Sandwich's fate, survived
the upheaval and overcame the service resentment. He also 
managed to force Middleton's resignation, an administrative 
loss but a personal relief to Spencer. But the cost in resent­
ment and lack of co-operation between Army and Navy in the 
field was high.
Despite this incident Spencer was not isolated in the 
Cabinet as Howe had been. He took office as a member of a 
group which was unenthusiastic about coalition and which could
force Pitt to make concessions. Spencer was a close friend of 
2
Windham, * and was drawn to Grenville by mutual interests; both 
bibliophiles, they shared a love of the classics. * Moreover 
all three men were united in their irritation'^even personal 
dislike of Dundas, whose chief recreations were politics and 
port.^*.
1. J.H. Broomfieldi-Lord Sandwich at the Admiralty Board: 
Politics and the British Navy, 1771-1778', The Mariner's 
Mirror, li.no.l.(February,1965),7-17.
2. Windham Correspondence. Rosebery, ed., II.47-49,Lady 
Spencer to Windham, 20 Apl.1797., 158, Windham to Spencer, 
25 June, 1800.
3. Grenville knew The Iliad and The Odvssev by heart, Spencer 
read widely while at the Admiralty. Once when overworked 
he was prescribed a day's rest and a Euripides' play. Le 
Marchant, op cit.. p.16.
4. Windham Correspondence. Rosebery, ed., II.8-10, Windham to 
Dundas, 1 May, 1796., 252, Windham to Captain Lukin, 9 Mar.
1805., C . Ma the son, The Life of Henry Dundas. First 
Viscount Melville. 1742-1811^ (London,1933),pp.156-7, 346, 
Dropmore Mss.. III.167-8, Grenville to Pitt, 25 Jan.1796., 
P.R.0.30/8/l57, Dundas to Pitt, 11 Apl.1800.
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Spencer leaned heavily on his naval advisors after
Middleton resigned. Such dependence was unacceptable to
Dundas who resented the influence the naval lords exercised
over Spencer. The responsibility for naval affairs lay with
him, he reminded Spencer, and 'your colleagues in the Cabinet
can look nowhere but to you for the rapid and prompt execution
of what is resolved upon.'^" Again and again Dundas lectured
Spencer on his duties and responsibilities as First Lord.
When the Helder expedition was being prepared in 1799 he
rebuked the selfishness of the Admiralty who would not alter
their convoy arrangements.
'If Mr. Pitt*, he argued, 'was to refuse the aid of his 
Revenue Cutters and yachts on such an occasion, would 
the Excuse be tolerated that a Cargo may be smuggled in 
the mean time, or that the Revenue might suffer by the 
deviation of the Revenue vessels from their proper 
duty?'
Spencer must put the country's needs first rather than those 
of his service. He was a 'Member of the Government of the
Country, implicated in the general responsibility of admini-
2
stration', and must shoulder the duties incumbent on him. ' 
Despite the crisis caused over the appointment to the Leeward 
Islands command in 1795, Dundas interfered in the same way in
1# The Spencer Papers. J.S.Corbett,ed., II.332-4, Dundas to 
Spencer, 5 May, 1798., Add.Mss.40102,ff.28-31,Dundas to 
Spencer, 1 July,1799., Dropmore M ss., V.113-4, Dundas to 
Grenville, 1 July, 1799.
2. Add.Mss.40102, ff.28-31, Dundas to Spencer, 1 July,1799.
149
1798 over the proposed expedition to Ostend, This was another 
combined operation, aimed at blowing up the gates and sluices 
of the Bruges-Ostend canal, so interrupting the navigation 
between French occupied Flanders and Holland and preventing the 
French massing their forces in Flanders, preparatory to an 
invasion of England. The proposer of such a scheme was Captain 
Sir Home Riggs Eopham. He was unpopular at the Admiralty, but 
worked well with the Army and was strongly recommended by Dundas.^ 
Because of strong Army pressure Popham got the appointment, but 
Spencer protested against 'this peremptory sort of nomination 
of naval commanders by land officers' and was concerned that 
the appointment would give 'great disgust and offence to the
o
profession who are sufficiently irritable in these matters.'
Two years later Dundas was urging Spencer to remove Admiral 
Lord Keith from the naval command in the Mediterranean because 
of rumoured quarrels with General Abercromby, a course which 
Spencer delayed until death removed Abercromby from the scene. " 
More important, Dundas brushed aside genuine difficulties as 
imaginary or easily overcome. He regarded the collection of
1. The Spencer Papers. J.S.Corbett, ed., II.317-8, Dundas to 
Spencer, 17 Apl.1798,
2. Ibid.. 319, Spencer to Dundas, 25 Apl.1798.
3. The Spencer Papers. H.W.Richmond, ed., IV,136-8, Dundas to 
Abercromby, 29 Dec.1800.
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fifteen thousand men at short notice for the Helder expedition 
an easy matter, and calmly suggested stripping guardships and 
Russian and British war ships of men whom it would have been 
virtually impossible to replace. The Admiralty was unjustly 
blamed for the failure of the Ostend expedition,^* but no 
account was taken of the other services for which frigates
o
might be needed besides acting as convoys for troop transports. * 
Spencer was opposed to the squandering of resources on expeditions 
and small enterprises, partly on logistic grounds which Dundas 
would have done well to consider. He was also concerned that 
the Navy would be unable to perform its functions, including 
the vital one of protection from invasion, if stripped of 
equipment and dissipated in unplanned exercises.
Dundas*s criticisms of Admiralty slowness and selfishness 
were occasionally justified but his method of sweeping aside 
difficulties as though they existed only in the mind of the 
First Lord, and of lecturing him about his duties, did not 
remove the difficulties or make Dundas more acceptable to 
Spencer. The latter only drew closer to Grenville, siding 
with him in his rivalry with Dundas for Pitt*s attention.
1* G.E.Manwaring, *Popham*s expedition to Ostend in 1798*,
The Mariner* s Mirror, vii.no.11. (November, .1921.)332-341.
2. Add.Mss., 40102, ff.92-3 Dundas to Spencer, 21 Nov.1800.
2. The Spencer Papers. H.W.Richmond, ed., III.159-160, Spencer 
to Dundas, 9 Aug.1799.
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Grenville neither dismissed difficulties nor lectured the First 
Lord on his duties, since both shared a landed aristocrat's 
conception of them. He consulted Spencer on policy affecting 
the Navy^'and drew him into informal discussions on foreign
o
and naval policy with Pitt, * He never bullied Spencer into 
appointing unpopular officers. Though as insistent as Dundas, 
in his/ own way, he appeared to leave the choice to Spencer.
In 1798 the Government received offers of alliance against 
France from Naples and Turkey. Much turned on the amount of 
naval help Britain could provide. Grenville proposed several 
measures to effect these alliances, among them the dispatch of 
a small naval squadron to the Turks, commanded by Captain Sir 
Sydney Smith. Smith had the added advantage of a brother who 
was consul at Constantinople and the two would work harmoniously 
together. * Spencer was well aware of Smith's unpopularity 
in naval circles and of the difficulties such an appointment 
would cause, and his orders were left deliberately ambiguous. 
Nevertheless, thanks to Smith's tactlessness, both St. Vincent 
and Nelson, his senior officers in the Mediterranean and Levant,
1. Dropmore M s s ., V.101-2, Grenville to Admiralty lords, 25 
June, 1799. See also official minute Ibid..VI.156-7.
6 Mar.1800.
2. Ibid.. V.376, Spencer to Grenville, 7 Sept.1799., IV.303-4, 
Spencer to Grenville, 10 Sept.1798.
3. P.R.O.30/58/2,f.37,Grenville to Spencer, 18 Sept.1798.
152
were chagrined at the appointment and the latter threatened to 
resign.^* The situation resembles Christian's appointment in 
1795. But Spencer was not annoyed by this suggestion, as he 
was by those of Dundas on similar topics. The whole tone of 
his correspondence with Grenville was different, nor were there 
angry protests against Foreign Office interference in Admiralty 
affairs.
The animosity Dundas had aroused was exposed in 1805 when 
Admiralty administration had become the focus of party strife. 
Parliament had a traditional admiration for the Navy, the 
national bulwark. There were approximately thirty naval
o
officers in the Commons between 1784 and 1806 * and in addition 
to this large body of professional opinion many politically 
powerful aristocrats had naval connections. * But Parliament 
had no affection for^üavy's administrators, who earned their 
share of criticisms of their professional ignorance and ambition. 4.
1. The Dispatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount
Nelson, ed. by Sir N.H.Nicolas, (7 vols. London,1844-46;
hereinafter Nelson's Dispatches.). Ill.213-4,nte., Spencer
to St.Vincent, 9 Oct.1798., 215, Nelson to St.Vincent, 31 
Dec.1798., 217-8, Nelson to Spencer, 1 Jan.1799.
2. Judd, op.cit.. p.88.
3. The Barham Papers. J.K.Laughton,ed.. III.203-4. Anon, to 
Lord Barham, 27 Dec.1805., Dropmore Mss., I.465, Buckingham 
to Grenville, 6 May,1789.
4. Hist.Mss.Comm.. Report on the Mss, in various collections,
VI. The Mss, of Captain H.V. Knoxl (London, 1909),p.201,
William Knox to Lord Walsingham, 25 May,1788., Seymour 
Papers. CR114A/348/7, Captain Berkeley to Seymour,16 Aug.1795
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Debates on purely naval topics were rare in peace. During 
the war routine attacks were made on the Admiralty for its 
slowness and u n p r e p a r e d n e s s . T h e  undefended state of the 
country in 1795, during the French expedition to Bantry Bay, 
and the naval mutinies of 1797, justified these attacks,
p
though censure motions were defeated in both houses. Admiralty 
spokesmen played an inglorious part in these debates, having 
no adequate spokesmen in the Commons. In 1795 it was Dundas
o
v^ /ho defended the Board against charges of sloth and in 1797 
the Admiralty lords were similarly reticent.
Between 1803 and 1805 there was a revival of interest in 
purely naval topics, and a renewal of party strife similar to 
that over the Keppel-Palliser affair some twenty years earlier. 
Pitt's resignation in 1801 introduced Henry Addington as Prime 
Minister. Though there was little change of policy and 
Addington was supported by Pitt, he was despised, for his 
mediocrity, his modest birth and for making the inglorious but 
necessary peace of Amiens, and harassed by the witty, spiteful 
jibes of Canning and his friends. Despite these jibes and the 
hostility of a powerful Commons group, calling themselves the
1. Parliamentary History. 1794-5, xxxi,1434-1454.,P.R.O.30/8/ 
364, Mo.IV. f.4. Undated rough notes for Lord Spencer, 
probably 1795.
2. Parliamentary History. 1797-8,xxxiii,107-125.
3. Ibid.. 5-25.
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'New' Opposition, and composed of Grenville, Windham and 
Spencer among others. Addington's ministry seemed likely to 
last as long as peace held and no controversial topics were 
introduced. The proposed Admiralty reforms soon showed on 
what shifting foundations the ministry was built.
In a ministry of mediocrities the Admiralty, under the 
direction of Earl St. Vincent, was outstanding, for it was 
only on naval policy that Addington's policy differed from 
Pitt's. The Admiralty had made an inspection of the dockyards 
in 1802 and were already at loggerheads with the Navy Board over 
the obstructions placed in their way. St. Vincent found it 
had become a principle that the royal yards could not build 
ships in war, but only refit and repair them, and that new 
ships were built, often badly, by contract with private firms 
at extortionate r a t e s . S t .  Vincent decided to stop contract 
building, reform the royal yards, which if properly managed 
could build and repair, discharge unfit shipwrights and make the 
remainder work harder. From 1802 he gave no more contracts to 
private yards. Such measures raised an opposition with strong 
vested interests in the status quo. Timber supplies were in 
the hands of the contractors who raised their prices, even 
refusing to sell to the royal yards. St. Vincent, thereupon
1. For fuller details see Memoirs of the Administration of 
the Board of Admiralty under the Presidency of the Earl 
of St. Vincent, a tract published as an appendix in 
Letters of Lord St. Vincent. D.Bonner Smith,ed.,11.429-564.
155
planned to build ships abroad, which created fresh enemies.
The result was deadlock; he would not use the contract system 
and his opponents would not use any other. There were two 
solutions; to go on with the reform, which Addington at first 
supported, or Pitt's plan, supported by contractors, merchants, 
shipwrights and all who stood to lose by the reforms, of 
returning to the old system. It was unfortunate that St. 
Vincent's reforms, begun in peace, were interrupted by a war, 
longer and more desperate than the former. His political 
enemies accused him of abandoning caution, common sense and the 
protection of the country in a reforming crusade. But it was 
just this latter point which drove him on, like an Old Testament 
prophet, to attack the corruption he had seen, and which, 
possibly, blinded him to international dangers.
By 1803 a Parliamentary commission was investigating 
frauds and abuses in the naval departments, Addington was being 
increasingly attacked for his naval policy and for the supposedly 
unprepared state of the country faced with the threat of renewed 
war with France, and was seeking support. Rumours were rife 
of cabinet changes and possible coalition between Pitt and 
Addington. Hints that Lord Melville, as Dundas had become, 
would take the Admiralty decided the 'New'. Opposition to take 
no further part in attacks on the Admiralty, since such attacks 
would only clear the way for Melville and not serve Spencer's 
ambition to return t h e r e . B y  May, war with France had been
1. Court and Cabinets. Buckingham, ed. , 1 1 1 .250-251,Grenville 
to Buckingham,^l5 Feb.1803.
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declared and Pitt had decided to return to office as Prime 
Minister, bending his energies to removing Addington. A 
campaign against the Admiralty, the First Lord and the Commission 
of Naval Inquiry, was therefore begun and much political 
manoeuvering and behind scenes cabinet making went on during 
the next months. By February, 1804 the 'New* Opposition had 
split into two; the larger Grenville group whom Pitt could 
not conciliate, and who amalgamated with Fox and the Old 
Opposition, whose interests and antipathies they shared, and 
the smaller group under Canning who joined Pitt.
Under repeated attacks Addington's nerve broke, he resigned 
on 10 May, 1804 and Pitt returned to form his last ministry, 
in which Lord Melville was First Lord. It was pitifully weak. 
Pitt had difficulty in combating the attacks of the Opposition 
whose attacks were made more bitter by the strong personal 
element which had entered into debates, and was hard pressed to 
find any support. Addington was won over with a seat in the 
Cabinet, and a peerage. The attack against the Admiralty 
having served its turn was now stopped, and Pitt offered command 
of the Channel fleet to St. Vincent, who indignantly refused it 
unless Pitt publicly apologised and denied the false charges he
A
had levelled against him. The latter had no need to do so 
and was taking steps to replace the Parliamentary commission 
with a Royal Commission, headed by Sir Charles Middleton, when 
the issue of the Tenth Report of the Commission of Inquiry,
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dealing with the office of Treasurer of the Navy, on 13 
February, 1805, altered everything* It destroyed for ever 
Melville's public reputation and revealed that while Treasurer, 
he had connived with Alexander Trotter, the Paymaster in 
speculation with public funds, allowing Trotter to place such 
funds to his own account in a private bank, in defiance of the 
law. The speculations in which Trotter engaged were successful, 
and there was no loss to the public, but Melville was involved 
by refusing to answer the Commissioners' questions, by borrowing 
money from Trotter which he must have suspected was public 
money, and by diverting such money from naval to other uses, 
which he would not disclose. Melville's had not been a 
popular appointment and hostile pamphlets and petitions poured 
in demanding his dismissal. The political passions Pitt had 
raised to remove St. Vincent now destroyed his friend.
The publication of the report was greeted with delight 
by Pitts and Dundas's enemies. The venomous attacks made on 
Dundas, the violent speeches and spate of coarse prints,^"were 
a continuation of the methods used to discredit St. Vincent 
and Addington. Fatally easy to rouse, they ware difficult to 
control or subdue. In the forefront of Melville's attackers 
were some of his former colleagues, with members of the Old
1 • M.D.George, English Political Caricature: A Study in Opinion 
and Propaganda, (2 vols. Oxford,1959),11.80.
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Opposition, On 6 April Samuel Whitbread, a brother in law of 
Charles Grey, introduced a motion accusing Melville of applying 
public money to his own use, Pitt's attempt to get the matter 
referred to a select committee was defeated in a tense House 
by the casting vote of the Speaker, The proceedings in the 
Commons then became temporarily chaotic. There were huzzas 
and 'view hallos' as numbers were read, and shouts of "We have 
killed the fox," indicated the strength of party and personal 
feeling.^* Melville resigned the following day to be replaced 
by Middleton, created Lord Barham. A  policy of harassment 
^ew the removal of Melville's name from the list of Privy 
Councillors, an exceptional step revealing great bitterness.
At the same time unsuccessful attempts were made to implicate 
Pitt in Melville's downfall and blacken his character by 
imputing financial frauds to him. Melville's enemies had not 
yet done. There was sufficient evidence for his impeachment 
and proceedings were begun in June, 1805. Examination of 
witnesses took the whole summer but though they uncovered much 
unsavoury practice the committee, of which Whitbread was chairman, 
failed to prove Melville had personally profitted by Trotter's 
transactions.
The rancorous party spirit was not assuaged by the news of 
Trafalgar and only slightly by Pitt's death. His cousin,
1# Matheson, op.cit.,p.350.
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Grenville is said to have wept on hearing the news, but there
was no such emotion for Pitt's closest friend. Even after
Dundas had been acpitted of all charges, except carelessness
Grenville harboured some resentment against him.^*
There were few disagreements between the Admiralty, War
and Foreign Offices after 1801. With the exception of Lord
Hawkesbury, Foreign and VJar ministers were mediocre. Neither
St. Vincent nor Barham attended the Cabinet regularly. Both
took office on the understanding that they need not attend
those Cabinets which did not deal with professional business.
St. Vincent left those meetings which seemed to him time-wasting,
2
Barham was regarded as something of a stop gap. * In June he 
had attended the Cabinet only once since his appointment in May, 
and when 'wanted the other day between five and six.... had
3
gone to drink tea somewhere or other in the City.' * He 
usually submitted a rough draft of the present state of naval 
matters which the Prime Minister corrected and submitted to 
the Cabinet.^*
1. Dropmore M s s .. VIII.387, Grenville to Wellesley, 16 Oct.1806.
2. Bathurst M s s ., pp.45-7, Lord Harrowby to Lord Bathurst,
21 Apl.1805, p.47, Lord Camden to Bathurst, 22 Apl.1805.
3. Aspinall, The Cabinet Council, p.181 nte.
4. P.R.O.30/58/6,f .167, 27 Nov.1805.
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The effects of Cabinet divisions on the conduct of the 
war were often disastrous. Traditional bad relations between 
the services were aggravated because at first the Navy won all 
the battles and the Army floundered under mis-direction. Only 
the best relations between the persons concerned could soothe 
ruffled feelings. But such relations were often far removed 
from the dealings of the War and Admiralty Offices and their 
subordinates, and a seemingly deliberate policy of non- 
co-operation was followed with the Ordnance Board.
In 1784 the latter requested the Admiralty's help in 
testing the durability of different types of gunpowder.^*
Such orders were given but a series of misunderstandings and 
delays at Portsmouth between Ordnance officials and navy officers 
responsible prevented the despatch of the powder. Once the 
war began such lack of co-operation was serious. The failure 
of the Dunkirk expedition in 1793 was partly attributed to the
fact that the gunners had sailed on one ship, while their guns,
2
on an Admiralty transport, never left Woolwich. * In 1805 the 
Admiralty distrusted the proposed use of rockets by the Ordnance 
against enemy vessels. Both Barham and Admiral Keith were ' 
opposed to them and disliked the projector of the scheme, Sir
1. Ad.1/4014, Rogers to Stephens, 5 May, 26 June, 1784.
2. Olson, op.cit., p.97., Windham Correspondence. Rosebery, 
ed., 1.153, Spencer to Windham, 18 Sept.1793.
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Sydney Smith, who was urging the experiment forward with
political help.^*
Quarrels at Cabinet level about suitable commanders for
combined operations sometimes meant delays which prejudiced
the success of the expedition from bad weather or other causes.
Such was the case in the Leeward Isles expedition. Reference
has already been made to the resentment caused at the Admiralty
and the arguments between Dundas and Spencer, over Christian's
appointment. Thanks to these disputes and delays the expedition
did not sail till late autumn when it met severe weather. Twice
it battled against November gales with heavy losses. It left
St. Helens with two hundred transports on 16 November, 1795.
The following day it was caught by a gale and six transports were 
2
lost.* In a second attempt one hundred and thirty four transports
3
were scattered or lost. * On the expedition's second return 
Spencer appointed Admiral Cornwallis commander, but further 
delays, the result of controversy over the Duke of York's 
regulations, were to occur. The controversy surrounding the 
introduction of these regulations illustrates another serious 
problem, never solved, in inter-service relations, that of
1. The Barham Papers. J.K.Laughton, ed.. III.170, Barham to 
? Pitt, 18 Nov.1805., The Naval Miscellany.IV. ed. by
C.Lloyd, (London,N.R.S.vol.XCII,1952),431,Barham to Lord 
Keith, 4 Oct.1805.
2. Victoria County Hist.Dorset, William Page, ed., ii.(l908), 
223.
3. Ad.1/3731.Transport Commissioners to Nepean, 1 Feb.1796.
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divided responsibility.
Since the beginning of the war disputes between naval and 
army officers had been most numerous in the Mediterranean and 
in 1795 they reached a climax. A quarrel between Lieutenant 
Fitzgerald, commanding the 11th foot regiment, acting as 
marines aboard H.M.S.Diadem, and the captain, resulted in 
Fitzgerald's court martial. The latter refused to plead on 
the grounds that Army officers were not amenable to naval courts 
martial and was upheld by his commanding officer. Nevertheless 
he was found guilty of disobedience and dismissed the service. 
There the matter rested but once the combined operation to the 
Leewards was proposed, it revived.
The Duke of York, thinking over the Fitzgerald affair and 
wishing to prevent similar incidents in the Leewards expedition, 
issued new regulations to the Army. Commanding naval officers 
were now allowed only to punish privates and then only if the 
senior army officer on board agreed. Spencer approved these 
regulations but when Admiral Christian saw them he was appalled 
by their implied threat to naval discipline. He protested 
to Spencer that such regulations would destroy all discipline 
in the fleet and wrote to his brother officers at Portsmouth 
telling them of the new regulations. The speedily aroused 
opposition there was led by Admiral Waldegrave, Lord Hugh 
Seymour's brother-in-law. Waldegrave informed Spencer that a 
distinction must be made between troops being carried and those
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acting as marines, and that the regulations should not apply 
to the latter. Spencer, after expressing surprise that there 
was such strong feeling on the matter, agreed, and marines 
temporarily replaced infantry on board ships for the West Indies 
and Channel fleet.
At a second meeting, senior officers at Portsmouth, still 
very angry, registered a protest against the regulations 
which they declared the ruin of the service and illegally 
introduced without Parliamentary sanction, and this protest 
was followed by one from the captains at Portsmouth two days 
later. Admiral Cornwallis, proposed by Spencer as the new 
Commander in Chief of the expedition, was among those admirals 
who protested, though he was then ignorant of Spencer's intention. 
When he learnt of his appointment he was unenthusiastic. The 
regulations were still in existence, though not enforced and 
Cornwallis renewed his demand for their complete withdrawal.
But Spencer was not prepared to humiliate the Army in naval 
eyes; he listened patiently to Cornwallis's complaints, and 
continued to urge the recalcitrant admiral to sea with all speed. 
On 29 February Cornwallis sailed, once more to encounter bad 
weather. Then his flagship had an accident which involved 
returning to Portsmouth, in March, 1796. When Cornwallis 
refused, for health reasons, to shift his flag to a frigate, a 
court martial was summoned. Comprised of his colleagues and 
supporters, it declared him not guilty of disobedience, for his
164
judges considered he was being prosecuted for his opposition 
to Army regulations, and their verdict expressed their own 
sympathies with his views. Thereupon the Admiralty ordered 
him ashore and he was not employed again while Spencer was 
First Lord.^*
This was the most serious dispute between the Army and
Navy over divided responsibility, but not the only one, as
the difficulties of the Transport Board illustrate. The
2
board was created in 1794, “ to centralize transport arrangements 
which had previously been in the hands of the Navy, Victualling 
and Ordnance Boards. From the first it faced obstruction from 
the latter and received little help from the Admiralty, * who 
were not eager to co-operate with a board only partly under 
their control. The War Office shared responsibility for the 
board and Dundas*s suggestions concerning it frequently read 
like commands.^' He altered transport arrangements by direct 
consultation with the board and then informed the Admiralty of
1 • G .Cornwallis-West, The Life and Letters of Admiral Cornwallis,
pp.291-341., The Spencer Papers, J.S.Corbett,ed.,11.131-229., 
Memoir of the Life of Admiral Sir Edward Codrington, ...Lady 
Bourchier, ed., i.38-9.
2. A^. 108/31, pp.1-7, Official Minute, 4 July, 1794.
3. Ibid., p.34, 29 Aug.1794., p.156, 20 Sept.1794.
4. W.0.6/147, p.1-2, 16 July, p.3, 19 July,1794, Dundas to 
Admiralty Commissioners.
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the altered needs of convoys.^* The naval departments' dislike 
of the new creation was thus intensified by its association with 
Dundas, who was suspected of creating a new office for his 
friends and relations. Sir Charles Middleton, another sponsor 
of the board, was suspected of trying to introduce the business 
routine he had failed to achieve elsewhere. Indeed several of 
the first transport commissioners were friends and fellow country­
men of Dundas and Middleton, for example. Captains Gambier,
2
Patton, Searle and Schank. "
Such dislike was easily transferred to field level. In 
the cramped, uncomfortable conditions which obtained in all 
transports every triviality was magnified and quarrels quickly 
flared up.^"
Another source of dispute was the chronic shortage of men 
suffered by both services. In 1795 fifteen regiments had to 
be drafted into the Navy to fill a yawning gap, leaving the 
Army seriously depleted. On foreign service where disease 
thinned the ranks both services needed constant re-inforcements 
and disputed arose as they fought each other for available 
manpower. In 1787 there was such a shortage in India, the
1. Ibid . . pp.34-36, Dundas to Admiralty Commissioners, 31 Aug. 
1794.
2. P.R.O.30/8/365, ff.58-64, Middleton to Chatham, 27 Jan.1794.
3. Ad.1/4330, Lewis to Stephens, 20 Nov.1790, enclosing 
complaint by the officers of the New South Wales Corps, 
embarked on H.M.S.Gorgon. Index 4809, Series III.no.101,
5 Oct.1789, Admiralty to Navy Board.
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Secretary at Vtàr suggested that Army officers be allowed to 
board ships discharging landsmen and enlist them volunteers, 
a suggestion the Admiralty rejected as too inconvenient.^'
There was constant correspondence even in peace, concerning 
the pressing of stray or deserting soldiers. In war pressing 
became frequent and rapacious; so desperate was the need for 
men that the gangs took all they could get without asking too 
many questions. Difficulties arose between Admiralty and War 
Offices, since neither was prepared to give way. The close 
proximity of Army and Navy officers on combined operations 
aggravated disputes over rank and discipline and at Ferrol, in
1800, brought accusations of naval greed for prize-money and
2
counter accusations of army cowardice. *
There were exceptions. The expedition of Sir Charles Grey 
and Admiral John Jervis to the West Indies in 1794 was an 
outstanding exception to poor inter-service co-operation. The 
reason was the good personal relations between the two commanders.
1. Ibid., 2 Nov. 1787, Admiralty to Secretary at War.
2. The Spencer Papers. H.W.Richmond, ed., 111.299,368-371.
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The co-operation between General Abercromby and Admiral Mitchell
at the Helder in 1799 was successful for the same reason.
Despite delays and difficulties and the dislike of the whole
scheme entertained by Spencer and Grenville, the Army and Navy
"pulled heartily together".^* John Graham could write to his
mother that Captain Reynolds of H.M.S.Pomone, was 'as good a man
2
as any in the Navy', * and Sir Ralph Abercromby lived so long 
on board H.M.S.Arethusa with Rear Admiral Harvey, at the capture 
of Trinidad in 1797, that he thought himself 'one of the family.'^" 
It was unfortunate for the conduct of the war that these 
harmonious relations could not be guaranteed in all the Admiralty's 
dealings with other departments and their officers.
Naval officers were often put under the direction of 
Secretaries of State. In such cases the officer wrote direct 
to the Secretary concerned. Occasionally he was ordered to put 
himself under the direction of the ambassador.^* But the 
Admiralty insisted on being 'exactly acquainted with everything 
which passes', and issued sharp reprimands when news was lacking. *
1. Dropmore M ss.,V.345-6, Mitchell to Admiral Duncan, 29 Aug. 
1799.
2. Graham M s s ., p.21, 29 Sept.1799.
3. Brit.Mus., Add.Mss.,29300,A-Y,f.11, Abercromby to Spencer, 
20 Feb. 1797.
4. Nelson's Dispatches. Nicolas, ed., IV.379, Secret Orders 
to Admiral Sir Hyde Parker, 16 Apl.1801.
5. Ibid., 110, Nelson to Nepean, 26 Nov.1799.
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Occasionally British admirals were virtually the only British 
representatives and conducted negotiations with foreign powers 
in addition to other tasks. Collingwood sustained this role 
for years in the Mediterranean. After Copenhagen Nelson 
arranged the armistice between Britain and Denmark.^' and later 
Hyde Parker was authorised to offer an armistice to the Swedes 
and Russians. * Naval officers were thus closely involved 
in the work of the Foreign Office.
In general harmonious relations prevailed between seamen and 
Foreign Office representatives, not merely because relations 
at Cabinet level were good, but because of the lack of inter­
service rivalry and of opportunities for friction.- The help 
of consuls and ambassadors was often essential to seamen for 
the passage of news or arrangement of supplies. When Nelson 
searched for the French fleet in 1798, he paused at Alexandria. 
The British consul, Mr. Baldwin, was absent, his deputy unin­
telligent and the Turks unfriendly. Writing to Baldwin three 
years later. Nelson declared that if Baldwin had been there to 
explain matters to the governor, he would have stayed several 
days, taking in fresh supplies and so have met the French as
1. Ibid.. 332-336, Nelson to Addington, 4 Apl.1801., 337-341, 
Same to the Sams, 9 Apl.1801.
2. Ibid., 349-350, Admiralty to Parker, 17 Apl.1801.
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they entered the bay.^~ The chief diplomatic posts were held 
by men of rank who might have connections with the navy and 
political influence at home. Such were Sir William Hamilton 
at Naples, Spencer Smith and the Earl of Elgin at Constantinople, 
Lord St. Helens at St. Petersburg. Occasionally diplomats
o
might be irritated by seamen's blunt ways or seamen profess 
scorn at time wasting diplomacy. ' But relations were 
generally good and naval superiority was considered a most 
effective argument.^"
In general too British sailors worked well with their allies. 
Duncan charmed the Dutch and Russians with his courtesy. Nelson  ^
the Neapolitans with his victories. Smith was able to deal 
with the Turks, and Ball was idolised by the Maltese. There 
were exceptions; Nelson found co-operation with the Austrians 
difficult and Hood and De Langara, the Spanish admiral before 
Toulon, were on unfriendly terms. Ushakoff, the Russian 
commander of a worthless squadron in the eastern Mediterranean, 
was hostile and suspicious of Turks, British and Neapolitans.
1. 0.Warner, A Portrait of Lord Nelson, pp.150-151.
2. P.R.O.30/8/367, ff.82-3. Hood to Chatham, 20 Oct.1793.
3. Nelson's Dispatches. Nicolas, ed., IV.375, Nelson to Earl
of Carysfort, Î9 May, 1801., The Spencer Papers, J.S.Corbett, 
ed., II.47-8, Jervis to Spencer, Aug.1796.
4. A. Paget, The Paget Papers:diplomatic and other correspondence 
of the Rt.Hon.Sir A.Paget. 1794-1807. i.l86, Elgin to Paget,
8 Mar.1800.
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Lord Bridport hated the French Royalists with whom he had to
collaborate^'and the Admiralty under Chatham and Spencer disliked
the idea of using Frenchmen, even supposed allies, in British 
2service. * Collaboration at all levels depended on the 
personalities of the men involved. This was the element of 
friction* on which the Cabinet, especially Pitt and Dundas, 
rarely counted, but which could hinder or speed the war effort.
1. Windham Correspondence, Rosebery, ed., 11.130, Windham to 
Dundas, 29 Nov.1799.
2. Ibid.. 118, Windham to Grenville, 6 Sept.1799., Parkinson, 
Edward Pellew. Viscount Exmouth,pp.141-2.
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CHAPTER. III.
Naval Finance ; Admiralty relations with the 
Treasury and the commercia1 interest.
The enormous admiration in which the Navy was held, was 
reflected in the readiness with which Parliament granted money 
for naval services, or with which money was subscribed for the 
relief of naval families and the erection of naval monuments. 
Yet most people had never seen a battleship, and of those who 
had, few realised how much it cost to maintain. Dillon tells 
the story of a wealthy farmer visiting the Alcide. in 1791. 
After examining her, he declared himself pleased with all he 
had seen.
'I never was on board a man of war before. The paying 
of the taxes is a constant annoyance to me. I could not 
make out what so much money was wanted for. Now that I 
have seen the Fleet, I don't grudge what I have paid, as,
I begin to understand how the money has been expended.*
Unfortunately not every tax payer was open to such first hand
persuasion. Not even the Government fully realised the exact
cost, since the real reason for the constant shortage of money
and credit seemed to have been not simple dishonesty nor gross
overspending, but 'that all concerned underestimated the real
2
cost of maintenance.* *
1# Dillon's Narrative. M.Lewis, ed., 1.24.
2. Sir 0. Murray, 'The Admiralty* pt.vi, The Mariner's Mirror,
xxiv.no.3 (July,1938) ,330.
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Naval expenditure formed a large part of the budget, even
in peace* This was inevitable when so much of the Navy's strength
lay in ships, yards and docks, which needed constant care to be
efficient. Despite cuts at the end of the American war, by 1786
the Navy was taking one sixth of total expenditure on military 
1.
services. " In the first years of*the war. Army expenditure 
exceeded that of the Navy, partly because of massive recruit­
ment and because, in the three international crises of 1787, 
1790,1791, the Navy had been brought to a high level of 
efficiency at a cost spread over several years. But by 1797 
the Navy and the Naval Debt was again costing almost half of 
total military expenditure. * The cost of the service was 
increased by the recruitment of 100,000 seamen and 20,000 
marines in 1797, a number which rose to 105,000 seamen and 
30,000 marines by 1801, and by the increase in the number of 
commissioned ships, from twenty-nine sail of line and one-hundred- 
and-eleven other ships in 1793 to approximately one-hundred-and- 
forty-two sail of line and five-hundred-and-fifty other vessels 
by June, 1801, Such increased expenses would have been 
impossible to meet but for the financial reforms of 1797 and 
succeeding years.
1. Pari.Pap., Accounts relating to Public Expenditure.1688- 
1801. Accounts and Papers, pp.197,199,203,205 ; 18o8-69, 
xxxv.pt.ii.
2. Ibid., p.219.
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The Admiralty was very largely independent of Treasury 
control, receiving its own revenue and paying its own bills.
Money for the Navy was granted by Parliamentary vote and the 
Treasury exercised little influence over Admiralty finance or 
naval estimates. These were divided into three classes; the 
'Ordinary* estimate for the ships 'in ordinary', or laid up, 
the Sea Service estimate for ships at sea, or 'in commission', 
and the Extra Ordinary estimate for exceptional services or 
for those not fully covered by the proceeding categories.
The first group included payments to principal officers and 
Commissioners of the Navy, superannuated sea officers, pensions 
and allowances to flag and other sea officers, to widows of Navy 
Commissioners, and relations of sea officers, wages to officers 
at the naval yards of Chatham, Deptford, Portsmouth, Plymouth, 
Woolwich and Sheerness, wages to officers at the outports and at 
ships laid up in harbour and repairs to docks, wharves, buildings 
etc. in various yards, and half pay to flag officers and 
officers of Greenwich Hospital.
The principal items of the second group, apart from the 
cost of wear and tear, comprised wages, victuals and ordnance 
for a specified number of men for the fleet, for a year of 
thirteen lunar months, each of twenty eight days. Until 1797 
this annual estimate was calculated on the sum of £4 per man 
per month which could be broken down into 30/- for wages, 27/6 
for wear and tear, 20/- for victuals and 2/6 for ordnance.
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After 1797 it was calculated on the sum of £7 per man per month,
split up into £3 for wear and tear, £1/17 for wages, £1/18 for
victuals, and 5/- for o r d n a n c e *
There was a considerable difference between the two estimates,
the first nearly always being less than the second and its
method of voting being standardised. At the opening session
of Parliament a general resolution was passed by the Commons,
'that a supply be granted to His Majesty.' Certain orders
were then issued in the following traditional form.
'That an estimate of the Ordinary of the Navy for the year 
1785 with the half pay of the Officers of the Navy and 
Marines be laid before this House ...... That an estimate
of the Charge of what may be necessary for the building, 
rebuildings and repair of ships of war in His Majesty's 
yards and other extra works, over and above what are 
proposed to be done upon the Heads of wear and tear and
ordinary for the year 1785 be laid before this House......
That an account of the services incurred and not provided
for by Parliament be laid before this House.  That
an account be laid before this House shewing how the 
monies given for service of 1784 have been disposed of, 
distinguished under the several heads.' 2.
These orders took the form of an address to the King, asking him
to order the preparation of these estimates and accounts, to
which the King in his reply formally agreed.
In consequence of these orders, and often in anticipation
of them, the Treasury sent a letter to the Admiralty, asking
1. Pari.Pap ., Finance Reports, 1798. Select Committee Report. 
No.XXIV. Public Debt and Expenditure for 1797,pp.151,169; 
1803, xiii.
XL
2. Commons Journals .4-71-2.
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them to direct the Commissioners of the Navy and Victualling 
Boards to prepare their annual estimates.^' This letter was 
a pure formality. Prior to the receipt of the Treasury
letter, the Admiralty had issued its ovm instructions for the
preparation of estimates to the Navy Board. When they 
received this estimate the Admiralty made their own revisions 
without Treasury interference, sometimes crossing out unduly 
expensive items. When it was in an acceptable form they sent 
a copy to the Treasury and then presented the estimates to the 
House of Commons, through one of their representatives. The 
House then referred the estimates to a committee of supply and 
voted them without alteration. *
In the second class of estimates, the independence of the 
Admiralty was more strongly marked. The Commons did not call 
for estimates; indeed, there is no evidence that the Admiralty
presented such an accounting to the House, much less to the
Treasury. The number of men to be employed in the coming year
was decided on Admiralty advice, by the King in Council. The
recommendation took the form of an Order in Council, requiring
1. X*27/37,p.lll, George Rose to Philip Stephens, 21 Jan.1785.
2. Ad.3/100, 6 Jan.1785., Ad.2/261, Admiralty Commissioners to 
Navy Commissioners, 6 Jan.1785., Ad.2/584. Stephens to Navy 
Commissioners, 21 Jan.1785.
3. Commons Journals. XL,540-549,605.
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an estimate of costs for maintaining a stated number of men.
This order was then sent, via the Admiralty, to the Navy Board
Commissioners, who reported back to the senior board. The
Admiralty then reported to the King in Council and, as a final
step, notification was given to the Commons and the House voted
supply.^" The Admiralty did not present the proposed numbers
of men as a formal estimate to the Commons. Some informal
communication must have been made to the House, but whatever
the form, the House took it as a matter of course, and debated
and voted the complement, without formal notification, by
2
procedure which was stereotyped. *
The Admiralty, determined to maintain its financial 
independence, insisted on seeing all accounts called for by 
Parliament ojr the Treasury, before they were delivered. * The 
Treasury had virtually no power to interfere with the Admiralty's 
finances, merely acting as book keeper to that Board. It 
could not refuse applications for money from the Treasurer of
1. M . 2/261,p.28,14 Jan.1785., Ad.*3/100,21 Jan. 1785. 106/
2617, 20 Jan.1785. Occasionally alterations in numbers 
were necessary and were made in the same way. See Ad.2/ 
261, p.59-60, 3 Feb.1785., Ad.106/2617, 7 Feb.1785.,
M . 3/100,18 Feb. 1785., M . 27261,pp.87-88, 18 Feb.1785.
2. Commons Journals. XL,479.
3. Ad.99/50,p.I, Undated memo., Ad.110/33,pp.277,278, 4 May,
1785.
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the Navy, since the Navy's total requirements had already been 
fixed by the Admiralty and voted by the Commons, for that year. 
All the Treasury could do was to see that the money was paid 
out as required with due regard to the state of the Exchequer 
and the needs of other public departments. To meet Navy 
requirements easily the Treasury therefore asked the Navy Board 
for a 'scheme of cash* or an approximate forecast of their 
annual demands.^*
Once the money was granted by Parliament the Treasurer of 
the Navy obtained a Privy Seal endorsement, authorising the 
issue of a round sum from the grant. The Treasury warrant and
order were completed and the Treasurer was given credit at the 
Exchequer to the amount named, on which he could draw when the 
respective boards approached him for money. * The desired amount 
in such cases was authorized by letter and the process was 
repeated until the whole sum, authorized by the Privy Seal had 
been used, when the process was repeated until the total amount 
had been used. * Once allotted to a particular service money 
could not be spent on anything else and once used up there was
1. T27/37, p.531, Rose to Navy Commissioners, 19 Aug.1785.
2. Ad.3/104, 5 Jan.1788.
3. J.E.D.Binney, British Public Finance and Administration. 
1774-1792.(Oxford.1958), pp.174-5.
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no borrowing from other heads, so that a fresh application to 
the Treasury was necessary. The practice of granting one total 
sum for all specific naval services continued unchanged till 1798 
and no detailed printed naval estimate of expenditure was 
presented to Parliament till 1810.^"
Under this cumbersome system the Treasurer of the Navy 
who paid all naval expenditure, held a larger balance of money 
than would have been necessary if it had been placed as a 
consolidated fund, applicable to all services. The Treasurer 
was one of the key public accountants holding large sums of 
public money, drawn from the Exchequer. He was the principal 
commissioner of the Navy Board, though he did not perform his 
office in person, delegating his duties to a Paymaster and 
clerks. He was also the Navy's banker, and was allowed to 
pay money received from the Exchequer into his private account, 
from which he might draw the interest as a perquisite. In 
addition to his salary of £2000 p.a. he received fees which 
frequently depended on the amount of money passing through his 
hands, so that it was in his interest, though not in the interest 
of the country, that the government should receive and spend 
large sums, and that he should keep these sums in his hands as
1. Parl.Pao., Accounts relating to Public Expenditure.1688- 
1801. Accounts and Papers.p.671;1868-9,xxxv.pt.ii.
2. Binney, oo.cit .. p.140.
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long as possible.^*
It was not possible for the Treasurer to balance his 
accounts till he left office, and, until this was done, his 
final account with the Exchequer could not be passed to the 
Pipe Office which gave him his final discharge, after which 
his account could no longer be questioned. There were always 
lengthy delays before this happened and many ex-Treasurers 
were allowed to keep the balances of public money in their 
hands for years after they left office. The clerks had thus 
to keep separate accounts for which they received fees from 
the Treasurers or their heirs, and many accounts were open for 
a considerable time.
In their twenty second report the Select Committee on 
Finance gave a list of 'desperate debts' in several offices, 
which, because of length of time or death of creditors, could 
not be paid. The total was over £41^,000,000, of which the 
Navy Board's debt was the largest, just over £3,QO0,OOO, and
the Victualling and Sick and Hurt Boards' debts considerable,
2
many dating from 1685. *
There were several reasons for such delay. One was the 
number of sub-accountants whose accounts had yet to be made up
1. E.Halevy, England in 1815.(London,1949),p.10.
2. Pari.Pap..Finance Reports,1797. Select Committee Report, 
No.XXII. Auditing the Accounts of the Public Receipt 
and Expenditure. The Exchequer. p.503;1803,xii.
180
and cleared before the Treasurer could cast his accounts.
The various boards could call for their accounts and hasten 
the final reckoning and the Committee recommended that they 
do so. Another reason was inadequate numbers of clerks in the 
Navy Pay Office. The Commission of the 1780*s had pointed 
out this difficulty, but the office remained permanently under­
staffed and overworked. Lastly the method of paying seamen's 
wages was cumbersome. Crews were paid on board, but those 
sick, absent or transferred to another ship, as commonly 
happened, could claim their wages later. Such claims could 
carry on for years, yet receipts could not be taken from seamen 
and treated as the Treasurer's vouchers, possibly because of 
the men's illiteracy and ships' books, bearing a record of the 
transactions, were therefore so treated, nor until they closed 
could the Treasurer's accounts be passed and audited.
Considerable delay followed, since ships might be away for years, 
To prevent fraud, it had been decreed that one book could not 
be a voucher for two Treasurers. Thus when a new Treasurer 
took office all ships' books had to be copied out afresh for 
his payments, a labour involving some nine months work.^"
The report of the Commissioners examining public accounts 
brought to a head the general dissatisfaction with this position,
1. Binney, op.cit..pp.143-5.
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In 1785 an act was passed regulating the office of Treasurer 
of the Navy with the support of the holder of that office,
Henry Dundas, transferring custody of the Navy's cash to the 
Bank of England. Such legislative action was intended to 
prevent the Treasurer from speculating with public money for 
his own profit. It was also decreed that a Treasurer should 
take over his predecessor's balances and pay the claims 
outstanding so avoiding the need for ex-Treasurers or their 
relations to hold balances. At the same time the Treasurer's 
salary was increased to £4000 p.a. The act did not specify 
how long money drawn from the Bank might be held by the 
Treasurer, or how and where it might be kept, and these loopholes 
were used against Dundas at his trial in 1805. It was then 
proved that Dundas's paymaster, Alexander Trotter, had withdrawn 
money from the Bank and deposited it at Coutts Bank, where his 
brother was a partner, under his ovm name, and that he had 
speculated with the money to make himself a handsome private 
fortune, though at no cost to the public, all in contravention 
of the spirit, if not the letter of the act.^* Trotter 
exonerated Dundas, in the course of an enquiry into the letter's 
affairs when Treasurer, occasioned by the publication of the 
Tenth Report of the Commission of Naval Enquiry. But Trotter 
refused to answer some of the questions put to him by the 
investigating Commons' committee, for fear of incriminating 
himself, and admitted to a private fortune of over £51,000,
1. Binney, op.cit., pp.145-148
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though he could not remember his fortune when he had been an 
extra clerk at £50 p.a. in the Navy Office. Melville's 
association with Trotter had not brought the former wealth, 
as the investigating committee tried to prove, indeed he was 
often in debt and notoriously careless of money matters. But 
Trotter, by gambling with public money, had achieved a Scottish 
estate, houses in Blackheath and Hampstead and a large fortune.^" 
The final and most troublesome item of the naval estimates 
was the Naval Debt, which, until the financial reforms of 1797, 
plagued successive governments. The Commons called annually 
for an accounting of this debt from the Admiralty who forwarded 
a copy to the Treasury at the same time. The debt itself was 
the result of the Admiralty's antiquated method of estimating, 
which led to constant under-estimating. Thus the Finance 
Committee of 1797 noted that the naval estimate for the year 
was £12,935,496, but that actual expense incurred was 
£14,065,980. * One reason was that the estimates were not 
based on contemporary costs and values, but on the unchanged
1. Brit.Mus., Stowe Ms s.374,f.14 July,1805. Trotters family 
was closely connected with Dundas. His heir married the 
letter's granddaughter, another son John entered the Bengal 
civil service through Dundas's help and a third, a captain 
in the Navy, was named after Dundas. J.Burke, The Landed 
Gentry. (2 vols.London, 1853),11,1435-6.
2. Pari.Pap .. Finance Reports. 1798. Select Committee Report, 
No.XXIV. Public Debt and Expenditure for 1797. p.150.,
1803,xiii.
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seventeenth century figure of £4 per man per month, totally
inadequate by 1797. The Navy Commissioners, when submitting
evidence to the Finance Committee, had warned
'that an Estimate formed for the succeeding year, of the 
probable Expense of the Navy, cannot be considered as an
Account to be depended on; as it can only be formed upon
the best Opinion taken from the Example of former years 
of the War, and a consideration of all the circumstances 
then existing, in addition to which many must arise, 
which cannot be foreseen, or provided for.' •
A further cause of the rising debt was the method of paying
the Navy's creditors. Payments were not made in cash but in
bills, drawn on the Navy, Victualling and Sick and Hurt Boards.
The members of these boards signed bills directing the Treasurer
of the Navy to pay the sum required but there was frequently
insufficient money to meet all the bills presented for payment.
The bills were of two types; Ready Money and In Course. The
first could be cashed on sight, provided there was sufficient
money available, the latter needed further directions before
they could be cashed.
On the receipt of stores the contractor's bill was
registered in a ledger, numbered in the order in which it was
received and Victualling or Navy Bills, bearing the date of
registration, and paid in the same order, as funds were available,
were issued to him. This method of payment was known as the
course system. The time of payment depended on the Boards
Ibid.. p.168, Appendix E2.
184
who were often a year in arrears and without ready money to 
meet their creditors. Because the delay in cashing In Course 
bills was considerable, Navy and Victualling bills had long 
become recognised as transferable, the holder being able to 
sell his bill for what it would fetch, if he poferred slightly 
less ready cash to the Navy's promisory note, often of doubtful 
value. The contractor sold his bill to a broker at a discount 
which varied according to the time between the registration 
and the payment 'on the course*. Speculators in Navy and 
Victualling Bills became established and regular quotations 
of market prices were published for them as for other stock, 
fluctuating according to the expectations of early or late 
payment by the Navy. This had a harmful effect on the price 
of naval stores, for when the Navy bills were at a discount 
the contractors raised their prices to cover themselves for 
possible loss when payment was due, either by raising the 
price of their next tenders, or by allowing for the increase in 
their original one after studying the discount rates. The 
naval debt was thus increased and naval credit collapsed under 
the strain. The Treasury assigned funds to pay both Victualling 
and Navy bills and until 1796 a discount rate was regularly 
quoted in the press.
Special, though unavailing efforts, were made by successive 
governments to pay off the Naval debt by making additional 
Parliamentary grants, and by December, 1785, thanks to a period
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of peace and a fall in the discount rates, it had been cleared 
to June, 1783, and bills were regularly paid. Thereafter 
despite peace, it rapidly increased and by 1789 stood at nearly 
£2,000,000.^* By May, 1791 it was seriously in arrears and 
the uncertain political situation had brought a rise in rates.
The credit of the Victualling Board was able to stand this until 
1793, when the war arid arrears in payment, caused a price rise.
An act of Parliament of 1794, whereby the Navy and Victualling 
bills from April, 1794 were payable at 15 months from the date 
of issue, with interest from the dates of registration, 
temporarily reduced the discount rates. But in 1796 it rose 
again, to be established in 1797 when an act was passed for 
the payment of all contractors by 90 day bills bearing interest
i
of 3%d per £100 p.d. from the date of the bill, which was equal 
to £5.6.5^% p.a. This ended the course system and because 
payment was at a certain rate, bills were no longer subject 
to discount. The rate of interest was reduced to 3d per 
£100 p.d. in 1803 and remained stable until 1819.^' The Finance 
Committee's recommendation that estimates be large enough to 
support government credit by punctual payment to contractors, 
was also effected.
1. Binney, oo.cit.,pp.141-2.
2. Sir William Beveridge and Others, Prices and Wages in 
England  from the Twelfth to the Nineteenth Century,I . 
Tbondon,  1939), 526-7.
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Despite the inconvenience attending payment, government 
contracts were highly profitable and eagerly sought. Though 
Lord Sandwich has generally been regarded as one of the most 
corrupt of First Lords in this respect, giving contracts in 
retur,n for political support, accordingtto Middleton, he was no 
worse than his successors.^" Certainly blatant examples of 
favoured contractors occurred after Sandwich had left the Board. 
In 1783 John Slade, one of the Victualling Commissioners, became 
involved in the trial of Christopher Atkinson, corn factor to 
the Victualling Board. Slade was deeply implicated in 
successful fraudulent attempts to gain money by overcharging,
and though he was not dismissed, Atkinson, M.P. for Hedon, a
2
borough with Admiralty connections, "was expelled from the 
House. The political connections of government contractors 
were to bedevil naval administration for some years.
Before the war the majority of articles for the Navy,
Victualling and Sick and Hurt Boards had been supplied by tender 
in answer to advertisements inserted in the newspapers, or by 
standing annual contract. If the former the contracts were 
stipulated as being for a number of months, usually six or 
twelve 'certain* and a given number provisionally. On an 
appointed day the contractors and the Board met. After some 
haggling the latter accepted the lowest tenders, except for
1. The Barham Papers. J.K.Laughton, ed., 11,10.
2. Namier and Brooke, Hist, of Pari.. 1.434,11.31.
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hops where quality was essential, refusing those whose prices 
were too high and re-advertising if dealers attempted to form 
a combine. It was at this meeting that quantities and times 
of delivery were settled. Difficulties were sometimes experienced 
when no tenders were forthcoming and the Board was then 
compelled to grant higher prices. Thus Alexander Donaldson, 
contractor for victualling the sick at Jamaica hospital, had his 
tender of 2/3dper man per day, accepted by the Sick and Hurt 
Board in June, 1789 although it was 3^d per day more than 
formerly. Only two months before Donaldson had stated his 
intention of giving up the unprofitable contract and there was 
no-one at Jamaica to replace him.^* In 1793 Edward Bayntun, 
contractor at Antigua, begged to be allowed an additional 
to his original contract price of 2/bi^d per man per day, because 
of rising costs. To this the Board agreed, because in 1792 
Bayntun had been the only merchant to submit a tender and a
o
refusal of his request might mean he would not contract again. *
But when this policy became too common and expensive the Board 
decreed that no future additions should be made without
3
Admiralty orders. '
1. M.99/50,p.39, 17 April, 1789,p.42, 26 June, 1789.
2. Ad.99/51.p.33-38. 18 Sept.1793.
3. Ibid.. pp.114-116, 4 Mar.1796.
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After 1793 increasing numbers of articles were bought on 
commission employing a dealer as agent with a percentage fee 
and costs, or by private tender. Thus the Sick and Hurt 
Board employed the appropriately named Mr. Bonus, a slop 
dealer, as agent and later supplier of clothing to prisoners of 
war, as 'more eligible than advertising for tenders, having a 
dépendance on his supplying proper articles at a fair price', 
though this was contrary to the spirit of open competition.^"
The Victualling Board's argument "was that in war open contracts 
would have disturbed the market, raised prices, created a 
combine and even passed information to the enemy. The latter 
was possibly true, since the public advertisements stated time 
and place of delivery for large amounts of stores. But there 
was an equal danger that by the secret methods adopted, the 
merchants would form a combine to crush opposition and raise 
prices, as happened in the dockyards with timber supplies.
When stores were urgently needed and difficult to get the 
Boards commissioned agents to buy foreign stores independently 
as well as those under contract. The agents thus employed 
were usually the merchants already serving the Board, but in 
this case they charged the Board the purchase price, incidental
1. AX.99/51,p.40, 14 Oct.1793.
2. Pari.Pap..Finance Reports. 1797. Select Committee Report,
No.XXXII., The Victualling Board.p.5 08;1803.xiii.
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costs, freight charges, and insurance and a commission 
percentage^; and received imprests before and during the 
transactions. The total cost was therefore higher but the 
supply more certain, though the Boards always returned to the 
contract system whenever possible. There were dangers in 
this method and careful supervision was needed to prevent gross 
overcharging. In 1795 Sir Andrew Hamond, the Comptroller, 
interfered personally to buy hemp and timber at Riga, to prevent 
the French buying up all supplies. The bargain, struck without 
the knowledge of the rest of the Navy Board, revealed the extent 
of Hamond*s ignorance and the dangers inherent in the system. 
Hamond allowed the special agent he used a commission of 5% on 
the best terms, and to Thornton and Son, the bankers who handled 
the financial arrangements in the Baltic, a commission of 2^o. 
This compared unfavourably with previous special arrangements 
when a maximum of A-% had been allowed and once the Navy Board
o
heard of the new percentages they reduced them to that figure. * 
The main contract for foreign stores was made in early
1. ADiW/G793, 4 Dec. 1804, Solly and Son of Danzig agreed to 
supply beef to the Mediterranean fleet at a commission 
of 2î^o. Since 1799 the same firm had been supplying the 
Victualling Board with barrel staves. Ad.2/623.p.110,
Nepean to Geo.Hammond, 26 Jan.1799.
2. B.Pool, "Navy Contracts in the Last Years of the Navy Board, 
1780-1832.* The Mariner's Mirror. I.no.3 (August. 1964), 
161-176.
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spring, between February and April. The bulk of naval stores
came from the Baltic and the contractors merchants trading
with those countries. It was important that contracts were
made before the fleets sailed and terms of delivery were usually
completed before Christmas to give traders eight to ten months
to make their arrangements. Terms of delivery varied according
to the country of origin. Contractors supplying British
manufactured goods or agricultural produce delivered their goods
1
free, though they might come from a considerable distance.
Baltic goods were cheaper at the Thames yards, a delivery 
allowance being paid by Portsmouth and Plymouth, but North 
American stores were cheaper at the latter and delivery charges 
were always higher in war because of the increased cost of 
insurance. Thus in 1778 premiums of two and a half guineas 
were charged on return voyages to the Baltic without a convoy 
and of one guinea with one. In 1793 the price had risen to 
three guineas with a convoy to Stettin and double without. 
Charges to China and the East Indies were higher as befitted 
the distance and extra hazards. In 1793 the premium on a 
return voyage from St. Helena was ten guineas without a convoy 
and three guineas with one, and in 1794 most 'respectable 
insurers' were charging ten to twelve guineas, for ships sailing
1. For example from South Wales and Yorkshire.CHA/l/l,p.38, 
4 July,1793, p.68,14 April,1795.
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without convoys. Ships sailing alone were charged according 
to their armament, five to ten guineas in 1793, eight to fifteen 
a year l a t e r . T h e  delivery charges for hemp at Portsmouth 
rose from 10/- in peace to 30/- in war, and of pitch and tar 
at Plymouth from 15/- to 30/-.^* There was a similar price 
fluctuation in victuals; beef was dearer in London than at 
western yards, sugar and spices cheaper. *
Grain and its products, hops, peas, coal, rum, rice, 
raisins and sugar were supplied by various traders, with 
varying lengths of contract, to the Victualling Board, which 
was often forced to accept several differing tenders on the 
same day to get the amount needed. Some contractors supplied 
several types of goods or supplied all boards. From 1760 the
main contract for British tallow was held by the dealer
supplying the Victualling Board with salt beef in barrels.
Solly and Son of Danzig supplied the Navy Board with timber
and the Victualling Board with beef and barrel staves.^'
Those contractors who held quarterly or annual contracts.
1. P .3.0.30/8/365,ff.9-13,10 Jan.1795, Memorandum by Sir John 
Julius Angerstein to Pitt.
2. Beveridge, op.cit.. 619.
3. Ibid.. 698-9.
4. See above p.189.
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usually for timber, iron, pitch, hemp, meat, butter, cheese, 
salt, vinegar or for the supply of chests of spices to the 
sick ; often supplied the boards for a number of years, and 
though on the renewal of their contract they had to compete 
once more against all comers, the contract tended to become 
consolidated in one family or group of families or firms, 
which had the experience and organisation to keep its prices 
down and outbid its rivals. Thus Peter Samuel and William 
Mellish in turn supplied beef, first at London and Chatham, 
then at Dover and Portsmouth from 1760 to 1829}' and Mellish 
and Sons gained the meat contract for Greenwich Hospital in 
1786. • Important contracts always tended to become limited 
to small numbers of merchants, because they involved such 
large quantities of stores that only those accustomed to 
supplying them could submit tenders.
Few firms could undertake to supply meat for forty thousand 
men on the cheapest and best terms, or the three thousand loads 
needed to build a seventy four gun ship, at steadily rising 
costs throughout the war, from £17/17 to £36 per ton. * A
1. Beveridge, oo.cit.. 516.,ADA/D36, 31 July, 1787, Abstract 
of Contracts.
2. M.*67/35,p. 192, 23 Sept.1786.
3. C.Derrick, Memoirs of the Rise and Progress of the Roval 
Navy. (London,1805),p.252.
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third rate required a mainmast of thirty six yards in height 
and thirty six inches in diameter. Such large sticks were 
difficult to find and an extra inch added greatly to the cost. 
Thus a single stick of American pine thirty five yards by thirty 
five inches cost £88, but one of thirty six yards cost £110.^* 
This meant a large capital outlay and a long wait for their 
profits, because of the frequently parlous state of naval credit, 
which only a few contractors could contemplate.
Such men were John Larking and William Bowsher, who 
virtually controlled the timber supply during the Napoleonic 
wars and formed a combine to force up prices and dictate to 
the Navy Board. When Lord St. Vincent became First Lord he 
attempted to break the timber combine and appointed timber 
inspectors to examine deliveries. Larking and Bowsher thereupon 
withheld all supplies and a desperate situation occurred after 
1803, The blockading ships grew more in need of repair and 
the squadrons smaller as these repairs were delayed. Lord 
Melville succeeded St. Vincent in May, 1804, and immediately 
Capitulated to the timber dealers, who allowed enough timber 
to the yards to patch up thirty nine sail of line in time for 
Trafalgar. Of the twenty seven ships at that battle, seventeen 
were repaired after the surrender to the dealers, and after
1. R.G.Albion, 'The Timber Problem of the Royal Navy, 1652-
1862', The Mariner's Mirror, xxxviii. no.I (February,1952), 
4-22.
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1805 a more serious shortage of timber, which not even Larking 
and Bowsher could remedy, strained the Navy’s resources to 
the limit.
Such contractors were not unique. Frequent complaints
of inferior quality hemp, contract rope, salt, and victualling
stores appear in commanders' despatches and inter-departmental 
2
letters. * The contractors were powerful enough to dictate 
their own terms and unscrupulous enough to do so in a national 
crisis. In association with private ship builders, whose fat 
profits, gained by building Royal Navy ships on contract, St. 
Vincent stoppe-d, they drove the First Lord from office to be 
replaced by the more complacent Lord Melville. Pitt was a 
party to this unworthy alliance and rewarded his supporters, 
such as Robert Wigram, with places or baronetcies.
On 6 May, 1805, Wigram wrote to Pitt requesting a baronetcy 
and setting out the services which deserved this reward, he 
was head of the firm of Wigram and Sons, merchants and East India 
agents. He was managing and principal owner of nine East India
1. For fuller details see R.G.Albion, Forests and Sea Power: 
The Timber Problem of the Royal Navy,1652-18627 (Harvard ' 
Economic Studies, vol.xxxix, 1926.)
2. ADIv1/D36, 7 Jan.1785, James Morrison to John Slade.,P.R.G. 
30/8/255, Port of London Papers, 1783-97, pp.218-243, 
circa 1791, concerning Thomas Weston, a salt supplier to 
Deptford., Pari.Pan., The Taking of Fees and Perquisites
in Public Offices,etc.. Reports from Commissioners.No.VIII. 
The Victualling Board,p.572; 1806,vii.
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ships. He had considerable investments in iVieux' brewery, v\/as 
interested in a patent ropery, ‘which renders the British Navy 
more independent of the Northern powers for hemp', and was M.P. 
for Fowey.^* Wigram was a good example of the criss-cross of 
commercial and shipping interests embracing East and West Indian 
connections and associated with the City and Lloyds. The 
latter were 'a source of intelligence and an instrument for 
shipping control' as well as 'the best channel of communication 
between the Admiralty and the shipping community as a whole'. '
The secretary regularly requested that members might see the 
Admiralty convoy lists, to discover which ships had recently 
sailed. * In permitting Lloyds to see these official and possibly 
secret lists, the Admiralty acknowledged the importance of the 
co-operation of the trading interest. Lloyds were equally 
conscious of the need to co-operate.^" Both boards agreed that 
trade must support the war, and that regular convoys would play
1. P.R.G.30/58/6, f.64, 6 May,1805. His letter of thanks for 
the baronetcy is Ibid., f.l29, 30 Sept.1805.
2. C.R. Fayle, 'Shipowning and Marine Insurance', The Trade 
Winds, ed. by C.N.Parkinson.(London,1948),p.44.
3. A d .1/3992, Thomas White to Evan Nepean, 4 Feb.1796.
4. Ad.1/3992, White to Nepean, 30 Dec.1796.
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an important part in preserving the fleet.
The importance of convoys was recognised by insurance firms 
(See above p.190) and increasingly stringent efforts were made 
to prevent 'running ships', which sailed alone, 'tempted by 
hopes of extraordinary gain, and not without suspicion in
o
numerous instances of fraud and collusion', evading the convoy 
system. Acts were passed in 1798 and 1803 imposing duties and 
licences and extracting heavy penalties from those who tried to 
evade the convoy's protection. Though merchants grumbled
o
Lloyds supported the Admiralty and the scheme was soon accepted. * 
The Admiralty had often to resist heavy pressure from commercial 
interests who would have sacrificed the Navy's other tasks to 
convoy duty. A powerful parliamentary lobby among merchants 
was able to get the Admiralty to listen to, sometimes adopt its 
plans for the protection of t r a d e . T h e  Chairmen of Lloyds, 
such as Angerstein or Thornton, were M.P.'s and personal friends 
of Pitt who listened to their advice. Lloyds sent memorials to
1. P.R.0.30/8/365, ff.42-3, Middleton to Chatham, 31 May,?1793. 
At the illuminations to mark George Ill's jubilee in 1809 
Lloyds displayed a transparency of a ship, anchors and 
tridents and a motto, 'Ships Colonies and Commerce.' M.D. 
George, English Political C aricature: A Study in Opinion 
and Propaganda, 11.84 nte.
2. P.R.O.30/8/364(1),ff,1-4, Undated Memorandum, Chatham to 
George III.
3. A.C.Wardle, 'The Newfoundland Trade', The Trade Winds,
C.N.Parkinson, ed.,p.236.
4. Ad.2/119,pp.325-7, Stephens to George Spence, 30 Dec.1790.
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the Admiralty urging the adequate protection of the East and 
West Indian and Baltic convoys against enemy attacks in the 
Channel, to which the Admiralty was compelled to listen and on 
which they acted with promptness.^" Nor were London merchants 
the sole agitators. Other ports possessed pressure groups who 
could exploit the anxieties of the Admiralty, or support its 
efforts. The Bristol and Liverpool merchants could command 
some Parliamentary interest and often had personal naval
o
connections which gave added point to their views. The whole 
merchant community regarded the Navy as 'the favourite and
3
popular Branch of the Public Service', "but their support was 
not unqualified. They considered the Navy's primary duty, and 
the Admiralty's chief concern was the protection of trade and 
were constantly pressing for more frigates for convoy duty or 
to protect the scattered colonial possessions where their 
trading interests lay"^*and were capable of using Secretaries of
1. A d .1/3992, John Bennet and T. White to William Marsden,
8 May,1804., Nelson's Dispatches, Nicolas, ed., VI.80-81, 
Nelson to Marsden, 21 June,1804.
2. Gloucester County Record Office, Bragge-Bathurst Papers, 
D421x6/1-34, x6/11, Mr. Daubeny to Charles Bragge-Bathurst, 
10 June, 1796.,P.R.O.30/8/250,pt.I,f.42, 23 Feb.1795, A 
memorandum from the merchants of Liverpool to the Admiralty.
3. Ibid., f.32, 9 Feb.1795, Memorandum from the shipowners of 
Sunderland.
4. The Spencer Papers, J.S.Corbett,ed., 1.247-255, Dundas to 
Spencer, 22 Apl.1796, enclosing letters from two Jamaica 
planters.
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State of His Majesty's consuls to express their v i e w s . M a n y  
of the Admiralty lords themselves had connections with the 
various trading or commercial interests, particularly the East
o
India Company, and several were M.P.'s in the Company's interest. 
In and out of Parliament the commercial interest was able to 
bring pressure to bear on the Board and besieged the Admiralty 
with requests for more convoys, or attacked them for neglecting 
the nation's true interests. The Admiralty were well aware of
Hic im pcrvfonci-
^keeping the supply lines open, not only for the country's good, 
but to ensure a regular supply of naval stores and food, but 
it was equally aware that convoys were not the best way to do 
this. With limited resources it would have been foolishness 
to dissipate the concentrated strength of fleets over a wide 
area searching for privateers or commerce raiders. The most 
effective way of protecting merchantmen was to clear the seas 
of the enemy fleets and blockade their ports effectively.
Some losses were inevitable. The French had Xttle trade 
themselves and concentrated their ships on a guerre de course.
It was impossible, the Admiralty argued to sweep away all 
privateers and the only solution was to bear the individual
1 • A 'Ttie Paget Papers:diplomatic and other correspondence of
the Rt.Hon.Sir A.Paget, 1794-1807,1. 309, Paget to Admiral 
Lord Keith, 9 Feb.1801.
2. C.H.Philips, The East India Company,1784-1834, (Manchester,
1961), Appendices I & IV.
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losses stoically as not great enough to affect the prosperity 
of the whole. This was cold comfort to those who had lost, 
but the argument was sound and the proof was in increased trade 
throughout the period. One indication of this vyas the opening 
of the West India docks in 1801, the London and Surrey docks 
between 1800 and 1804 and of the East India docks in 1806, to 
accommodate the profitable increase. At the same time marine 
insurance rates fell from 25% in 1790 to 6% in 1810.^*
1. A.Briggs, The Age of Improvement,1783-1867,(London,1959). 
p.162., See also Bragge-Bathurst Papers, D42lx/17/22, 
Nicholas Vansittart to Charles Bragge, 4 July,1801.
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CHAPTER IV.
The Financial System of the Admiralty Office.
Like other old established government departments, the 
Admiralty was virtually independent of the Treasury, but the 
period saw a gradual change whereby the Admiralty’s financial 
independence was slowly diminished. By 1806 there were small 
yet significant pointers to the Treasury’s ultimate dominance. 
The supply of office stationery had been removed from private 
contract to another government department, the Stationery 
Office, over which the Treasury had control. Fees were 
abolished, the Treasurer of the Navy and his sub-accountants 
no longer were allowed to hold large sums of public money from 
which they could derive a personal advantage. More adequate 
salaries and a generous pension scale had been introduced, 
preparing the way for a truly professional civil service in 
the nineteenth century. Some of this was the work of 
Parliamentary committees, exerting outside pressure on all 
offices, but some of the reforms were the work of the Admiralty 
itself, attempting to maintain the office as one which would 
continue to attract suitable recruits by being lucrative, 
responsible and a fitting occupation for ’gentlemen’.^'
Various fees, gratuities and allowances supplemented the
1. Stat.1/1,0.307, Thomas Kite to Nepean, 10 Feb.1802, 
referring to the Admiralty clerks in this way.
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salaries of most officials in government departments. A 
regular schedule of fees existed in the Admiralty carefully 
graded from £5/7/6 for making out a commission to flag rank, 
or a warrant for a commissioner of the Navy, Victualling or 
Sick and Hurt Boards, to one of 2/6 for issuing a protection 
from the press gang.^* £152,019/11/1 was received in fees 
between 1769 and 1798 according to the Lords Commissioners 
report to the Privy Council in 1799.^' The Admiralty paid 
fees as well as receiving them. The largest sums were to the 
Exchequer when drawing bills on that office. Until 1794 they 
amounted to £3000 annually, then they rose first to £6000, then 
to £9000 finally reaching a peak in 1800 at £12,000.^" The 
commissioners themselves paid fees to the Home Office on the 
issue of a new patent of Admiralty, the First Lord at the rate 
of £100, the other commissioners at £50. Occasional smaller 
amounts were paid on Treasury warrants, and an annual fee of 
three guineas went to the Post Office clerks for sending daily 
and weekly lists of packet boats. There were occasional
1. Pari.Pap., The Taking of Fees and Perquisites in Public 
Offices etc.. Reports from Commissioners.No.III.The 
Admiralty.pp.123-124,Appendix 28;1806,vii.
2. Pari.Pap., Finance Reports,1798. Select Committee Report 
Proceedings of the Admiralty on Finance Reports.G.p.805; 
1803,xiii.
3. Ad,. 17/222.
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payments on commission of officials appointed to Vice Admiralty 
courts and fees to the Home Office for patents passed under 
the Great Seal, bestowing knighthoods on deserving naval officers 
for feats of conspicuous gallantry^'and a regular fee of
o
approximately ten guineas annually on venison warrants. ' Except 
for those paid on the Exchequer bills and those for the new 
Admiralty patent, these fees were all paid out of the contingent 
expenses by the chief clerk.
The basic salaries of the secretaries were good. Philip 
Stephens, the first secretary from 1783-1795, earned £800 p.a. 
Ibbetson, his deputy, earned £600. Both men were also 
secretaries to the marine department at £300 and £200 p.a. 
respectively. Thanks to the fees they received their total 
net salaries were much higher than those of the Lords Commiss­
ioners. Stephens' fees in 1784 were £1,184/4/2, increasing 
his salary to £2,146/8/8 and Ibbetson*s fees amounted to 
£358/16/6 in the same year, which raised his salary to 
£1,197/8/6. The basic salary of the chief clerk was £200,
1$ Ad.17/8,1800. £198/10/6 for Sir Edward Hamilton, knighted
for re-capturing H.M.S.Hermione from the Spaniards.
2. I have been unable to find further details of these, but
they may be similar to the three fat bucks in summer and
three does in winter to which the auditors of the
Exchequer-were entitled from the royal parks and forests. 
Pari.Pap . . Finance Reports.1797. Select Committee Report. 
No.XXII. Auditing the Accounts of the Public Receipt and 
Expenditure. The Exchequer.p.456,Appendix Bl;1803,xii.
203
supplemented by fees to £804/^8. The salaries of the six 
established clerks ranged from £431/1/9 to £113/8/3, which 
included all their fees and other emoluments. Without these 
allowances their basic salaries only ranged from £150 to £60 p.a. 
All the junior or extra clerks earned a basic wage of £50 p.a. 
swelled by occasional fees for copying Parliamentary papers, 
to a maximum of £57 to £77. One of these clerks, Robert 
Maxwell, earned £100 p.a. as French and Spanish translator, 
until 1787, when payment ceased by Admiralty, o r d e r . T h e  
two marine clerks were slightly better off at £180 and £80 p.a. 
which, with fees and with sundry small allowances, as agent for 
Portland garrison or purser to a ship 'in ordinary', they 
increased to £245/19/6 and £97/17 respectively.^*
In 1784 the total expense of the Admiralty office, including 
salaries, pensions and contingencies was £27,227/18/-!^, By 1797 
it had almost doubled to £52,668/14/8%.^* There had been an 
annual increase of £5,325 in office salaries, partly from an 
increased number of clerks employed and partly from the
1. Ad.22/4,p.158.
2. Pari.Pap..The Taking of Fees and Perquisites in Public 
Offices etc.. Reports from Commissioners.No.III.The Admiralty, 
pp.126-7, Appendix 30;1806,vii.
3. Pari.Pap., Finance Reports, 1797. Select Committee Reports.
No.XVII. The Admiralty Board, the Navy Board, the Navy
Pay Office, the Marine Pay Office.p.341;1803,xii.
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augmentation of the salaries of some of the permanent clerks as 
a reward for the amount of war business. Since 1795 the 
establishment of three new offices, that of Hydrographer, the 
Inspectors of Telegraphs and of Naval Works.,, formed a principal . 
item of this increase, amounting to £3,650 each year.^" The 
increase had been gradual but pressure for increase was inexorable; 
after 1787 there were no diminutions until 1795 when there was 
a slight reduction. But this was almost immediately offset
by increases in salaries and allowances totalling over £1,200
2
for that year alone. *
The basic salaries of the established clerks had not altered, 
though their fees had increased enormously in wartime. Nepean, 
the first secretary, earned £5,242 p.a. in 1797 of which £4,340 
came from fees; the second secretary's basic wage, increased 
from £600 to £800 in 1790, was swollen by three times the amount 
of fees his predecessor had received, making a total of 
£1,931/18. Charles Wright, the chief clerk, more than doubled 
the fees he received during the war. Like his predecessor.
Sir Harry Parker, he received a two per cent allowance on the 
amount of contingent bills he paid. His total net salary in 
1797 was £1,383/11/8 compared with Parker's salary of £804/2/8
1. Ibid.,0.328.
2. Ibid.,p.335,Appendix Dl.
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in 1784. The senior established clerk, Joseph Belson, had a 
total net salary of £568/10/9, approximately £300 more than 
his predecessor had received thirteen years earlier, the primary 
cause being the amount of fees he took, now five times as much 
as in peace.
The basic salaries of the fifteen extra clerks were
increased in 1790 and now ranged from £110 to £90, plus five
guineas a year for the majority for preparing papers for
Parliament. In addition Mitchel Hollingsworth, first extra
clerk, was granted an allowance of £205/5 for his care in
managing the secret order branch of the office. One other
extra clerk, James Cutforth, appointed in September, 1794 by
2
Admiralty order, "had an extra allowance of £150 as reading 
clerk to the Board. This appointment, together with that of 
keeper of the minutes, at £150, was the result of Middleton's 
departmental re-organisation.
It had generally been conceded by the Commissioners of the 
1780's that the salaries of Admiralty clerks were inadequate 
to the work performed and, more important, to the trust reposed 
in them. They were not graded by length of service and, unlike 
clerks of other departments, were given no official proportion­
ate increase in salary during the war for the extra work they
1. Ibid., pp.338-339,340-341.
2. Ad.22/6,0.178.
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performed. An official superannuation scheme did not exist. 
Clerks paid part of their salary to their predecessors as a 
reward for the vacancy to which they succeeded. Thus in 1797 
Charles Wright, the chief clerk, and Joseph Belson, the senior 
established clerk, were paying Thomas Fearne, the former senior 
clerk, £62/10 p.a. each from their salaries, as part of an 
annuity, since by his resignation they had obtained their 
positions. William Pearce, paid £25 annually to James Freshfield 
for the same purpose.^*
To remedy this state of affairs the Commission investigating 
fees in the 1780*s recommended that clerks be arranged in three 
classes,according to seniority, and their wages increased 
accordingly; that certain fees should continue, being placed 
under the responsibility of one of the senior clerks and collected 
into a fee fund used by the Admiralty to defray the costs of 
stationery and contingencies. The cost of these items would 
be covered in war by the money derived from fees, but if in
peace amounts were insufficient, money from the sale of old
naval stores, always amounting to many thousands of pounds,
could make up the deficiency. The purpose of abolishing fees
in this manner, begun in all government departments at this 
time, was to reduce public expenditure and indirectly lessen
1. Parl.PaP., Finance Reports,1798. Select Committee Report 
No.XXXI. The Admiralty, Dockyards and Transports.p.501, 
Appendix FI;1803.xiii.
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the amount of patronage a minister had at his disposal. The 
joint purpose of the 'economical reform* movement would thus 
be fulfilled. All fees, gratuities, perquisites or other 
emoluments, not strictly allowed by the office were to be 
abolished as,
* a species of emolument very liable to abuse: it may be 
a reward for civility, favour, or extra service; it may 
be also the purchase of undue preference, expedition, and 
in some cases, of procrastination. Flowing, at first, 
from the liberality of opulence, the ostentation of vanity, 
or the design of cunning, it very soon assumes the name 
of custom, and becomes a claim, submitted to, to avoid 
the imputation of meanness, and frequently to the great 
inconvenience of contracted circumstances.* i*
To reinforce their determination that fees and gratuities should 
disappear the Commission had proposed that clerks should enter 
into a bond of three times their annual salary to faithfully 
perform their duties. That if they broke this bond, or took 
any fees other than those allowed, or acted as agents, or had 
any interest in naval stores or provisions, they should lose 
the bond, be dismissed from the service and never employed 
again in a civil capacity.
The Admiralty were unsympathetic to these recommendations, 
and when the Select Committee on Finance made their investiga­
tions, they discovered that the Board had followed a policy 
of passive resistance to the proposals of 1787. No fee fund 
had been established, no pension scheme was in existence. Clerks 
had been graded into established or extra ranks according to
1. The Annual Register, vol.XXVIII.1786.197.
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their seniority, but the basic salaries of the former had not 
increased to compensate for the abolition of fees, which 
therefore continued unabated. The explanation given in a 
letter of 29 June, 1797, from Nepean, the Admiralty secretary, 
was that the proposed establishment was inadequate and the 
proposed salaries insufficient for the 'constant and laborious 
service* performed by the s t a f f . D e s p i t e  the protests of 
the Finance Committee the Admiralty succeeded in staving off 
proposed alterations in the status quo, until 1799, when they 
made their own report on the Finance Committee's findings, to 
the Privy Council. In this report they gave grudging agreement 
to the principle they had obstructed for over ten years; the 
payment of salaries free from all fees. But they were doubtful 
whether office business would ever be conducted 'with the same 
facility and dispatch as under the former system.*
In its opposition to the recommendations of the Select 
Committee of 1797 and previous commission of enquiry, the 
Admiralty at first sight appears re-actionary. In fact its 
counter proposals were more generous and its attitude to its 
employees more liberal than the apostles of 'economic reform*.
1. Pari.Pap.. Finance Reports 1797. Select Committee Report. 
No.XVII. The Admiralty, the Navy Board, the Navy Pay 
Office, the Marine Pay Office.pp.328,330,Appendix A;
1803,xiio
2. Parl.PaP.4 Finance Reports. 1798. Select Committee Report 
Proceedings of the Admiralty on Finance Reports.G.p.801; 
1803,xiii.
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There was some danger that future recruits to the clerical 
staff would be deterred from entering the service by the 
economies proposed by the Finance Committee. Though the latter 
had suggested increases in the salaries of the secretaries, the 
first to have £2000 p.a. and the second £^2*00@ p.a. and of the 
senior clerks to £400, £350, £300 and so on, in descending order 
of seniority, their recommended abolition of all fees and 
gratuities would have actually reduced these salaries below the 
level of what the secretaries and clerks earned in peace. The 
Admiralty therefore proposed, more realistically, a salary of 
£4000 for the first secretary in war and £3000 in peace, and 
to the second of £2000 in war and £1500 in peace, as being more 
suitable for the hard work they performed and for the trust 
placed in them. The Admiralty's establishment was more 
extensive than that of the Select Committee and more generous 
in its pay scales. Its cost annually exceeded that of the 
Select Committee by £4,543 in peace and £7,118 in war, but the 
Board did not consider these salaries exceeded what ought to 
be given to trustworthy officials. They were as follows.^"
1. Ibid.. pp.801-802.
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Select Committee's Recommendations• Admiralty Recommendations.
1st. senior clerk
2nd. » "
3rd. " "
4th. " "
5th. " "
6th. “ "
Receiver of Fees and 
Paymaster of Contin­
gencies.
3 first junior clerks 
5 other *' "
£400.
£350.
£300.
£250.
£200.
£150.
£150.
£120.each. 
£100.each.
An additional salary of— £50] 
for the French and 
Spanish Translator.
3 extra clerks
1 marine clerk 
2nd. " "
Translator
£150.
£90.
£200. 
£120. 
£100.
1st. senior clerk. £500.
2nd. 
3rd. 
4th. 
5 th. 
6th.
£450.
£400.
£350.
£300.
£250.
1 marine dept.clerk.£300.
1 junior marine 
dept,clerk.
2 junior clerks
3 « ”
2 extra clerks 
4 extra clerks 
1 marine clerk
Translator
Secretary to the 
First Lord
£250.
£200.each. 
£175.each.
£150.each. 
£100,each.
£90.each. 
£150.
£100.
£300.
The salaries eventually approved by the Order in Council 
of 15th January, 1800, were more extensive than these and 
provided, at last, an adequate remuneration for the work performed. 
The war time salaries were to be as follows. The chief clerk 
Was to earn £950 p.a., the eight ænior established clerks from
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£640 to £240, the eight junior established clerks from £240 to 
£180, the two marine clerks £360 and £180 respectively, the 
six extra clerks from £100 to £90 and the post of translator 
was revived and that of secretary to the First Lord created at 
£300 p.a.^* The Select Committee's proposal to create a new 
officer, the receiver of fees, when the chief clerk managed 
the business adequately, was rejected, and the proposed salary 
of £150 paid to the chief clerk for his trouble.
On the renewal of war in 1803 salaries, which during peace 
had been cut down, were again increased. * At the same time
3
eight new extra clerks were engaged "at salaries ranging from 
£100 to £90 each.^" Nevertheless,despite these increases in 
staff numbers and their wages, the total bill for salaries, 
stationery and contingencies in 1805 compared favourably with 
that of 1797. The reason was the total abolition of fees and 
the removal of various allowances to clerks for specific duties. 
In addition the salaries of the senior extra clerks were reduced 
from £110 to £100, the wages of the housekeeper were transformed 
into a pension and placed on the Ordinary estimate, the job of
1. Ad.22/8,pp.174-177. For fuller details see AppendixII.
2. Ad.22/9,pp.175 et sea.
3. Ad. 22/10, p. 14.
4. For details of 1805 costs see Appendix II., Start.3/2,p.26,
Lewis Wolfe to G.Rose, 30 Apl.1799. A d .17/8,1805.
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Inspector of Repairs had been abolished and the extra porter 
was also employed as a watchman.^' . , Nevertheless
all Admiralty employees were better off in 1805 than twenty 
two years earlier. Prices had risen but wages had risen to 
keep pace with them, and by 1805 the extra clerks' salaries 
had doubled the standard of 1784, those of the junior established 
clerks increased by from fifty to one hundred per cent and 
those of the senior established clerks by approximately two 
hundred per cent. The salary of the second secretary had 
almost quadrupled, that of the first had increased fivefold.
The Admiralty, in fact, was more concerned with maintaining 
a sense of permanence and continuity, so essential,to a govern­
ment department than with strict financial economy. By its 
insistence on higher salaries, more generous pensions, more 
staff to asist with increased work, it showed itself more 
conscious of the real interests of the office and more aware 
of the dangers to its future development than the investigating 
committees. The Board was aware of a departmental 'ethos' 
which must be strengthened and enhanced by suitable rewards to 
staff. Its tone to outsiders was aloof, and a little contemp­
tuous, even to those representatives of 'economical reform' 
who threatened the office's independence. A comment on the 
hours of attendance suggested by the Select Committee,illustrates
1. Ad.22/9,p.8.
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this. The staff worked from approximately 11.0.a.m. till
5.0.p.m. or later if necessary and the committee suggested
that they come into line with the Navy Board and work from
10.a.m. till 4.0.p.m. with the advantage of more daylight
hours. While the Admiralty considered these hours suitable
fur the Navy Office they assumed the commissioners had 'either
very little understood or did not well consider, the nature
and extent of the business to be conducted by this Department..
.... where business must be executed at all hours and cannot..
... for a moment be delayed', and they proposed that the Board
should fix its own hours of work as it had always done, since
- 1
it knew Its own business best. * The Admiralty had recognised 
a fundamental administrative truth; that unless rewards were 
compatible with work, unless a certain status was achieved for 
clerks, by higher pay, assured and reasonable pensions, security 
of tenure in office and 'gentlemen's' hours of work, which the 
office could regulate, then it would eventually be impossible 
to find suitable applicants and the office would suffer.
This was not an abstract problem. In 1784 there were 
six established and eleven extra clerks. In 1796 the number 
of extra clerks had risen to fifteen, plus a keeper of the 
minutes. By that year only three of the six established clerks 
of 1784 remained in office. The others had died, retired or
1. Pari.Pap..Finance Reports.1798. Select Committee Report. 
Proceedings of the Admiralty on Finance Reports.G.p.803 ; 
1803,xiii.
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left. Four of the junior clerks of 1784 had risen by promotion 
and seniority to the ranks of senior or established clerks, 
but of the remaining seven extra clerks of 1784 only four 
remained and they were still extra clerks though slowly rising 
in the scale of preferment.^* The majority of extra clerks 
in 1796, nine of them, had service of two years and under, 
compared with the position in 1784 when none of them had less 
than four years. * In 1787 many clerks had given evidence of
3
resignations because of the low salaries. * The increase to 
extra clerks in 1790 had contributed to the problem. By an 
Admiralty order of 24 May, 1790, extra clerks were to receive 
increases, back dated to 25 March, which would raise the 
salaries of the first four extra clerks to £110.p.a. of the 
next three to £100 p.a* and of the three junior clerks to £90 
p.a. This increase 'for their greater encouragement' and
'to enable them to support themselves in a manner more becoming 
their situation', raised the salaries of these clerks above
1. Ad.22/5,pp.9,10,185.See Appendix II.
2. Pari.Pap..Finance Reports.1797. Select Committee Report 
No.XVII. The Admiralty Board, the Navy Board, the Navy 
Pay Office, the Marine Pay Office.pp.338-341;1803.xii.
3. Pari.Pap.. The Taking of Fees and Perquisites in Public 
Offices etc. Reports from Commissioners. No.III. The 
Admiralty.pp.Ill,113,Appendix 6,10,11;1806,vii.
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those of the most junior established clerks at approximately 
£60-£70 p.a.^* These men would have been less than human if 
they had not resented their position. The abolition of fees 
at this time would have increased the resentment.
Lov»/ wages also encouraged the taking of bribes and selling 
of information. In 1784 Thomas Kite, one of the extra clerks, 
had received a salary of £57 p.a. though part of his duties 
were to copy out confidential papers for the First Lord.^" 
Robert Maxwell, the translator, had confidential information 
often passing through his hands, but his salary only amounted 
to £145/15 in 1796. Such information could be valuable on 
the stock market, nor is it surprising if clerks yielded to 
the temptation their position afforded of using their inside 
knowledge to speculate on foreign stock, sometimes imperilling 
the secrecy of operations. Other clerks had been known to
3
sell information to the enemy. * It was for these reasons, 
among others, that the Admiralty allowed its employees to take 
fees and gratuities or earn additional income through other 
employment, in accordance with the spirit of the age. The 
eighteenth century saw nothing wrong in the Admiralty secretary
1. Ad.22/5,p.70.
2. Pari.Pap., The Taking of Fees and Perquisites in Public 
Offices etc. Reports from Commissioners.No.III. The 
Admiralty.p.113; 1806,vii.
3# Ibid., p.111.Appendix 6.
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earning £160 p.a, as secretary to the commission for the relief 
of poor naval widows, or the second secretary Ibbetson, being 
secretary to Greenwich Hospital, at £221/5/10 p.a., a post he 
retained on his retirement from the Admiralty, or Marsden, his 
successor being naval officer for St. Vincent and Dominica at 
£116/4/11. Sir Harry Parker, when chief clerk, had been 
secretary to the Board of Longtitude at £74 p.a. Wright, his 
successor, retained his place as purser to a third rate, at 
£30 p.a. which he had first taken when a clerk, and had prospects 
of other gains from his position as Register of the Vice 
Admiralty Court at Halifax, Nova Scotia.^* Similarly Joseph 
Belson, senior clerk in 1796, kept his tv^ o offices as secretary 
to the Privy Seal at £30 p.a. and deputy to two clerks in that 
office, at £80 p.a. One of the extra clerks in 1796, John 
Dyer, was deputy secretary to Greenwich Hospital at £96 p.a. and 
both he and James Cutforth, reading clerk to the Board, were 
sinecure pursers of ships of the line. Another clerk, Mitchel 
Hollingsworth, was even allowed to supplement his meagre salary 
of £57 p.a. by employment as assistant collector of Imported 
Liquors at the Custom House, which paid less than £60 p.a. To 
this job he attended in person, since he did not have to be at 
the Admiralty office until 12.0.a.m. though sometimes it was 
much later when he arrived. Nevertheless,he was granted this
1. Ibid., pp.126-7, Appendix 28,p p .110-111,Appendix 6.
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indulgence because of the smallness of his income and the
largeness of his family. * Even when the Board agreed to
abolish fees it saw no reason why a 'meritorious servant of the
Public, should preclude from the advantage of any ......
additional reward for his services'. The labourer was at all
2
times worthy of his hire. "
Adequate pensions also played an important part in estab­
lishing a sense of permanence, security and continuity. The 
Admiralty considered the Select Committee's recommendations of 
a pension of half the salary insufficient for those who had 
spent a lifetime in the service. They suggested their own 
pension scale whereby the pension bore some relation to the 
length of service and thus gave added incentive to junior clerks 
to continue with the office. For those with between seven and 
ten years service a pension of one third their salary was devised; 
for those with between twenty and thiity, two thirds the salary 
would be provided. Those with over thirty years service would
3
have three quarters of their salary. * Something had already 
been done on these lines prior to 1800. When John Ibbetson, 
the second secretary retired in 1795 he was granted a pension
1. Ibid., pp.114-115,Appendix 15.
2. Pari.Pap..Finance Reports. 1798. Select Committee Report. 
Proceedings of the Admiralty on Finance Reports.G.p.802;
1803,xiii.
3. Ibid.. p.803.
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of £800 p.a. for his faithful services,^* and the former chief 
clerk, Sir Harry Parker, received a pension of £400. Two 
clerks who retired at the same time were granted a pension, 
the one of £100 for life, the other £55, half his salary, for 
the same period. * The Admiralty proposals for higher pensions, 
submitted on 13 August, 1799 to the Privy Council, were not 
therefore original. Before a great deal could be done the 
government resigned and Lord St. Vincent's board were more 
concerned with economies and attacking corruption in the yards. 
Yet in 1804 two old established clerks, William Gimber and 
Robert Robinson, both in the office for thirty three years, 
received pensions of three quarters of the peace time salary
3
on their retirement. * Nothing was given to the dependants 
of clerks who died in service, but this was expecting too much 
from a department already generous in its provision for past 
employees.
The contingent accounts varied considerably over twenty 
three y e a r s . I n  1784, at the end of the American War,
1. Ad.22/17,p.206.
2. Ibid.. p.231.
3. Ad.22/19,p.221.
4. Those between 1795 and 1800 seem to be missing. Only 
those between 1784-1794, Ad.17/7 and 1800-1806, Ad.17/8. 
have therefore been consulted.
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£10,689 was spent on contingencies. There was a spectacular 
halving of this account the following year and a further 
reduction, to £3,834, the lowest figure ever reached, in 1786.
By 1790 however costs were rising inexorably and by 1794 were 
almost at a level of ten years previously. An attempt in 
1792 to cut back expenses illustrated Pitt's determination to 
cut naval costs and his sanguine belief that peace was assured, 
just as the reductions in expenses between 1800 and 1802 are 
indicative of St. Vincent's economies on the same premise.
Both were falsely based and economies cancelled by the enormous 
rise the following year. In 1791 the contingent account was 
£8,304/1/4, in 1792 £6,846/7 and in 1793 £8,862/13/0%. There 
was a drop of over £628 between 1800 and 1802, followed by a 
rise of £676 in 1803 and £1,109 a year later. The cost of 
contingencies between 1784 and 1789, the years of peace, 
averaged £5,519 annually, between 1790 and 1794, £8,206 and from 
1800 to 1805 they had risen to £11,653 p.a. The commission 
on fees thought that fees should cover the costs in war and, 
with the help of the sale of old naval stores, in peace, but 
the experiment was never tried.
An examination of the contingent accounts is best considered 
under the headings of rents and taxes, lighting and firing of 
the pffice, domestic duties, stationery, books, maps, messengers 
accounts and postage, and various other items included in the 
account.
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Rents, rates and taxes fluctuated slightly over the period, 
showing a tendency to rise after 1800 but were never very large. 
Some of the rents were unchanged; the ground rent remained at 
£50, the land tax was £151/17 p.a., the water rate £45. The 
window and house tax was approximately £88 each annually until 
1792 when there was a sharp rise to £97 and £179 respectively. 
Until that year the land tax, poor and water rates were all 
included in the payments for parish dues. Since this payment 
also contained amounts for coal and candles, it is impossible 
to separate items before that date, but in 1792 the poor rate 
was £151/14/2 and subject to violent fluctuations in the 
succeeding years. By 1800 it had reached over £250. . There 
was also an annual Easter offering to the parish church of St. 
Martin's in the Fields, of five guineas.
The cost of providing the office with lamps, oil and cotton 
varied considerably in war and peace. In 1787 it was only 
£177 but in an average war year it was approximately £400 and 
in 1805 had reached £609/6/4. Coal and candles, wood and 
turnery ware were provided by the head messenger, and until 
1792 included in the lump sum allowed for parish dues. After 
1801 the woodman's bill averaged £40 p.a. and the bill for 
coal and candles for two years, 1799, 1800 came to £1,361/8/1. 
Lighting and firing must have formed a large part of this 'block 
grant*, for the Admiralty commissioners and secretaries were 
allowed £97 worth of coal and candles each year for their private
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use, and the office requirements were added to this. Domestic 
duties cost approximately £160 p.a. and included destroying 
rats, sweeping chimneys, pumping water, emptying cesspools,
watering the yard and street, a necessary convenience.^ to allay
u>ere mdde
the thick dust before metalled roads,^especially in summer, 
washing towels^^inkstands, cleaning carpets, all items costing 
less than £20 p.a. There were seasonal payments too, like 
that of £1/11/6 for throwing snow off the roof.^* Besides 
these regular payments there were skilled, occasional tasks, 
the cleaning of pictures, repair of clocks, the upholstery of 
office furniture on which an average of £262 p.a. was spent 
between 1785 and 1802. The cost of the latter was considerable, 
though the sum of £1,029/15/4 in 1791 was exceptional and was 
probably the result of repairs and redecoration after the office 
rebuilding. There was also an occasional bill of £62/18/4 
for bargemen's liveries.
The cost of office stationery in 1784 was £1,489/0/5 but 
during the war it rose sharply as more despatches, orders and 
letters were written and as minutes and letter books increased. 
Between 1797 and 1799 it averaged £4,468/18/7% p.a.^" To reduce 
this expense the Admiralty was supplied from the Stationery 
Office from 1 July, 1799, on a Treasury order. The stationery
1. Ad.17/8,1801.
2. Stat_.3/2,p .26,Lewis Wolfe to George Rose, 30 April,1799
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was paid for out of the ordinary estimate, but after 1801 
regular large payments were made for stamps, vellum, passes 
and commissions to ^^ssrs.Winchester, the office stationers.
This firm also printed and bound for the office; over a period 
of four years, from 1801 to 1805, they were paid £9,219/11/8 
for their services. Before being supplied by the government 
the Admiralty had spent roughly £1000 per quarter on stationery, 
after 1799 this was reduced. In 1803 it was averaging £454 per 
quarter^" and from Michaelmas 1805 to Midsummer 1806, amounted 
to £693 per quarter. * However it should be remembered that 
approximately £1,844 was being spent with Messrs.Winchester 
annually and that the Stationery Office, though officially 
empowered to do so, did not bind many of the Admiralty's maps 
and charts, and that there was an Admiralty printer, at £100 
p.a. Money was also paid to the King's printer for his work
3
on gazettes and treaties. *
The expenditure on maps was slight and an average of only 
£10 annually was spent on books^'but that on newspapers and 
charts was consistently high, particularly once war began.
1. Stat.3/57.pp.29,45.57.
2. Ibid..pp.130.135.140.
3. M . 1 7 / 8 ,  in 1803 it was £315/6/3.
4. This does not include the exceptional item of £460 spent 
on The Atlantic Neptune in 1784, but if that is included 
the average rises to £30 p.a.
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In 1792 newspapers cost £189/3/6, two years later the figure 
had risen to £231/2/4 and continued to rise until it averaged 
£279/10/6 from 1800 to 1805^* French newspapers were also 
an expensive item, £181/4/6 being spent on them in two years, 
between 1800 and 1803.^'
Postage and messengers journeys were straightforward and 
were paid by the head messenger from money imprested to him 
by the chief clerk. These sums ran into several thousands, 
averaging £2,570 before 1794 and proportionately more as the 
war continued. Messengers journeys made up approximately a 
quarter of this sum, rising steadily throughout the period, 
from the lowest figure of £371/15/9 in 1785, to £1,082/14/9 
in 1790 over the Spanish crisis. This figure was regularly 
exceeded in war and reached £2,710/4/6 in 1804, by which time 
messengers' accounts, postage, coal and candles were all listed 
separately, being too large to lump together. Amounts spent 
on postage were much smaller but showed the same tendency to 
rise throughout these years. They formed about one tenth of 
the total sum granted the head messenger, averaging £237 before 
1794 and approximately £590 after 1800. To this was added £25 
for carrying letters to the Post Office.
1. By contrast the Stationery Office spent £5/1 p.a. on 
newspapers, Stat.3/2,0.36.
2. See Chapter V.p. 255.
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Other grants on the contingent account were for extra 
clerks, employed during the war, or at any crisis when extra 
help was needed, at two guineas a week, the travelling expenses 
of the Admiralty commissioners in their visitation of the 
dockyards, and casual items scattered through the accounts, 
of passing interest. Such was the payment, in 1794, of 
£30/7/6 to Captain Bligh for the expense he had been put to 
by a native of Otaheite, the allowance of five guineas to a 
seaman, coming to the office for his master's examination, who 
had been robbed en route of all his possessions,^* or the 
various sums paid to distressed Dutch seamen in 1797, presumably 
after the battle of Camperdown or the compensation to Morarocco
merchants for their losses under 'peculiar circumstances' for
2
which the Admiralty felt responsible,*but it was rarely that
the Board played the Good Samaritan in this manner.
One major item of expense which must be mentioned was that
for 'naval services', often unspecified. There were regular
annual payments to consuls at Rotterdam, Elsinore, Smyrna,
Salonica and other ports, amounting to several hundred pounds.
This money reimbursed the consuls for their trouble and expense
r
in caring for shipwrecked, destitute sailors o^ those taken
3 4prisoner in the area, * or for forwarding naval despatches.
1. Ad.17/7,1794.
2. Pari.Pa n .. Finance Reports.1797. Select Committee Report. 
No.KVII.The Admiralty, the Navy Board, the Navy Pay Office, 
the Marine Pay Office.p.342;1803,xii.
3. Ad.l7/B^ iZoo.
4. Ad.17/8,1803.
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Money was also spent on secret or special services of which no 
details were given and for which no receipts were required.
Thus £1,206/6 was paid to an unidentified person for secret 
services, between August and November, 1790, when the danger 
of war with Spain was most acute,^'and in war these sums 
increased enormously. In 1784 £848/10/6 was paid to foreign
correspondents outside the usual channels, who sent information
2
to the office. In 1797 £11,327 was spent on such services.
3
Anonymous sympathisers, merchants trading with Europe "regular
French informers^ând even spies in the French ministry of 
5
marine "passed information and received money.
1. Ad.17/7,1790.
2. Pari.Pap..Finance Reports,1797. Select Committee Report.
No.XVII. The Admiralty, the Navy Board, the Navy Pay 
Office, the Marine Pay Office .p.342;1803,xii.
3. The Spencer Papers,J.S.Corbett,ed.,1.255-257, Richard 
Cadman Etches to Spencer, 7 May,1796. Between 1797 and 
1799 Nepean received regular reports from his agents, 
William May and Richard Cadman Etches, in Holland, 
revealing the disordered state of the Dutch Navy and urging 
an attack on the Texel. N.M.M. Papers of Sir Evan Nepean, 
1751-1822. See NEP/1 and NEP/2.
4. Dropmore M s s ., II.402,Pitt to Grenville,June-July,1793.
5. Memoirs and Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh, 
Londonderry,ed., 1.372, Wickham to Castlereagh, 21 Sept. 
1798. There were similar leaks in the British War Office 
since an order to seize French fishing boats in 1798 was 
known on the French coast before it had been signed by
the Secretary for Vvar and sent to the Admiralty. The Diary 
and Correspondence of Charles Abbott, Lord Colchester, 
ed. by Charles, Lord Colchester^ (3 vols.London,1861), 
1.138,8 Mar.1798.
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It may be asked why the Admiralty did not raise salaries 
when they realised their clerks were underpaid, instead of - 
allowing them to hold numerous sinecures. The Select Committee 
on Finance of 1797 to 1798 also remarked on this seeming 
anachronism, but the Select Committee looked at institutions 
with an innovator's eye. Fees, sinecures or alternative 
emoluments were legitimate eighteenth century rewards for service 
and Admiralty finances should be judged from an eighteenth 
century standard. There was a fear, real in the seventeenth 
century and not completely eliminated under George III, that a 
large government salary might make its receiver the government's 
tool. There had been a time when despotic officials seemed 
beyond the reach of the law. A large salary from a single 
source meant the emergence of a single-minded man, the expert, 
anathema to the spirit of the noble amateur or dilettante, so 
beloved by English government. The safeguard against him and 
against 'an administration based on abstract political principles 
and staffed exclusively by those who held these opinions' was 
the gentleman.^"
The English approach to politics and administration has 
always been pragmatic. The main test of any office machinery 
was whether it was reasonably efficient and worked at little 
cost to the central government. By employing gentlemen the 
government could call on their sense of noblesse oblige, of
1. W.L.Burn, The Age of Equipoise, p.263.
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honour and duty, which the majority possessed. They would 
run the machine well because they were accustomed to leadership. 
They would run it cheaply because state service was a duty and 
an honour and in return would accept the spoils of office, the 
places, pensions, sinecures and possessions. Gentlemen would 
not 'push professional zeal to inconvenient or dangerous lengths.' 
They might indeed be casual anateurs, but even this was safer 
than a state educated man, dependent on the state for a 
living.^'
This attitude to government service persisted well into 
the nineteenth century, but first showed signs of collapse in 
the civil service. These signs were heralded by administrative 
reforms of this period. Amidst the complexities and elabora­
tions of war, ever more costly and time consuming, the expert 
emerged, with all the virtues and vices of his type. His advent 
can be faintly traced in the development of the Admiralty office 
during this period. There was tighter monetary control, more 
efficiency from increased numbers of clerks, more government 
control, at least at the periphery of office finance, a stronger 
emphasis on economy as a prime virtue, and a corresponding 
withering of paternalism, which could lead to a lowering of 
staff status.
Despite the reputation of the service departments for
1. Ibid., p.264.
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hidebound rigidity, the Admiralty was one of the first to 
attempt to put its own house in order. Treasury control was 
excluded and the Board resented interference, but while 
protecting its staff against too rigid and short sighted 
economies, it introduced its own reforms. By paying its 
clerks more and not overworking them, by engaging extra 
messengers, granting the First Lord a secretary and messenger 
on the office establishment and establishing three new depart­
ments to deal with modern technological problems, the Board 
showed itself able to adapt to changing circumstances and to 
be concerned with its own increased efficiency rather than 
pure economy. Much of the credit must go to that prototype 
of nineteenth century administrators. Sir Charles Middleton,
I I *
a veritable Sir Gregory Kardlines, who as Comptroller of the 
Navy Board, Lord of the Admiralty and First Lord, introduced 
and carried through many of the reforms discussed here. It 
was he who urged the several commissions of enquiry on their 
task and insisted on their recommendations being put into 
effect. There was no real divergence between the Board and 
these committees, rather they were two sides of the same coin, 
dealing with the same problem, that of remodelling an eighteenth 
century department on modern lines. It may even be that one 
corrected the faults of the other and that through the efforts 
of both the office achieved a temporary equipoise between 
government control and total financial independence, in these 
years.
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CHAPTER V.
The Office at Admiralty House.
The Admiralty had been established on its present site 
in Whitehall since 1725. It was one of a group of government 
offices in that area, close to Parliament and to the subordinate 
naval offices, once they moved to their nev^ / premises in Somerset 
House in 1787. The Admiralty was housed in a plain and 
comparatively small building, enclosing three sides of a 
courtyard, opening into Whitehall, protected at first by a high 
wall, and after 1785 by an ornamental screen designed by Robert 
Adam. The single narrow entrance was inconvenient for coaches, 
though a protection against riotous mobs, and most traffic 
probably came via the Horse Guards entrance.
The designer of the building, *a most ugly edifice and 
deservedly veiled by Mr. Adam's handsome screen', according 
to Horace Walpole, was Thomas Ripley, an indifferent architect 
but a protegee of Sir Robert Walpole. The building was the 
official residence of the commissioners as well as their place 
of work. The First Lord's apartments on the south west side 
were the largest, but the four senior lords had houses there 
and the first secretary unfurnished rooms. These apartments 
were highly valued. They were not always grand, but they 
were central and rent free, no small item to the parent of
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families raised there.
The amount of space available for the thirty five clerks 
and other officials living and working in the building in 1784 
was thus limited. In 1797 the number had increased to fifty 
four, owing to the creation of three new departments, the 
Hydrographer*s office, the Inspector of Naval Telegraphs, and 
the Inspector General of Naval Works. Yet there were only 
a few rooms for them, in the cellars, attics and some central 
rooms, in 1784. As their numbers and the office work increased 
more room was needed. Lord Kinnoul's house, next door, was 
bought, demolished and a new house for the First Lord erected 
in its place. This allowed the Board Room, used by Lord 
Sandwich as a dining room, to be used solely for business. *
The life interest in Kinnoul,House had been acquired by Sir.
R.Taylor, the Admiralty architect, from whom it had to be 
purchased for £3,200, and whose pupil, Samuel Pepys Cockerell, 
later appointed to the sinecure office of Inspector of Repairs, 
carried out the new work. Work on the foundations of the new 
building was begun on 10 April,1784. It was temporarily halted
1. Admiral Leveson Gower had seven children 'C.F.Aspinall- 
Oglander, Admiral's V/idow: life and letters of the Hon.
Mrs.Edward Boscawen,1761-1805,(London,1942),0.135%; two 
of Admiral Markham's sons were born there,(Markham 
Correspondence, Markham, ed.,p.xiv.; and Philip Stephen's 
daughter died in childbirth there in 1805. G.E.C.Complete 
Peerage, X.736.
2. D.Bonner Smith, 'The Admiralty Building', The Mariner's 
Mirror, ix.no.9.(September,1923),278.
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while the Commons debated the £6000 estimate recommended by an 
investigating committee, and not passed until 12 June. There 
had been protests at the unnecessary and excessive expense 
involved. Charles Brett, in reply to these charges, had 
urged the lack of room and discomfort under which clerks worked. 
Some were in attics, lit by candles, some in permanently damp 
cellars, often flooded by the Thames, and papers lay about in 
confused heaps, not docketed or locked away.^' Other members 
asked if the drawing rooms, library and bedrooms being added, 
were designed for the greater security of official papers, or 
the improvement of clerks' conditions, and whether the conversion 
of Kinnoul House into offices would not have been a cheaper 
and easier process. But these motions were defeated, the 
estimates passed, and work continued. *
In common with most building operations the original 
estimates were exceeded and the work took longer than had been 
expected. Between October 1786 and 1789, £13,000 had been 
advanced to Cockerell, but his accounts were not finally passed 
till 22 May, 1795, when the Admiralty ordered the payment of 
the balance due to him, over £700, plus the allowance of £600
1 * The Debates and Proceedings of the House of Commons,viii 
pt.ii.1786,170-171.Printed for J.Stockdale.
2. Ibid., 312-316.
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for the three years spent preparing plans and a further £200 
forhis trouble in supervising further alterations between 
1789-1790 and for the repair of the garden at £110/5.^'
The dominant building skills were those of the bricklayer 
and carpenter, on whom the craft trades, painters, plasterers, 
glaziers, depended. The largest bills for the new work were 
therefore those of the carpenter, £3,554/3/1 and the bricklayer 
£3,239/18/5. Cockerell would seem to have followed the 
customary practice employed in public works, entering into a 
contract with master builders in the two constructional trades, 
who subcontracted the remainder of the work. * The masons 
and plasterers submitted bills of over £1000 each, those of 
the more specialised trades, plumbers, smiths, painters, 
glaziers, cost proportionately less.
'The London craftsman was, as a rule, a man of considerable
3
skill and status - proud, conscientious, and expensive.' * One 
of the craftsmen employed by the Admiralty in 1789 earned 
£1/11/6 per week for forty nine weeks, for work of a special
1. Ad.17/1.The details of costs of labour and materials,unless 
otherwise stated, come from Ad.17/1.
2. J.Summerson, Georgian London, (Harmondsworth,1962),pp.76-77. 
For these and similar details I have drawn heavily on
-Chapter V of this excellent book.
3. Ibid., p.69., Bragge-Bathurst Papers, D421x/17/69, Undated
letter, probably about 1806, from Lord Spencer to Charles
Bragge-Bathurst, recommending the appointment of Thomas
Buzzard, glazier to be glazier at the Mint.Buildings. The
recommendation probably had political significance but 
also mentions Buzzard's professional skill.
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unspecified nature, possibly to do with the laying out of the 
garden, after the building had finished, leaving behind the 
usual builders* debris. The garden disappeared under the 
building of Admiralty Arch in the 1890*s but it was extensive 
enough to cost approximately £10 p.a. for seeds, trees and 
tools and £79/18/5 in 1790, after the buildings were complete 
and the garden re-laid. Turf and fifty nine loads of gravel 
were also needed to restore the garden to its former order.
The Admiralty showed a desire to economise wherever possible. 
All the chimney pieces in the new building were brought from 
dismantled or reconstructed houses. Four came from Sir Gregory 
Page's house at Blackheath, three from York House and one from 
Lord Egremont's, all at a cost of under £250. Window shutters, 
two mahogany doors, columns and several other items were brought 
from Blackheath at a reasonable cost. From their descriptions 
some of the chimney pieces, particularly those from York House, 
were sumptuous, with marble statuary, swags of fruit and flowers 
and sienna columns.^' In fact, though a plain building, the 
Admiralty was not completely unadorned. It was roofed with 
best green Westmorland tiles, and £24/14 was paid for the 
highly popular, artificial Coade stone, used for ornaments 
and extremely hard wearing. Inside, ornament was confined to
1. The expert task of installation was supervised by Richard 
Westmacott, father of the famous sculptor. D.N.B.LX.355.
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the public rooms and was both chaste, rich, and appropriate.
The main staircase was rebuilt and a pair of plaster 
Tritons ordered for it at a cost of £5/17. The bills for 
the fine wood carving and iron work involved also include 
accounts for Portland stone and Purbeck marble. The latter 
was used for paving halls, laid in squares with little diamonds 
of black Namur marble at the crossings. The plaster mouldings 
of the public rooms were also the work of craftsmen. The 
more elaborate pieces, some of which were gilded, were moulded 
separately and then fixed to the cornice. The motifs used 
were the normal classical ones, Ionic medallions, Doric 
tryglyphs, the Vitruvian scroll, but others reflected the 
English countryside in their use of ruffled leaves, roses and 
honeysuckles, and the nautical nature of the office in scallop 
shells, anchors and sea-dolphins. Of more practical nature 
were the lead cisterns to which water was brought from Chelsea 
Water Works or York Buildings. Adequate sanitation was 
provided by cesspools in the garden, but a more modern installa­
tion was Joseph Bramah's water closet, reliable and hygienic, 
at a cost of £32/16/4!^.
It was at this time that the Board room was given a new 
ceiling, and a print by Pugin and Rowlandson, circa 1807, 
shows what the room looked like at this period. Above the 
fireplace was a series of rolled up maps, at one end of the 
room the magnificent carvings, possibly by a pupil of Grinling
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Gibbons, at the other, in a recessed case, were the books, 
globes and wind dial recording every variation in wind direction. 
The room was panelled in oak and in the centre was the mahogany 
table, made for the office about 1789, with its desk shaped end 
for the secretary.^"
A  series of public rooms opened out of the large plain 
hall, where messengers waited and where the doorkeeper was 
permanently on duty. On the left of the passage leading past 
the main stair was the Captain's room, where Nelson's body lay 
for one night. Facing it on the right, was the waiting room.
Cn<^r<3iu»no 2 ,
Cruikshank's drawLng- of it in 1820 shows a featureless apartment, 
sparsely furnished and thronged, as in real life, with hopeful 
naval officers. Beyond these public rooms, was a narrow stair 
and a labyrinth of dark passages and small rooms, crowded with 
boxes and drawers full of maps, charts and the official depart­
mental records, a swelling tide which threatened to engulf the 
clerks who dealt with it. The Admiralty was unable to expand 
because of the difficulties of the site. Hemmed in by other 
government offices, it had to build upwards and the accommo­
dation for clerks was never satisfactory. Yet it was from 
these cramped quarters that the whole naval war effort was 
directed and the Navy controlled, by a staff much smaller than
1. C.Hussey, 'The Admiralty Old Building-VVhitehall', Country 
Life, (November,1923),688-692.
2. "T lic w ds Üie U30i-k op C dptc.k i
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that now employed by a moderately sized town council.^*
Like every government office the Admiralty maintained a 
small staff for household duties. Throughout these twenty 
three years the domestic staff, caring for the needs of 
Admiralty officials, changed very little, though the numbers 
increased very slightly during the war. Only retirement from 
ill health or death removed them.
The housekeeper at £40 p.a. and the necessary woman at 
£35 p.a.did not perform their duties in person, employing a
o
deputy, to whom the latter paid half her salary. * The letter's 
salary was raised during the war, first to £60 and by 1804 by
3
a further £50 to help pay the two assistants-she now employed. * 
There were three watchmen, for the hall, gates and gardens at 
an annual salary of £20 each, though they received allowances 
which augmented this. In 1784 those of the senior watchman 
amounted to £16/12/8 and of the others to £4/8/8. Part of this 
was a clothing allowance to provide for a thick coat. Coals for
1. The Admiralty only employed between forty five and fifty 
six clerks during the war, compared to the Navy Board which 
had one hundred and sixty, and was smaller than the War 
Office with fifty eight; though compared to the Home and 
Foreign Offices with staffs of under thirty it was quite 
large. Emmeline W. Cohen, The Growth of the British Civil 
Service, 1780-1939 (London.1941),pp.34-5.
2. Pari.Pap., The Taking of Fees and Perquisites in Public 
Offices etc.. Reports from Commissioners.No.III. The 
Admiralty.p.119,Appendix N o .23;1806,vii,
3. Ad.17/8,1804.
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a fire as protection against the fogs and chills of the Thames
were also bought out of this sum. The watchmen were paid
for messages they delivered at discretionary rates; in 1784
these came to £60 each. The position was thus a valuable and
responsible one, though Lieutenant Bowling's confidence in the
head watchman's influence was perhaps too g r e a t . A f t e r  1799,
when stationery was supplied by the Stationery Office, Winchester,
the chief watchman, was given substantial sums to buy stamps,
vellum, passes, commissions for the office. In 1802 these came
to £1,152/9/4, and from 1803 a regular item appears in the
accounts of sums to Messrs. Winchester and Sons for printing
and binding books of instructions, marine treatises and signals
at a cost, between 1803 and 1805 of £3,611/9/9. This was in
addition to printing done by the office printer, or binding
2
done by the Stationery Office. *
A porter and three messengers completed the tally of 
domestic staff. The former's salary of £30 p.a. remained 
constant until 1800, but was supplemented by a series of lucrative 
perquisites and allowances whose fluctuations over ten years,
1787 to 1797, are reflected in the slight increase in salary
1. T.Smollet, Roderick Random.(London,1961),p.257.
2. 17/8,1802,1803,1804,1805.
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by the latter date. In 1787 he earned £57/12, in 1797 
£61/3/10.^’ To a £10 allowance for rent, was added £15/10 
for clothing, a gown every two years, a red cloak and hat, 
presumably some official livery. His share of New Year gifts 
came to two guineas, but his biggest source of income came 
from an allowance of one penny for every burner in every lamp, 
every night, and for supplying the lamps with oil and cotton.
In 1784 this allowance amounted to £355, thirteen years later 
had increased to £375,^"and after 1800 averaged £486 p.a.^"
The head Messenger, William Millman, was responsible for the 
cleaning of the office and the overall supervision of the 
domestic staff. Out of the money granted him by the chief 
clerk, amounting to considerable sums, he paid his assistants' 
expenses, parish dues, postage bills, water rates, casual 
employees engaged to destroy rats, pump water, sweep chimneys 
or empty cesspools, the bills for livery for Admiralty bargemen 
and other petty office expenses. He no longer delivered
1 * Pari.Pap., The Taking of Fees and Perquisites in Public
Offices etc.. Reports from Commissioners. No.III. The 
Admiralty, P.118:1806,vii..Finance Reports,1797, Select 
Committee Report, No.XVII. The Admiralty Board, the Navy 
Board, the Navy Pay Office, the Marine Pay Office, 
pp.340-341, Appendix G.l; 1803,xii.
2. Ibid., 340-341., The Taking of Fees and Perquisites in 
Public Offices etc. Reports from Commissioners.No.III. 
The Admiralty.p.119, Appendix no.23; 1806,vii.
3. ^ . 1 7 / 8 ,  1802,1803,1804,1805.
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letters except, occasionally, to East India House, when he 
received 7/6 for his pains. His predecessor had lived at 
the office but these rooms were appropriated for clerks and 
Millman received £40 p.a. in lieu of accommodation. His 
official salary was £50, but he received an allowance of £300 
from the Board to supply brooms, mops and pails for cleaning 
the office, coal and candles for lighting and heating, and 
for keeping the locks, stoves and fenders repaired. Apart 
from this allowance, numerous small fees also increased his 
basic salary to approximately £100 p.a. Of these the most 
profitable were the three guineas received on each marine 
commission and the shilling on each protection made out by the 
office. These fees, which he shared with his assistants,were 
considerable during the war. Millman*s share had amounted to 
approximately £150 before 1763.
His assistants shared some of these fees but their basic 
salaries were lower, £40 and £30 respectively.^' They did 
receive, however, generous travelling expenses; one shilling 
a mile for 'riding journeys' out of London and at discretion 
for other errands. Their expense accounts had to check with 
the journey book kept at the office, in which the sender was
1. Two assistants were added during the war at £30 each, but
received no allowances or fees. Pari.Pap., Finance Reports, 
1797, Select Committee Report.,No.XVII.The Admiralty Board, 
the Navy Board, the Navy Pay Office, the Marine Pay Office, 
pp.340-341, Appendix Gl;1803,xii.
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noted and the business specified. The account was then sent 
to the Board, signed and paid, via the head messenger, by the 
chief clerk. Post chaises were rarely hired by Admiralty 
messengers, though subordinate boards used them extensively.^* 
The Admiralty thought the number of messengers insufficient 
and wished to retain the extra staff employed in war time and 
increase their salaries 'for their better support and main­
tenance.' Their proposals in this respect compared favourably
2
with those of the Select Committee. *
Select Committee's Proposals, 1797.
Head messenger
Assistants
Porter
£100.p.a. 
£40-£30,p.a 
^50.p .a .
Admiralty proposals,1799. 
Head messenger £120.p.a. 
Assistants
Two extra 
messengers
Porter
Extra porter
£60-£50.p.a,
£40 each. 
£50 p.a.
£40 p . a .
It was the Admiralty's recommendations which were carried into 
effect from 1 January, 1800, when a general increase in the
3
salaries and wages of all Admiralty employees took place. *
A third extra messenger at £40 p.a. was added in 1800 and a 
messenger for the First Lord's secretary also at £40, in the 
autumn of 1804^" and six months later the wages of the assistant
1. Ad.2/1393, Admiralty Commissioners to Navy Board,19 Oct.1801
2. Pari.Pao.,Finance Reports,1798. Select Committee Report. 
Proceedings of the Admiralty on Finance Reports.G.p.802; 
1803,xiii.
3. A d .22/8,pp.77-78.
4. Ad.22/10,P.14.
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messengers were raised by between ten and twenty pounds each.^*
Over the period there was thus a steady rise in the wages of
domestics, and in some cases a dramatic one; twenty five per
cent for the watchmen, sixty six per cent for the porter and
2
over fifty per cent for the messengers. *
The Admiralty messengers delivered letters, despatches
and orders to other government offices, to the outports, to
the Secretaries of State or First Lord, absent at Bath or on
their country estates, and to the King. Less important mail
was delivered by the twopenny post. Messengers did not go
abroad. The Admiralty sent its despatches either in one of .
its own ships or in the Post Office packets, not always a
reliable or comprehensive service. Despite its strategic
importance there was no service to Malta until 1806 and then
3
only in the teeth of Post Office opposition, * and there were 
criticisms by commanders of packet captains* inefficiency and 
even cowardice.^* On the Post Office side there were complaints
1. Ibid..p.73.
2. See Appendix II.
3. P.Mackesy, The War in the Mediterranean,1803-1810,(London,
1957),p.18.
4. JER/21,St. Vincent to Nepean, 5 Apl.1797., The Letters of 
Lord St.Vincent, D.Bonner Smith,ed.,1.301,St.Vincent to 
John Robinson, 30 March,1801. The packets were built for 
speed not fighting and appointments to them were open to 
borough influence. See A.C.Wardle, 'The Post Office Packets} 
The Trade Winds, C.N.Parkinson,ed.,278-290.
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of the unpunctuality of Admiralty clerks and messengers.
Overseas mail left the General Post Office at 8.0.p.m. and letters 
from government departments had to be there at 7.45.p.m. As 
the war continued and work increased, the mail arrived later 
and later, resulting in serious delays. Francis Freeling, 
secretary to the Post Office, appealed to Nepean in 1799 to send 
letters by 7.30.p.m. and the Admiralty agreed that no letters 
should leave their office after 7.0.^* But a month later the 
Post Office complaint was renewed, when a check revealed the 
Admiralty messenger to have been regularly ten minutes late 
delivering letters. * Sometimes there were more serious 
complaints. Messengers allowed strangers to put their letters
3
in the Admiralty bag to avoid postage charges "or perpetrated 
petty frauds by overcharging on official letters.^* But the 
Post Office was not blameless; their clerks were equally careless 
with important despatches. An increase in the number of 
Admiralty letters brought Post Office requests not to stuff the 
envelopes too full and to use stronger paper packets to avoid 
them being torn in transit. Nepean gave appropriate orders.
1. Ad.1/4073,Freeling to Nepean, 2 May,1799.
2. Ibid., Freeling to Nepean, 14 June,1799.
3. Ad.1/4072, Freeling to Nepean, 19 Oct.1797.
4. Ibid., Freeling to Nepean, 18 March, 1797.
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but in a revealing minute asked that the Post Office clerks' 
practice of jumping on the bags, a circumstance to which many 
torn letters could be attributed, should stop.^' In 1804 
two letters for Sir Andrew Mitchell at Halifax got into the 
Jamaica bag and were returned to Falmouth to await the next 
North American packet. * Delays of months could result from 
a few minutes carelessness and vitally affect plans of campaigns.
Even if everything went well and there were no delays, 
news took weeks to reach its destination. It was conveyed 
along well defined routes. Easy communication between Bergen 
and Christiansand provided the Baltic news with an alternative 
route 'to the north German ports and there was a regular route 
to India via Germany, Venice and Constantinople. An alterna­
tive route to India existed via Alexandretta, Aleppo and Bussarah, 
providing a service frequently quicker than the long sea route 
round the Cape.^' Yet though many of these routes were faster 
and more convenient than the long sea voyage they were exposed 
to interruption and hazards, especially in war. Countries then
1. Ad.1/4073,Freeling to Nepean,19 Dec.1803.
2. Ibid., C.Godby to Marsden, 5 Dec.1804.
3. Seymour Papers, CR114A/325, f.26, Spencer to Seymour,
1 Apl.1796.
4. It took only three weeks to go down the Red Sea to the 
Malabar coast in June, as opposed to several months via 
the Cape. Nelson's Dispatches,N.H.Nicolas,ed.,111.40, 
Nelson to St. Vincent, 29 June, 1798.
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previously friendly were often hostile or in the Balkans and
2
the Middle East robbers or hostile Arabs held up such traffic.
By the time information so conveyed arrived, the situation had 
changed and plans were often out of date. In May 1800, Lord 
Spencer considered Rear Admiral Blankett's letters from the 
Red Sea, written in April and June of the previous year, 'rather
3
now like a matter of history than anything else.' * The 
Admiralty therefore issued orders in the most general terms 
and vital decisions were left to the judgement of the commander 
on the spot, often himself in ignorance of the latest news or 
of Cabinet changes of plan. Such conditions inevitably affected 
the war and the success of campaigns.^" The escape of Rear 
Admiral Bruix from Brest in 1799 leaving no clue to his destin­
ation, compelled the Admiralty to issue vague orders to Nelson 
in the Mediterranean. Lord Spencer thought Bruix's destination 
might be Ireland, "but Pitt, Dundas and Grenville thought it
1. Ad_. 1/389,Captain R.Forbes to Admiral Peyton,8 June, 1790.
2. The Spencer P a p e r s Richmond,ed.,IV.205, Rear Admiral 
Blankett to Spencer, 17 Dec.1799.
3. Ibid., 219,11 May,1800.
4. C.Llovd, The Battles of St. Vincent and Camperdown,(London, 
1963),p.58.
5. The Spencer Papers, H.W. Richmond, ed.. III.58-9, Admiral 
Young to Spencer, 1 May,1799.
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might be in the Mediterranean.^*The Board's orders covered
2
most eventualities; 'their complexity was the result of a
lack of reliable information and of a swift system of transmitting
any fresh intelligence. The speed with which news was passed
to headquarters5 so that its effect might be calculated and
the next strategic step planned, was therefore of vital
importance and methods of transmitting news should have been of
the best.
Until the invention of a machine to transmit messages, 
information could only be sent as fast as a man could ride, 
and despite improved roads, a system of post horses and hard 
working messengers, in an emergency this method could be too 
slow. On the news of Bruix's escape the messenger covered
the distance between Plymouth and London in the record time of
3 4twenty three hours,'normally it took almost two days. ' News
from Ireland took longer, depending on the weather. Mails
leaving Waterford on December 16, 1804, arrived in London late
on the evening of December 23. ' The telegraph and semaphore
1. Ibid., 61, Same to the same, 3 May,65-7, Marsden to 
Spencer, 4 May,1799.
2. Ibid.,51-2.
3. L.Kennedy, Nelson's Band of Brothers,(London,1951),p.173.
4. Ad.1/4073, Way Bill for Apl.27,1797.
5. Ibid., Way Bill for 16 Dec.1804.
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were therefore gradually introduced to improve upon these
traditional methods, though the Admiralty were reluctant to
spend money on experiments with these machines.
The Navy already possessed a good system of flag signals,
and signal stations existed to pass pre-arranged messages.
But the telegraph, working by means of a shutter, spelt out
words and sent messages direct rather than in the code of the
flag system. Various experiments were made by the Rev.John
Gamble, chaplain to the Duke of York, with the help of dockyard
officials at Portsmouth.^* Unfortunately for Gamble the Rev.
Lord George Murray, son of the Duke of Athol, and later Bishop
of St.Davids, had also experimented and produced a better and
larger machine, able to transmit more messages. It was this
machine the Admiralty adopted in 1795, though they cut down
2
Murray's original scheme to one costing less money. In 
September, 1795 George Roebuck was given the contract to erect 
fifteen telegraph stations between London and Deal with a 
branch to Sheerness. They were ready by 27 January, 1796 and 
and their superiority was immediate; on a clear day messages
3
could be sent in seven minutes,*and Lord Spencer paid tribute
1. W.0.6/148,pp.3-4,Huskisson to Nepean, 5 Jan.1798.
2. The Spencer Papers, J.S.Corbett,ed., I. 261-2, Murray to 
Spencer, 10 June, 1796.
3. The Diary and Correspondence of Charles Abbott, Lord 
Colchester, Colchester, ed., 1.30, 4 Feb.1796.
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to the invention in a speech on naval defence a year l a t e r * 
Another line from London to Portsmouth was completed by
o
the end of 1796, to keep in touch with the Channel fleet. *
A  proposal to extend the telegraph to Yarmouth in 1801 was 
delayed by peace, but once war broke out the Admiralty kept a 
ship permanently stationed between Southend and Sheerness to 
pass on military signals, and the line was extended to Plymouth 
and later, in 1805, to Falmouth. This was the decision of 
Lord Barham, who considered the trifling cost of the installation
3
offset by the great advantages it bestowed. * The lack of - 
communication with Admiral Cornwallis was creating difficulties 
and the extension of the telegraph to Falmouth afforded easy 
communication with a port near the mouth of the Channel and 
gave better opportunity of counteracting enemy moves than did 
reliance on ships blockading Brest and Rochefort.^"
The telegraph system was not without faults. There were 
frequent interruptions, bad weather and poor visibility making
1. The London Chronicle, 16-18 March,1797.
2. Ad.1/524,f.129, Admiral Duncan to Nepean, 15 May,1797..
The Spencer Papers, H.W.Richmond, ed., III.Admiral Pasley 
to Nepean, 30 Apl.1799.
3. P.R.O.30/58/6,f .139,_Barham to Pitt, 25 Oct.1805.
4. The Barham Papers, J.K.Laughton, ed.. III.116, Part of a 
memorandum by Barham for the King and Cabinet, 11 Jan.1806.
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it impossible to use in winter, and sometimes mistakes were
made in signalling.^* There were also abuses in the small
Inspector of Telegraph's office; in 1805 a private code vtfas
discovered by which Roebuck, the Inspector, 'sent up Prawns
by signal to London.' * Nor were the Admiralty always
enthusiastic about improvements in a system which seemed to
work well enough. They displayed no interest in Gamble's
3 .
radiated telegraph, *and as soon as peace was signed endeavoured 
to save money by closing the signal stations, and after 1814 
even selling the land and houses very cheaply. Suggestions 
forwarded by the War Office were tersely acknowledged or 
coldly received.^* They were similarly abrupt with William 
Goddard, who wished to interest the Board in his improved code 
system. On submitting his plans to the secretary, Marsden 
annoyed him by facetiously remarking that he thought Goddard 
would have proposed something that could see through fog. *
1. The Spencer Papers, H.W.Richmond, ed.. III. 180-181, Dundas 
to Spencer, 1 Sept.1799.
2. Captain R. Huddleston, 'The Coast Signal Stations and the 
Semaphore Telegraph', The Mariner's Mirror.i.no.7.(July.
1911),161-166.
3. Commander O.T.Tuck, 'The Old Telegraph', The Fighting Forces, 
n o .3.(September,1924),469-470.
4. Ad.1/4333. Huskisson to Nepean, 1 Aug.1801., W.0.6/148, 
p.66, Huskisson to Nepean, 28 Apl.1798.
5. Commander H.P.Mead, 'The Story of the Semaphore',
The Mariner's Mirror, xix.no.3.(July,1933),333-334.
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If the horseman was the prime means of sending messages, 
the prime means of transcribing them was the clerk. The war 
brought mechanical aids to both. A copying machine had been 
bought in 1791, eight years before the War Office bought one, 
at a cost of £15/4/6,^*and a small printing and rolling press 
was installed in 1797. The copying machine had its limitations, 
the most serious of which was that copies made by pressing very 
thin paper on the original letter, could only be taken after 
the ink had set firmly on the original, and were always a 
reverse copy, readable only when held to the light. Still it 
was useful in a war department where records were often needed 
for consultation by other branches, and a second copying machine, 
by Bramah, was bought in March, 1806, as the work of the office 
increased. * The printing press issued proclamations, official 
forms, protections and passes, and there were frequent bills 
for touching up the copper plates used, or for engraving a new 
set.^"
Most clerks spent their office lives copying despatches and 
letters. One copy was made of letters to home departments,those 
from overseas were copied in triplicate, the original and a 
duplicate being sent and the third entered in the Out Letter book.
1. It came from Lawrence and Winchester, A d .17/7,1791.
2. A d .17/8,1806.D.Murray Young, op.cit.,p.136.
3. Two plates cost £131/5. Ad.17/8,1802.
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Large amounts of stationery were therefore required. No account 
of stationery supplied to the Admiralty for this period is 
preserved among office papers, but a comparison of the stationery 
supplied to other departments may enable an estimate of the 
stationery used in the office to be made,^* Reams of superfine 
royal, foolscap gilded and plain, demi, quarto, cartridge and 
superfine propatria gilt paper were supplied. Black and red 
ink, pounds of best Dutch sealing wax, wafers, memorandum books, 
a very large quantity of pens and an almost equally large 
quantity of 'best Hudson's Bay Quills' and pencils, slates, 
ivory pounce boxes and reams of blotting paper, penknives with 
several blades and razor strops to sharpen them, red and green 
tape, needles and thread, rubbers, rulers, shears, inkstands 
and lip glue were some of the items constantly needed.
Until 1799 the stationery was supplied by contract, by 
Lawrence and Winchester, and cost well over £1000 p.a. * From 
1 July, 1799, however, stationery was supplied by the Stationery 
Office, who also bound the official records and Parliamentary 
minutes. This system, devised to save government money, did 
not work as well as was hoped. There were delays in delivery 
of supplies blamed by the Comptroller of the Stationery Office 
on the laziness of clerks or storehouse men, or temporary
1. Stat.1/1 % pp.81,179.
2. 3tat.3/l,p.l38. Winchester and Co. remaihd contractors to
the Stationery Office throughout the period. Stab.3/56.pp. 
23,24, et sea.
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exhaustion of supplies.^* Sometimes the Admiralty were
completely without stocks, 'not a pen or sheet of paper' for
a week in February, 1802 * and these delays were increasingly 
3common, "
Being a conservative department the Admiralty kept its 
records, though not until Sir Charles Middleton came to the 
Board, with any great order. The chief clerk received £100 
annually for taking care of maps, books and papers belonging 
to the office, but there was very little room to store these 
in the building and as early as 1784 the office statutes were 
being kept in a warehouse, for which the Admiralty paid an annual 
rent of £8. The older Admiralty records were scattered 
between the British Museum, the Bodleian Library, Lincoln's Inn 
Library, Doctor's Commons, and the State Paper Office. The 
latter contained ninety volumes of correspondence between 
Admirals, commanders and the Admiralty from 1689-1761, besides 
warrants and commissions which should have been readily available 
for consultation. They were housed in the Transmitter's office
1. Stat.3/2.00.96-97. Lewis Wolfe to J.H.Addington, 17 Feb.1802.
2. Stat.1/1,0.307, Thomas Kite to Nepean, 10 Feb.1802.
3. Such complaints and objections to poor quality stationery
continued after 1806. Stat.1/2,24 Aug.1807, A.B.Erickson,
The Public Career of Sir James Graham, (Oxford,1952),
p.102 nte.
, 2.
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in Middle Scotland Yard, an office which, according to the 
select committee reporting on the preservation of public 
records, was 'old and ruinous throughout', and constantly 
damp through the river overflowing into the cellars every 
high tide.^' There were annoying gaps in these records. In 
1797 when Nepean wanted an Admiralty memorandum on seamen's 
pay dating from the Long Parliament, Mr. Ancell of the State 
Paper Office found the papers of that period 'wholly deficient'.
Letters and minutes were bound between hard covers, stamped 
with the office seal, or tied into bundles with the red tape, 
which symbolised for so many the toils of officialdom. Foreign 
treaties, and documents in foreign languages, mainly French 
and Spanish, but occasionally in Dutch were also kept. They 
were translated either by clerks employed for that purpose,
3
or by outsiders if the language was unfamiliar. '
The sheer weight and volume of records increased enormously 
with the war, and consultation of them became difficult. This 
placed greater reliance on clerks' memories, particularly those
1 « ParioPaP., The State of Public Records of the Kingdom,
Select Committee Report.Nos.I & II.pp.69,73,566;1800,xv.
2. Ad.1/4291,Ancell to Nepean, 24 Apl.1797.
3. A d .17/7,1786.1792., For translation difficulties in oriental 
languages see Murray Young, op.cit., M.S.Anderson, 'Great 
Britain and the Barbary States in the Eighteenth'Century', 
Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research.xxix. 
(Ï956)‘,106.
253
of the senior officials, though since several of them had spent
a lifetime in the office they were able to draw on ample
experience, and the copying of documents in which each clerk
v/as involved, impressed its contents on his memory. Nevertheless^
memory proved no substitute for an adequate filing system. The
lack of one involved the Admiralty in reversed decisions and
countermanded orders. On 5 July, 1787, an Admiralty order
was issued to the Victualling Board that all ships in port be
1
victualled with fresh meat in place of salt, every meat day.
But the Victualling Board, on previous Admiralty orders of 
26 September, 1786, had laid in large stocks of salt meat, 
which they begged might be used first, by restricting the issue 
of fresh meat to two days, and to this the Admiralty agreed.
Such confusion involving large sums of money and the logistic 
delays to which the Victualling Board vms liable, was not 
permissible in war.
The very length of service of some of the officials, 
especially the first secretary, may have hindered the introduction 
of more modern methods necessary to deal with wartime business.
A properly kept minute book did not exist until Middleton came 
to the office in 1794, and created one with 'inconceivable 
perseverance'. By his insistence on punctuality and method 
he carved an orderly office routine, symbolic of the nineteenth
1. ADiV/OSb, Victualling Commissioners to Stephens, 5 July, 1787.
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century, out of the seeming confusion of eighteenth century 
methods.^* It is perhaps not without significance that a 
year after this 'wind of change ' blev»/ through the office,
Stephens was promoted to the Board, and his place taken by 
Evan Nepean, a younger man, more accustomed to the 'bustling' 
ways of Dundas and Middleton. Under Nepean documents were 
more regularly and fully minuted. Sometimes several minutes 
appear on one letter requesting and relaying information on 
relevant topics. Scraps of paper containing minutes or informal 
notes were bound in with the relevant correspondence, and a 
more efficient classification and arrangement of records was 
begun. Private signals and instructions were regularly bound 
and printed after 1804^*and the first digest of Admiralty 
records was made in 1806, one of the last things Middleton was 
able to accomplish before he resigned. A, digest of Admiralty , 
statutes had been made in 1791, but this was a small compilation, 
costing only £2/12/6, compared with the monumental work of 1806, 
costing £209/11.^'
Another sign of changing times was in the number of news­
papers taken by the office. Before 1792 it was negligible.
1. The Spencer Papers. J.S.Corbett,ed., 1.12-14, Middleton to 
Spencer, 19 Dec.1794,
2. ^.17/8,1802,1804 et sea.
3. Ad.. 17/7,1791.,Ad. 17/8,1806.
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by 1800 the cost was £279/10/6. From that date also French
newspapers had become sufficiently numerous and important to
list as a separate item and almost £200 was spent on them
between 1800 and 1803.^* The English newspapers taken
probably included The True Briton and The Sun both pro-government
2
papers, the latter founded by George Rose and Francis Freeling, 
and The Times, which came out strongly in defence of the First
3
Lord during the attacks on the Admiralty in 1803. * In addition 
Lloyds enclosed colonial newspapers if they contained any 
interesting news^'and from 1790 onwards Lloyds annual register 
of ships was bought by the office.
The books bought by the office were on naval or allied 
subjects, and purchased for strictly practical purposes. In 
1784 twenty sets of Desbarres* Atlantic Neotune, were purchased, 
at a cost of over £460. * Three years later the voyages of Byron,
1. Ad.17/8.
2. K.Ellis, The Post Office in the Eighteenth Century,(London,
1958),160-162.
3. The Times. 4 Apl.1803, 17 March,1804.,Aspina11, Politics 
and the Press,1780-1850, p.77.
4. Ad.1/3915,Bennet to Marsden, 9 Nov.1803.
5. Pari .Pap., The Taking of Fees and Perquisites in Public 
Offices etc. Report of Commissioners.No.III. The Admiralty, 
pp.124-5, Appendix 29; 1806,vii.
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Wallis, Carteret, Cook and Bougainville were bought for
Lieutenant William Bligh's use on his voyage to Tahiti.^*
Small sums were spent on directories, maps of London, a History
of Mauritius, and an item whose relevance is not obvious, but
on which £105 was spent, some natural history drawings of Mrs.
2
Helena Ross. * More useful to naval officers, and a mark of 
approbation, was the binding and preservation of Admiral William 
Cornwallis's journal of his masterly retreat from a superior 
French force in 1795. The Admiralty kept the journal as a
3
blueprint for other officers to follow in similar situations. * 
Unidentified maps were bought between 1783 and the outbreak of 
war. Two maps of 'Indostan'(sic) were bought in 1792 and a 
modern map of Europe in 1800 to keep pace with Napoleonic 
conquests. But maps cost the office less per year than the 
bargemen's velvet caps.^" The real expenditure, steadily 
increasing after 1790 and receiving greater impetus after the 
establishment of the Hydrographer's office in 1795, was on charts, 
The charts and narratives of voyages of discovery by British 
naval officers were carefully preserved at the office,especially
1. A d.17/7,1792,1794.
2. Ad.17/8,1802.
3. The Spencer Papers, J.S.Corbett,ed., 1.49, Memorandum by 
Middleton, 30 June,1795.
4. See Chapter IV pp.221,222.
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those of Captain Cock and Lieutenant Vancouver. Large numbers 
of charts were being bought by the Admiralty before the 
Hydrographer's department was established. In 1790 fifty sets 
of plans of the Tortugas and Florida keys were bought, a 
reflection of the increasing tension between Britain and Spain 
which culminated, the following year, in a diplomatic crisis 
and warlike preparations in the West Indiea. Two years later 
twelve sets of plans of Jamaica and the V/indward passage were 
purchased, an indication of the importance of the West Indies 
in naval affairs. Charts of the Baltic and entries of accounts 
for manuscript books of charts fill the records after 1791. 
£271/6/9 was spent on them betv\/een 1790 and 1794, £139/17 in 
the latter year alone, and once the Hydrographer*s office was 
set up approximately £400 p.a. was spent on it exclusive of 
staff salaries. In 1804 over £110 V'jas spent on buying a 
new set of charts. French and Dutch charts were also purchased 
whenever possible, and charts of East Indian waters were supplied 
by the East India Company. Alexander Dalrymple, the first 
Hydrographer, had made his great reputation as hydrographer 
to the Company, a position he retained on his Admiralty appoint-
LL Spe^ co-^  he, iixiA Cmcl
ment.  ^A Fellow of the Royal Society,^it was probably Spencer's 
influence which engineered the appointment at that time. Under 
the Earl's tactful handling Dalrymple worked well, but he was 
an obstinate perfectionist and his relations with Spencer's 
successors were less happy. The few models bought were confined
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to war time experiments. There was a model of a floating 
battery in 1794, and one of an invention to steer fireships 
after the crew had left in 1803, but expenditure on them was 
small.
The Admiralty adopted a paternalistic attitude to its 
employees, and provided money for extras and a few rare 
allowances, on occasions from the contingencies. There were 
treats; four guineas was often spent on beer in which to drink 
the King's health on his birthday, and on the occasion of the 
several great naval victories the Admiralty was illuminated.
The bills for this service increased as the war proceeded and 
the victories became more splendid, rising from £50/7/-i^ in 1794, 
to reach a peak in 1802 when £216/1 was spent to celebrate the 
peace. By contrast £101 was spent in 1805 when the Admiralty 
was illuminated for three nights only, but Nelson's death cast 
a cloud over the joyousness of that occasion.
Though none of the domestics received an official pension, 
special arrangements were occasionally made for old servants.
The housekeeper, whose office was a sinecure, was employed 
because she was the widow of a former messenger, and even when 
the Admiralty agreed to the abolition of the office they insisted 
on continuing her salary of £40 p.a. for the rest of her life.^ '
1. Pari.Pap..Finance Reports. 1798. Select Committee Report.
Proceedings of the Admiralty on Finance Reports. G.p.802;
1803,xiii.. She was granted an official pension from
1 Jan.1800 which ceased with her death on 14 Dec.1803.
Ad.22/8,p.252.Ad.22/19,0.166.
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A  former messenger, John Jones, was granted an allowance
averaging £46 annually between 1802 and 1804 until he could
be provided for and the Admiralty paid the necessary five
guinea fee, in 1804, on a Tresury warrant, granting him a licence
as a Port of London waterman.^* Twelve years earlier, in 1792,
John Hill, one of the watchmen, was appointed porter at Sheerness 
2
yard, * This was a promotion, since at Sheerness,Hill had a 
house and a salary of £45 p.a. and like most yard porters, was 
permitted to keep a tap, which could bring in well over one 
hundred pounds annually. * The Board could be equally considerate 
to casual employees or men hurt in their service. In 1790 four 
sums of ten guineas were paid to members of a press gang as
4
compensation for wounds received in the service. * During the 
building of the new offices in 1788 one of the workmen, James 
Sibbald, fell down a coal hole and was paid compensation of 
£10/6/8 for the injuries he received. * A year later four
1. Ad.17/8,1804.
2. Ad.22/5,p.460.
3. Pari.Pap., The taking of Fees and Perquisites in Public 
Offices etc.. Reports from Commissioners.No.VI.The Dockyards, 
p p •286,288 ;1806,vii.
4. M ± 1 7 / 7 , 1790,20 July,13 Oct.
5. Ad.17/7,1788.
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guineas was paid to Diana Murphy, wife to one of the workmen 
injured, during work on the office, in a fall which confined him 
to Westminster Infirmary for twelve weeks.
One of a number of government offices in Whitehall, the 
Admiralty had outgrown its premises by 1783. Limited expansion 
partially solved the problem of clerical accommodation, though 
the staff employed was not large for such an important department. 
A domestic staff catered to the essential needs of commissioners 
and clerks, often earning more than the latter through their 
traditional allowances or profitable contracts. Admiralty 
tradition was shown in its conservation of records, its leisured, 
eighteenth century attitude to work in their haphazard collection 
and preservation. The advent of Sir Charles Middleton to the 
Board, the removal of elderly officials and the growing numbers 
of documents compelled the introduction of a more systematic 
cars of documents recording policy-making decisions. Yet 
though a traditionalist department the Admiralty had adopted 
mechanical aids for the office earlier than many others, always 
paying due regard for the saving of public money by cutting 
down wartime services as soon pas peace was declared. But the 
Board was prepared to invest in practical schemes. After 1790 
the increasing numbers and importance of accurate charts was 
recognised by the creation of a special department for them
1. AdL17/l.
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and for the new telegraphic system, in 1795. The Board was 
conscious of its importance as the organiser of naval affairs 
and was generous in its official tribute to the numerous 
victories of the period. In its limited way it was faithful 
to old servants and generous in granting small pensions and 
allowances to old employees, or even casual labour. Despite 
pressure from reforming committees the Admiralty endeavoured, 
successfully, to continue these beneficent payments, and its 
attitude to clerks and domestics alike was one of kindly 
paternalism.
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CHAPTER VI
The Relations of the Admiralty with subordinate Naval boards.
Immediately under the direction of the Admiralty was the 
all-important Navy Board. Responsible for civil administra­
tion, it was not consulted on policy or strategy, though when 
the Admiralty was weak, or there were no seamen with sufficient 
experience at that Board, a strong Comptroller, like Sir 
Charles Middleton, might alter this position. The Board's 
duties were to make contracts for and distribute to the yards, 
all necessary naval stores, to prepare naval estimates, examine 
and certify the Treasurer's accounts, pay the seamen, recommend 
officials for yard employment and gunners, carpenters and pursers 
for sea service, draw up warrants for the latter, and generally 
design, build and maintain the fleet, administer the yards and, 
through subsidiary boards, deal with the transport, victualling 
and health of the fleets.
In the late eighteenth century the complete establishment 
of the Navy Board comprised twelve commissioners of whom the 
principal, and nominal head was the Treasurer of the Navy. He 
was responsible to the Admiralty and was appointed by patent, 
but did not perform his duties in person. These were delegated 
to a Paymaster and clerks and by 1783 the Treasurer had ceased 
to attend board meetings. The post was a sinecure, a political 
appointment held by some important government supporter. Pitt
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thought the office next in importance to Cabinet ministers^* 
one of whom sometimes held it. For most of this period Henry 
Dundas was Treasurer, 1783-1800. His successors were the 
Hon.Dudley Ryder, Charles Bragge Bathurst, Addington's brother 
in law, George Tierney and George Canning.
Of the otherdeven commissioners, four were at the outports 
of Portsmouth, Plymouth, Halifax and Chatham, and seven more 
in London. These seven properly composed the Board and were 
the Comptroller, the Comptrollers of Treasurer's, Victualling 
and Storekeepers' Accounts, whose duties were to check the 
accounts of their respective departments, the Surveyor, whose 
duties were practical and technical and involved the supervision 
of all ship building and repairs in the yards, the Clerk of 
the Acts, who acted as secretary to the Board, and one, in war 
two, extra commissioners. In addition there was one assistant 
to the Clerk of the Acts, two to the Surveyor, a storekeeper 
of slops, one hundred clerks and other inferior officers. 
Previous to 1786 their office had been on Tower Hill, but in 
that year they moved to Somerset House and larger premises.
The real head of the Board was the Comptroller, vAo presided at 
meetings, prepared the Board's agenda and attended the Admiralty 
and Treasury frequently. In addition he supervised his own
1. The Diary and Correspondence of Charles Abbot. Lord 
Colchester. Colchester, ed., 1.258.
264
department which was responsible for bills and accounts, half 
pay, the supervision of the yards at Deptford and Woolwich.
But by 1783 work had so increased that he had to transfer half 
pay arrangements to the Navy Pay office and on the outbreak 
of war a deputy was created to share the burden.
The central administration was distributed to the yards 
through resident commissioners. There were six main British 
yards; four were on the Thames at Deptford, Woolwich, Sheerness 
and Chatham, and two on the south coast at Portsmouth and 
Plymouth. Smaller yards were at Deal, Harwich, Leith and 
Kinsale, and there were foreign establishments in the Mediterr­
anean, the East and West Indies and Halifax, Nova Scotia. The 
post at Chatham was generally regarded as senior and better 
paid, a basic salary of £500 was increased by fees to £623, 
allowances of coal and candles and payment as one of the 
governors of Chatham C h e s t . T h e  appointment at Sheerness 
was the most junior. Portsmouth and Plymouth, rendezvous of 
the Channel fleet, being busier and larger than the Thames 
yards had larger responsibilities. The salary of the Portsmouth 
commissioner was £529 p.a. plus allowances and payment as 
governor of the Royal Academy, at Plymouth it was £551 and
1. Pari.Pap., The Taking of Fees and Perquisites in Public 
Offices etc.. Reports from Commissioners.No.VI. The 
Dockyards.p.289, Appendix 134;1806,vii.
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a l l o w a n c e s *
Below the resident commissioners were the six main yard 
officials. The Master Attendant v;as responsible for sails, 
rigging and bosun's stores, the Master Shipwright for the 
building and repair of ships, docks and buildings and the 
supervision of all artificers except the sail makers and 
riggers. Not only were the shipwrights the most important 
and highly skilled workers in the yard, 'that main-spring of all 
naval movements', * but the most independent, turbulent and 
difficult to control. In all yards they formed an hereditary 
castle, difficult to reform, intricately organised, with roots 
in the boroughs which made them formidable opponents. Especially 
during the war there were frequent, violent demands for higher 
wages, when revolutionary principles affected some and greed 
others, culminating in the great strike of 1801. * The Clerk 
of the Cheque was the representative of the Treasurer of the 
Navy and responsible for pay, the Clerk of the Survey checked 
on all yard proceedings, especially accounts, the Storekeeper, 
Clerk of the Ropeyard and Purveyor, who surveyed, marked and 
reported on timber tendered by contract, were the remaining
1. Ibid.. pp.408-9*
2. Letters of Sir T. Bvam Martin. R.V.Hamilton, ed.,III.390.
3. A.Aspinall, The Early English Trade Unions.(London,1949), 
pp.13,39,48., C.N.Parkinson, Trade in the Eastern Seas. 
1793-1815.(Cambridge,1937),pp.27-129.
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officers. All of them surveyed and inspected stores delivered 
in the yard, signing bills and certificates for them. There 
were also a surgeon, a bosun of the yard who was assistant to 
the Master Shipwright, and a porter who kept the gate, in the 
larger yards. The last post was usually given to a favoured 
servant of an admiral or First Lord^'until St.Vincent decided 
to change the name to warden and use it to provide for active 
officers, such as lieutenants of the Navy. The smaller yards 
had lesser establishments, consisting of a storekeeper or 
clerk of the cheque and clerks and the overseas establishments, 
apart from Halifax, had a naval officer who acted as storekeeper, 
a master shipwright and a small staff of artificers and clerks. 
Through long custom the yard officers appointed their own clerks 
and received premiums from them. These clerks often performed 
the duties for which their superiors were responsible.
There were three Comptrollers between 1783 and 1806, Sir 
Charles Middleton, 1778-1790, Sir Henry Martin, 1790-1794, and 
Sir Andrew Snape Hamond, 1794-1806. Their deputies after 1793 
were Captain Le Cras from August, 1793 to February, 1794, Hamond 
from February to October, 1794, Captains Samuel Marshall, from 
October,1794 to 1796, Charles Hope, until 1801 and Henry Duncan 
from 1801 to 1808. All were naval captains when appointed
1. Letters of Lord St. Vincent. D. Bonner Smith, ed., II.pp. 
179-80, St. Vincent to H.R.H. The Prince of Wales, 8 Sept 
1801.
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and the majority received baronetcies as a reward for bravery 
in action or distinguished civilian service. All the Comptroll­
ers were M.P.'s while at the Board, for government controlled 
boroughs, like Middleton at Rochester, 1784-1790, or for 
boroughs controlled by friends of the administration, like 
Martin at Southampton, 1790-1794 and Hamond at Ipswich 1796-1806.
Hamond was the son of a wealthy shipowner at Blackheath.
He entered the Navy in 1753 and through Lord Howe's influence 
and his own ability quickly rose in his profession. By 1780 
he was governor of Nova Scotia, commander-in-chief on the Ner4h
Scoho/
A-mo-ric-a station and commissioner of the yard at Halifax. Created 
a baronet at the end of the war, his connections and ability 
secured him employment in peace when he served as commander-in- 
thief at the Nore, 1785-1788, and in the Spanish crisis of 1790, 
Three years later he became a naval commissioner and on the 
outbreak of war deputy comptroller, to succeed to the Comptroll- 
ership on Martin's death in 1794. Possibly the King's personal 
liking for Hamond contributed to his appointment, since he 
commanded the Southampton frigate in which George III cruised 
while at Weymouth in 1789.
Martin also enjoyed royal favour. Prince William was 
entrusted to his care in 1781 and 1785, while Martin was at 
Portsmouth.^" Martin's family had estates in Antigua, where 
his father had been speaker in the Island's assembly. One half
1. The Prince fell in love with Sarah Martin and had to be
removed. N.M.M.Papers of Admiral Lord Howe, How/4,George III 
to Howe, 28 Jan.1786.
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brother, Josiah, had been governor of North Carolina, another,
Samuel, Treasurer to the Dowager Princess of Wales. Martin,
whose service career was undistinguished, was friendly with
Lord Hood, and through him with Pitt, while a son in law was
an independent politician, J.P.Bastard,M.P. for Truro, 1783-
1784, Devon,1784-1816.
Captain Charles Hope was son of the second earlx of
Hopetoun and member of a large and powerful Scottish noble
family. A cousin was M.P. for Linlithgow with a son who was
president of the court of session and lord advocate in Addington's 
1
ministry. * He was succeeded by Henry Duncan, second cousin
of Admiral Duncan who began his career in the merchant service
and achieved a fortunate marriage which made him financially
independent. Settled in Dartmouth he may have devoted himself
tkot of
to local politics, for his career was bound up with^Lord Howe's,
(jjl. UJClÇ
^M.P. for that borough. Duncan became his flag captain on the
North American station and commissioner of Halifax when Howe
Vi/as First Lord. He remained there until 1799 while the Duke
of Kent was governor, an association which may have been useful
but was unfortunate for his reputation. According to Lord St.
Vincent, he had been 'a pimp and pandar to the Duke of Kent
2,
and exposed himself to much slander and contempt'. * Duncan
1. D.N.B.XXVII.312-3,314.
2. JER/24, St. Vincent to Nepean, 4 Feb.1800.
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Duncan was appointed commissioner at Sheerness and finally
deputy Comptroller.^*
Thus all these men were seamen with some service and civil
experience and in some cases with influential friends or family
connections which had contributed to their appointment. The
same is broadly true of the resident commissioners. The most
senior was Charles Proby at Chatham, appointed in 1771,
resigning in 1799, to be succeeded by Captains Hartwell and Hope.
Proby, whose mother was a Leveson Gower, whose brother was
Baron Carysfort and whose nephew, the first Earl, married into
the Grenville family, had seen service with Lord Anson and had
o
a brief spell as Comptroller of Victualling Accounts. *
Sheerness's first resident commissioner was Captain Henry Harmood, 
formerly a commissioner at the London board without special 
function. He was succeeded by Hartwell and then by Isaac 
Coffin, son of an American loyalist, to whom an accident had 
brought retirement from active service. He served at Corsica 
and other Mediterranean ports, Halifax and Sheerness and was
3
a follower of Lord St. Vincent. *
At Portsmouth Henry Martin, later Comptroller, was succeeded 
by Charles Saxton, in 1790, a rough sailor according to Nelson,
1. The Naval Miscellany, J.K.Laughton, ed., 1.107-110.
2. The Naval Chronicle.1799.ii.83.
3. J. Marshall, Royal Naval Biography.i.229-233.
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with few social pretensions but wide experience.^' At
Plymouth John Laforey, 1783-1789, and Robert Fanshawe,1789-1815, 
were the commissioners. The first had West Indian connections, 
his wife was from Antigu^, which were complemented by his appoint­
ment to the Leeward Isles as commander in chief in 1789.
Fanshawe, 'that odd fish' 'had seen action under Lord Rodney 
but his connection with the Duke of Leeds, Foreign Secretary 
till 1791,probably secured him the post. At Halifax the 
commissioners were Henry Duncan, later deputy comptroller, and 
John Inglefield. The letter's service had been marked by 
personal bravery but his marriage to the daughter of Sir Thomas 
Slade, a former Surveyor of the Navy, must also have helped him 
professionally. Inglefield was pompous but a capable admin- 
istrator. ' Captain Francis Hartwell was the son of the 
Lieutenant Governor of Greenwich Hospital, had seen active service 
in 1790 and 1791 and been Victualling Commissioner in 1793.
He then became resident commissioner at Sheerness and Chatham 
and was appointed extra commissioner.^*
1. D.N.B.L.384-5.
2. Letters of Sir.T.Bvam Martin. R.V. Hamilton, ed., 1.222, 
Commissioner Laforey to Martin, 27 Ap1.1788.
3. D.N.B.XXVIII.437-8., The Spencer Papers. H.W.Richmond,ed., 
IV.5, St. Vincent to Spencer, 22 Jan.1799.
4. Marshall, op.cit.. iii.60-61.
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The remaining commissioners were civilians, trained clerks 
with specialised experience, gained at the outports and London 
office. The Clerk of ..the Acts, George Marsh, worked at 
Deptford as secretary to Admiral Mostyn, as private secretary 
to the First Lord and as Victualling commissioner, before joining 
the Navy Board, But William Palmer, Comptroller of the 
Victualling Accounts had a more typical career. He began as 
clerk in the Slop Office, became clerk to one of the commission­
ers,clerk of the survey at Deptford and of the cheque at 
Portsmouth, before being promoted to the Navy Board. The 
Surveyors had worked in all the principal home yards and 
generally spent some time as draughtsmen in the office of the 
former Surveyor who acted as their patron. Yet there were 
exceptions to this conventional pattern. William Bellingham, 
Comptroller of Storekeepers Accounts in 1790, had been Pitt's 
private secretary, was a close friend of Lord Chatham, and M.P. 
for Reigate, 1784-1789.^* Extra commissioners without special 
function during this period were Samuel Gambler, Benjamin Tucker, 
Lord St. Vincent's protegee, who on his removal to the second 
secretary-ship at the Admiralty, was replaced by the Hon.H.Legge, 
related to the Earls of Dartmouth. Osborne Markham, brother 
to Captain Markham at the Admiralty, became an extra commissioner 
in 1803 in place of Bellingham and the Hon.E.Bouverie and
1. Namier and Brooke, Hist.of Pari.. 1.81.
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John Deas Thomas, were appointed in 1605. Bouverie whose 
brother, the first Earl of Radnor, took an active part in 
Melville's impeachment, may have been selected in an unsuccess­
ful attempt to appease a powerful enemy.
Though not all the commissioners belonged to a similar 
social group their profession and position helped to bind 
them into a recognisable entity. Their families occasionally 
intermarried and formed connections with the service and with 
the yards, as well as more tenuously with politicaland other 
non service interests. Thus Martin's son, Thomas Byam, married 
one of Fanshawe's daughters, four of whom married naval officers 
Inglefield's daughter married Captain Hallowell^’ Laforey's son, 
Francis, became an admiral, his daughter married Captain Molloy, 
a friend of the Duke of Rutland, court-martialled after the
battle of the Glorious First of June and dismissed his ship.
2
Proby's daughter married Rear Admiral Tchitagoff. ' Hartwell's 
wife was the daughter of Captain John Elphinstone, vice admiral 
in the Russian service and one time commander of their Baltic
fleet.3"
These connections were not confined to commissioners but 
permeated every part of the dockyard service. Thus Commander 
Samuel Warren married the daughter of the clerk of the survey
1. The Naval Chronicle. 1800,iii,331.
2. The Naval Chronicle,1799,ii,547.
3. Marshall, op.cit.. iii,61-2.
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at Chatham.^* The daughter of John Lloyd, clerk of the cheque
at Plymouth, married Admiral Herbert Sawyer. Sawyer's sister
was the wife of Charles Hope, commissioner at Chatham, whose
son, Henry married his cousin. Sawyer's daughter. Admiral
Samuel Hood had married Margaret Linzee, whose grandfather had
been Master Ropemaker at Portsmouth. The three sons of Peter
Butt, clerk of the survey at Deptford, all entered the Navy,
while one of his daughters married Vice Admiral George Parker,
2
the nephew of Admiral Peter Parker, Nelson's patron. * There 
was thus a close web of relationships, which was probably 
closer than can now be discovered, between the yard officers, 
the commissioners and the service. Few of these men came from 
noble families, most belonged to the middle and professional 
classe s •
This web of relationships did not extend to the Admiralty 
whose members had little in common, socially or professionally 
with the Navy commissioners. The two boards resembled concentric 
rather than overlapping circles. Middleton was the only member 
of both during this period, though Admiral Hood was another 
Admiralty lord whose social and professional ties were with the 
Navy rather than the Admiralty board. Relations between the 
Admiralty and Navy Boards, like those between the Admiralty 
and other government offices, were often dependent on
1. The Naval Chronicle. 1801,iv.527.
2. J.Summerson, 'The Monuments in St.Nicholas Church,Deptford', 
The Mariner's Mirror, xxvii.no.4.(October,1941),288.
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personalities, principally those of the Comptroller and First 
Lord. Middleton and Howe did not agree; Howe, who was in 
the stronger position theoretically, would not listen to 
Middleton's advice or consult him on official business and did 
not take him on the visitation of the yards. Martin and Chatham, 
their successors, were two mediocrities on friendly terms.
Spencer and Hamond worked well and for similar reasons. Spencer 
was reluctant to stand against the professional advice of the 
Navy Board^* and both men were rather controlled by their 
boards because of their own professional ignorance. Under St. 
Vincent things were different. There was now an experienced 
seaman at the head of affairs and one who had long considered 
the civil administration rotten and the Navy Board inefficient.
At first St. Vincent excluded Hamond from this general condem­
nation and placed reliance on his opinion. But when he found 
him upholding the fraudulent yard workers and siding with the 
timber contractors against the Admiralty he revised his opinion, 
refused to writs to the Comptroller except on official business 
and would 'have almost given his two ears' to get rid of him. * 
Communication with the Navy Board therefore virtually came to 
a halt during these strained relations and became the subject 
of Parliamentary inquiry in 1803 and 1804.
1. Parkinson, Edward Pellew, Viscount Exmouth.p.124.
2. Letters of Sir.T.Bvam Martin. R.V.Hamilton, ed.. III.274,
H.Legge to Byam Martin, 24 Oct.I83I.
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But there was another reason for difficult relations between 
the two boards. There were two essential but opposing elements 
in naval administration; the civil and military, compelled to 
work together for the good of the service. The development of 
administration has been a civil process, performed in offices 
far removed from fighting but it has been concerned with the 
supply and development of the fighting machine. A struggle 
has therefore been present for supreme importance. The civil 
administration was in contact with the military branch by letter 
only and rarely experienced at first hand the conditions of 
service it helped to form. The military branch rarely had 
experience of civilian administration and over-simplified the 
problems involved. Since fighting has always been regarded as 
a more manly occupation than clerical work there was a constant 
struggle between the civilian, inferior Navy Board and the 
military, superior Admiralty, reinforced, in this period, by 
social distinctions and embittered by a personal quarrel.
The superiority of the Admiralty did not rest unchallenged. 
A strong Comptroller could, in practice, almost reverse this 
balance ; an Admiralty ignorant of civil problems could not 
assert its full authority. Since most Admiralty Boards were 
composed of young, inexperienced aristocrats and middle aged 
seamen, this frequently happened. Latent antagonism between 
the boards was reflected in ships' appointments. The senior 
officers, fighting men, were appointed by the Admiralty, the 
civilian officials, pursers and the like, by the Navy Board.
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Coupled with the problem of divergence of function was 
the normal dislike of the civil administration entertained by 
serving seamen. There was a tendency in the service to despise 
those who accepted a safe civil appointment and rejected the 
toils and glories of service life for the more tangible rewards 
of promotion, safety and emoluments. This was the natural 
dislike of the active for the chair-borne, of the soldier for 
the civil servant, but it was mixed with an irrational envy 
for the comfort of a 'soft billet* and the detachment from 
hardship which the civil servant enjoyed. The Navy Board 
were thus caught between the upper and nether millstones of 
Admiralty status, including social superiority, and service 
scorn. It is not therefore surprising if the Navy Board consoled 
themselves with perquisites or entrenched themselves behind 
barriers of precedents.
Correctly and conscientiously performed the Comptrollership 
was no sinecure. The Comptroller was responsible for the 
smooth running of the naval machine. His efficiency or slackness 
affected not only his clerks but the humblest yard worker, and 
would ultimately affect the efficiency of the ships themselves 
in their performance in battle, their speed on convoy work, 
their sheer persistence in blockades and cruising. Though the
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Admiralty issued the orders, these could not be carried out 
with rotten masts, leaky hulls, ravelled cordage, supplied 
by inefficient or corrupt yards, nor by men debilitated by bad 
beer, mouldy biscuit and rotten meat.
It was Sir Charles Middleton who, by herculean labours, 
brought order out of chaos when he was first appointed in 1778. 
He re-organised the office work, dealt with the day's business 
in the day and expected punctual attendance and hard work from 
subordinates. He took office in the middle of a war, when 
there was a serious deficiency in stores, ships and men. By 
the end of the war he had replenished the stores of timber, 
built new yards in the West Indies and twelve new sail of line 
at home, and coppered the entire fleet. He had also drawn up 
an index of Admiralty orders and instructions for the Navy 
Board's use and insisted on regular accurate returns from the 
yards, so that a check on expenses and stores might be kept 
and reliable estimates made. Unfortunately these excellent 
regulations were allowed to lapse after Middleton retired and 
the Commission of Naval Enquiry of 1803 recommended that they 
be restored. Middleton had achieved all this in the face of 
continued obstruction from the yards and the Admiralty. He 
may have hoped Pitt's interest in naval affairs presaged a new 
era in naval administration; if so he was disappointed. He 
was ordered to reduce expenses by between £300,000 and £400,000 
p.a. This brought him into conflict with the First Lord,
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Lord Howe 5 who insisted on the dismissal of two extra 
commissioners, Captains le Cras and Wallis. Unable to reduce 
expenses without damaging what he considered necessary services 
and finding his recommendations for the reform of the office 
were not carried out Middleton resigned in disgust in 1790,
Yet he had achieved a great deal. The speed and efficiency 
with which the fleet was equipped to meet the crises of 1787, 
1790 and 1791 and the outbreak of war in 1793, were attributable 
to Middleton.
He had also made the office of the Comptroller next in 
importance to the First Lord, by discussing affairs with Pitt, 
without reference to the Navy or Admiralty Boards. Such 
intimacy with the Prime Minister and such an extension of the 
Comptroller's influence aroused the jealousy of the Admiralty. 
His idea that the Comptroller should become a member of the 
Admiralty, while the first Victualling commissioner became a 
member of the Navy Board, was sound, but he did not dare to 
suggest it to the Commissioners investigating the taking of 
fees in the 1780's, nor attempt to put it into practice. Any 
attempt to do so would have aroused the Admiralty's wrath, 
particularly while Howe was First Lord, and would have been 
doomed to failure. But Middleton did impress his personality 
on the office. He raised the standard expected from future 
holders and under him the board worked efficiently. This was 
not always true of his successors.
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, Martin’s four years were uneventful. According to 
Middleton he allowed himself to be advised by dockyard officers,^" 
and his tenure was marked by tact rather than reforming zeal. 
Hamond was not a strong character. He took office in 1794, 
the same year in which Lord Spencer became First Lord. Spencer 
was totally unfamiliar with naval administration and depended 
on his naval colleagues at the Admiralty, none of whom, after the 
resignation of Middleton and the recall of Hood, were particu­
larly noteworthy. In such a situation a strong Comptroller 
could have been the dominant figure, and it may be imagined 
what Middleton would have made of this opportunity. But Hamond 
did not have Middleton’s strong character. Though both served 
for twelve years, there is no comparison of the work done by 
them. Hamond was Comptroller of a Board which weakly yielded 
to the threats of timber contractors and the demands of yard 
workers for piece work rates and overtime, regardless of work 
done. The Board was virtually unchanged from that which worked 
under Middleton. But the momentum the latter generated began 
to run down. Not only the clerks but the commissioners needed 
constant supervision which neither of Middleton’s successors 
were prepared to give.
1. The Barham Papers. J.K.Laughton,ed.. III.20-21, Draft 
Memorandum, Apl.1803.
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The Commission investigating the taking of fees in public 
offices in its report on the Navy Board, voiced Middleton's ^
recommendations. The most important of these was that the 
number of commissioners in London be increased to ten and 
divided into three committees, of stores, accounts and 
correspondence. The Comptroller would be an ex officio member 
of each committee with a casting vote, and each would report 
to the whole board on its work. This proposal was to eliminate 
what Middleton had complained of as 'nine commissioners sitting 
at a table to obstruct business', a revealing description of 
business at a board where no commissioners had specific duties 
and each an equal voice. The Commission also made a compre­
hensive survey of the yards. Though they acknowledged that all 
the officials there and at the central London office seemed to 
do their duty to the best of their ability, they criticised the 
taking of fees and premiums and condemned the embezzlement of 
stores and the other petty abuses they uncovered. Their 
primary function however was not to reform the whole yard 
structure, but to recommend where economies could most effec­
tively be introduced. Undoubtedly much petty thieving did exist
1• Pari.Pap., Portsmouth Borough. On Petitions of Inhabitants 
respecting Frauds and Abuses in the Victualling Departments, 
House of Commons Reports.Miscellaneous,No.55.pp.3-13, 
Appendix 5; 1783-4,xxxvi.
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there was often gross overcharging for stores^' articles were 
signed for before they were received, work was often rated as 
'job' rather than 'task' work and paid fifty per cent higher, 
though it was the same work, children, old men and invalids
p
were sometimes carried on the yard books and the granting 
of special perquisites like 'chips' of wood for shipwrights 
and of fees and premiums for all workers, was common. The 
1787 Commission therefore had recommended that fixed, adequate 
salaries be paid, fees abolished, duties performed in person 
and the abuses connected with 'chips', stores and the taking 
of apprentices be checked.
The Admiralty, to whom these recommendations were made, 
largely ignored them. Middleton resigned when he realised 
they would not be implemented and no further investigation , 
was carried out into the Navy Board or dockyards until 1798.
By then Britain had been at war for five years and public 
credit was feeling the strain. The Sleet Committee on Finance, 
appointed in the precejçding year, to investigate these problems, 
though not concerned with a whole scale reform of the Navy Board
1. Pari.Pap., The Taking of Fees and Perquisites in Public
Offices etc.. Reports from Commissioners. No.IX. Naval
and Victualling Departments at Foreign or Distant Ports, 
pp.728-9, Appendix 4, p.745, pp.746-8, Appendix 5 ;
1806,vii.
2. Pari.Pap., Commission of Naval Enquiry into Irregularities,
Frauds and Abuses practised in the Naval Departments and
in the Business of Prize Agency.. Reports from Commissioners 
No.VI. Plymouth and Woolwich Yards, pp.59-60;1803-4,ü i .
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and yards devoted several reports to the Navy as one of the 
biggest government spenders, and part of their thirty first 
report dealt with the yards.
Several regulations, recommended by the Commission of 
1787 had already been implemented. By an order in council of 
8 June, 1796 the Navy Board was re-organised into the Committees 
recommended and on 2 August the offices of clerk of the acts, 
comptrollers of Treasurer's, Victualling and Storekeepers accounts 
were abolished and their holders became extra commissioners 
without special function. This was the most important reform, 
but smaller ones had been introduced in the yards, aimed at 
bringing standing orders up to date and keeping an accurate
■1
list of stores. The Finance Committee, while noting the jif- 
Admiralty's reluctance to investigate the naval departments 
during the war, hoped that such an investigation would not be 
long delayed. An order in council of 12 January, 1792 had 
urged the preparation of such a report and the Admiralty had 
promised one^'only to be thwarted by the war. Fees still 
remained, there had been no rise in salaries, chips and other 
abuses continued to flourish. The Committee therefore produced 
no new recommendations since those of ten years earlier had not 
been carried into effect, but they urged the Admiralty to deal 
with this matter at the earliest opportunity.
1. Pari.Pap.. Finance Reports. 1798. Select Committee Report 
No.XXXI. The Admiralty Dockyards and Transports.p.486; 
1803,xiii.
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It was not until 1801 that the Admiralty replied to these 
reports. The Board that did so was Lord Spencer's, which 
prepared a partial reform of the yards, based on previous 
suggestions. Progress was slow because of the war, and before 
they could get far the Admiralty board were themselves replaced. 
But, in common with their suggestions concerning the Admiralty 
office, many of the Admiralty's proposals were more far reaching 
than those of the two earlier committees and showed a genuine 
desire to improve the efficiency of the service. They suggested 
higher salaries to compensate for a rise in prices and the 
higher rates paid by private yards, introduced a graduated 
pension scheme by which ten to fifteen years service earned one 
third the peace time salary, fixed more adequate compensation 
for the abolition of the traditional privileges of 'chips' and 
the taking of apprentices, and required a stricter attention 
to work and the employment of sufficient clerks. They also 
showed themselves jealous of their power over the naval estab­
lishment, and disapproved of any recommendation which imperilled 
this. Thus while they wished to increase the power of the 
resident yard commissioners, they rejected the view that these 
should be chosen from the seamen at the Navy Board. They 
spurned the idea that salaries at Sheerness be a quarter less 
than anywhere else because it was a smaller yard, despite the 
Navy Board's tentative approval of this recommendation,^*and 
they considered the appointment of a surveyor of civil
1. Ibid., p.491,Appendix Dl.
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architecture unnecessary while the Inspector General of Naval 
Works, their own official, performed his functions.
Lord St. Vincent's board were prepared to follow up the 
work of their predecessors and the strike of shipwrights, 
coupled with the First Lord's well knovm opinion of the rotten­
ness of the civil branch encouraged this resolve. A visitation 
of the yards was in any case long overdue, thanks to the war.
Nor, at first, were the motives which inspired it partisan.
St. Vincent had his suspicions, even pre-conceived notions, of 
yard corruption, but these were not certainties and he and his 
board had no idea of the true state of affairs. Hamond later . 
claimed that St. Vincent did not allow the Navy Board a fair 
hearing in its defence, and there is some truth in this charge. 
When roused the Earl's wrath was crushing and he could pursue 
supposed enemies vindictively. Marsden agreed that reforms 
in the yards were necessary, but objected to the manner of 
carrying them out, 'the object seeming to be to find grounds 
for delinquencies presumed in the first instance'.^* The inferior 
boards, he claimed, had been abused and attempts made to drive 
them from office. 'To crush them was the object of the Bill
(against naval abuses), and the frauds in the dockyards.......
2
are only the pretext'. * Yet to argue that the Navy Board was
1. Marsden's Memoir, p .103.
2. Ibid.,p .104,nte.
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only guilty of negligence is untrue. Their duty was not to be 
negligent, but to 'uphold and enforce obedience to their 
Instructions and not to palliate the conduct or furnish excuses 
to those who act in direct contradiction to them'.^" There 
were cases of corruption and undue profit when all exaggeration 
is cleared away.
The Admiralty's visitation of the yards began in August, 
1802 at Plymouth. Throughout the Admiralty laid special 
emphasis on upholding the power of the commissioner, not only 
over the officials in the yard but sometimes even in contra­
diction to the Navy Board. Fanshawe at Plymouth was supported 
by the Admiralty in his dispute with yard officers, and the 
Navy Board ordered to communicate orders to him only in future 
and not to yard officials in an ixegular correspondence, and 
on all occasions to strengthen his authority. At Sheerness 
they upheld the Commissioner Coffin in his dispute with the 
Board and after uncovering many abuses, on 16 October wrote 
to the Board, strongly censuring their conduct and failure to 
fulfill their duty. It was decided to appoint a commission 
of enquiry to investigate the abuses in the naval department 
and this was established in December, 1802. At its head was
1. Pari.Pap..Commission of Naval Enquiry into Irregularities.
Frauds and Abuses practised in the Naval Departments and 
in the Business of prize Agency. Reports from Commissioners 
Mo.XII. Observations supplementing the First Report, 
p .244 ;1806,iv.
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Vice Admiral Sir Charles Pole, a relative of Captain Markham.
Another commissioner, Ewen Law, was Markham's brother in law,
while Law*s brother. Lord Ellenborough, the lord chief justice,
was the son in law of Commissioner Towry of the Victualling
Office. The commissioners were thus not free from the usual
eighteenth century connections. They worked until June, 1803,
when they produced the first three reports on naval storekeepers
at Jamaica, the Chatham Chest, and the Block and Coopers contract,
all revealing notable frauds.
Abuses not only flourished in the yards but were connived
at in the Navy Board. No check was made of wages paid to
shipwrights, and three of the commissioners, when examined on
this point were uncertain whether the yard pay books were
checked in the office or not before payment.^* When asked by
the Admiralty why they allowed false vouchers from Halifax yard,
knowing them to be false, they gave the incredible answer that
false vouchers saved the trouble of making out numerous correct 
2ones. * The Board had regularly agreed to the requests of
certain contractors, for an increase in rates above that submitted
3 Wock
by their tender. * It was discovered that the^contract had
1. The Letters of Lord St.Vincent.D.Bonner Smith,ed.,11. 
Appendix,p.451,nte,
2. Ibid..p p .479-80,nte.
3. Pari.Pap..Commission of Naval Enquiry into Irregularities, 
Frauds and Abuses practised in the Naval Departments and
in the Business of Prize Agency. Reports from Commissioners. 
No.III. The Block and Cooper's Contract, pp.177-181,183 ; 
1802-3,iv.
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never been read at the time of minuting^* and never signed
and so was invalid in law, whereupon the Admiralty cancelled 
it and established machinery at Portsmouth to make blocks. ^
Not only did St. Vincent enrage the merchant builders, he 
antagonised the powerful timber contractors. The Navy Board, 
according to a standing order of 1776, was supposed to keep a 
stock of timber for three years consumption in the yards and send 
the Admiralty an annual account of all timber in store. From 
1795 to 1802, years when Middleton had resigned and Spencer 
and Hamond were left in professional ignorance, this was neglected. 
In 1797 the Board refused to buy timber on the grounds that it 
would not need any till the following year though there were than 
ships rotting for want of timber to complete them and though 
the Purveyor reported that there were sufficient trees for
o
cutting in the royal forest of Sherwood. *
The reason for this attitude was the desire to accommodate 
the timber merchants, who supplied the yards by contract.
These merchants, the foremost of whom were John Larking and 
William Bowsher, had formed a 'ring' with the connivance of 
the Board, completely controlling the timber supplies in the 
country. The clerks and receivers of timber in the yards were 
their agents, paid more by them in fees than their government
1. Ibid. , p. 183. This mouckn^ru ujcis jmvCnLi'on of M. of T. /(.ÿun&f.
2. Letters of Lord St.Vincent, D.Bonner Smith,ed.,11.Appendix, 
p .453.
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salary. As a result, of tv\/o hundred and eighty nine trees 
the contractors sent to Deptford in 1801, one hundred and forty 
four were defective. The Navy Board had advanced money to 
these merchants which enabled them to outbid the Navy Purveyors 
and drove every other contractor out of competition. Time 
and again the Board sided with the contractors and weakly 
acquiesed in blackmail. Though there was a severe timber 
shortage in 1802 they refused to accept less than one hundred 
loads of standard size timber which prevented all but the 
biggest contractors tendering and which also meant good first 
size timber was cut up for repairs or smaller ships. They 
rejected small private offers and sometimes paid for royal 
trees as though they were private property, thanks to the 
fraudulent dealings of the Purveyors and contractors.^* Neglect 
in checking the timber delivered meant the best pieces were 
taken for use in private yards and though the reports of the 
Purveyor were the only vouchers the Board had to show what 
they had paid for,such vouchers were neglected in Plymouth for 
sixteen years. * As a result of these and other abuses by 
December 1800 there was less than one and a half years timber 
in the yards, though a private contract had been made with 
Larking for fifty thousand loads of Holstein oak, of notoriously
1. Ibid.,pp.465-6.
2. Ibid. . 4 6 7 .
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poor quality, for which the Board paid the best price and 
freightage charges.
Once St. Vincent discovered what was happening he tried to 
prevent it. The timber converter, appointed by the Board, 
was replaced by a timber master, appointed by the Admiralty 
and responsible for the receipt of wood and its good quality, 
having power to reject unsatisfactory timber. This immediately 
aroused the contractors' hostility; their prices, they declared 
had been low because of the easy method of checking used in 
the yards, an interesting admission. The timber masters were 
unreasonably harsh, the contractors averred, refusing good 
timber and they threatened to cut off supplies altogether, as 
a reprisal. Hamond urged reconciliation, which St.Vincent, 
by now thoroughly aroused, scouted, advertising in the press, 
sending Rule, the Surveyor on tour to buy up oak, though with 
disappointing results. The royal forests, which at this 
juncture should have been able to supply naval needs, were 
equally unforthcoming and St. Vincent wanted an act of Parliament 
to commandeer private oak in a national crisis. This proved 
impossible. The landowners who stood to lose by the act were 
the very men required to pass it, and the suggestion remained 
unfulfilled. By 1803 with the outbreak of war, the situation 
was desperate. The timber trust refused to co-operate and 
did not submit contracts for that year. To get round these 
difficulties Hamond suggested the appointment of a Purveyor
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General and suggested John Larking for the post. While St. 
Vincent remained First Lord this was rejected, but once Melville 
was appointed in 1804 the capitulation and humiliation of the 
Navy Board was complete and Larking took office. A reconcilia­
tion was made with the timber trust, higher prices and revised 
contracts were given whereby the timber masters were rendered 
harmless and this situation continued for as long as the Navy 
depended on timber.^* In 1789 Commissioner Cherry, chairman 
of the Victualling Board, wrote to Admiral Cornwallis that it 
was nearly impossible
'to counteract the machinations and combinations of 
unprincipled people. I lament that men of that description 
seem numerous in the public service and to defraud the 
Crown is by many scarce held to be dishonourable or a 
crime * .
It was unfortunately true of the subordinate naval boards during 
this and succeeding periods, though the Navy Board and the 
dockyards seem to have surpassed others in their wholehearted 
surrender to such an attitude.
Apart from the clash of personalities and breakdown of 
communication between the two boards in 1803, routine work 
continued to be done through a regular though not daily corresp­
ondence. In peace it slowed to a trickle, only nineteen letters
1. R.G.Albion, Forests and Sea Power, pp.319-324.
2. G.Cornwallis West, The Life and Letters of Admiral 
Cornwallis, p .153.
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between January and April, 1786. But by 1803 it had swelled 
to a flood and one hundred and fifty two letters were written 
in April alone. The main topics of this correspondence were 
finance, appointments of clerks and lists of ships and stores. 
The Navy Board were expected to inform the Admiralty of any 
change in their method of business^'and received a severe 
reprimand from the Admiralty if they neglected this duty.^"
In general the Navy Board's advice was adopted on technical 
matters and the Admiralty gave directions which followed the 
suggestions of the inferior board^'but not always so^'and the 
Navy commissioners who presumed to act without the Admiralty's 
sanction were rebuked. * The Admiralty too often adopted an 
attitude of Olympian detachment from the cares and worries of 
its subordinate boards but attempts by naval officers to play 
off one against the other usually led to failure since no matter 
how deep the divisions between the boards, they closed their
1. ^ . 3 / 1 0 0 , p.25,1 Nov.1784.
2. Ibid., p.68, 7 Dec,1784.
3. Ad.2/259.0.552.18 Mar.1784, p.571,25 Mar.1784, Admiralty 
Commissioners to Navy Commissioners.
4. ADM/B,vol.207, Navy Commissioners to Admiralty Board,
29 Jan. 1 Feb,1803.
5. Ad.2/624,pp.59-60, Nepean to Navy Commissioners, IS May,1799.
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ranks when threatened with external criticism.^" On occasion
2the two boards met to discuss pressing problems "and such 
meetings were common between the Navy and Victualling Boards. 
Relations with the latter and with the Sick and Hurt Board 
were cordial, though contact was slight. The Comptroller 
could ask the Sick and Hurt commissioners to 'step over to the 
Navy Office' for an informal talk on an urgent problem;" a 
further example of the importance of good personal relations 
between departments. Such friendly relations with the 
Admiralty were unthinkable. There was a greater distance 
between them than that between Somerset House and Whitehall or 
than could be bridged by crossing the road.
But if the Admiralty's relations with the Navy Board were 
be-devilled by poor personal relations, frequently strained 
and always formal, those with the Victualling Board and Sick 
and Hurt Office were generally good. A regular correspondence 
existed with the former which had been a distinct department 
since 1783 and whose duties were to buy provisions for the Navy 
and arrange for their storage and distribution. The bulk of
1. Index 4813.Series III.no.85a, Lieut.Harris to Admiralty,
6 Apl.1793,, Markham Correspondence, C.Markham, ed.,p.25, 
St. Vincent to Markham, undated.
2. ADIV/B.P.ô B, Navy Commissioners to Admiralty, minute,
13 March, 1786.
3. jW.99/51,p.ll9, 18 Apl.1796.
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stores was bought at principal victualling centres or made 
under supervision, for once it had obtained the necessary raw 
materials, the department was almost self-supporting. It killed 
and salted its own meat, packed it in its own casks made in the 
cooperage, brewed its own beer and baked its own biscuit from 
flour ground at its own mills. It was one of the most important 
divisions of naval administration, since on its efficiency 
depended the health and well being of the fleets.
Besides the Commissioners in London, each of whom super­
vised a separate branch of the service, with a large staff of 
clerks, there were permanent establishments at Deptford, where 
the principal storehouses had been built, at Portsmouth,
Plymouth, Chatham, Dover and Gibraltar, each of which had an 
Agent Victualler, responsible to the Board. To these were 
added in war, establishments at the Leeward Islands, Lisbon 
and the Cape of Good Hope, but the victualling of the Navy 
was so vast and complexf and so dependent on local circumstances, 
that it was impossible to have agents victualler or contractors 
wherever ships touched. At such places the commander of the 
ship or ships was authorised to buy necessities for which the 
purser.drew bills on the Board for the same amount. Victuals 
for the East Indies were sent out from England or provided by 
a.contract made through the Commander in Chief.
1. C.Northcote Parkinson,.War in the Eastern Seas,1793-1815, 
(London,1954),pp.349-351., G. Cornwallis-West, op.cit., 
pp.155,157-8.
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The seven commissioners, three of whom made a quorum, were 
appointed by patent, receiving their instructions from the 
Admiralty, who appointed the secretary. The officers and 
chief clerks were appointed by the Commissioners on Admiralty 
orders, and the clerks by the Commissioners themselves. Until 
1784 no business procedure had been fixed, nor was there any 
permanent chairman, but in that year the Admiralty directed 
that the commissioner superintending the department of the 
accountant for cash should preside at meetings and the 
remaining members should take precedence from their respective 
departments.^* These were the accountant for stores, that 
of the hoy taker, the brewery,cutting and bakehouses and 
cooperage.
Little is known of the commissioners. The appointment was
p
sometimes held by the First Lord's former secretary,* a 
departmental official, like Robert Moody, appointed in 1794 and 
thirty eight years in office * or by seamen, of whom there were
1. Parl.PaP., The Taking of Fees and Perquisites in Public 
Offices, etc.. Reports from Commissioners. No.VIII. The 
Victualling Board.p.553; 1806,vii.,Ad.3/100,pp.30-31.
3 Nov.1784.
2. The Morning Post, 24 Apl.1805.,The Naval Chronicle,1798, 
i.539.
3. AD j\V'D38, Victualling Commissioners to Admiralty Board,
21 Mar.1794.
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five at the Board in 1798.^' One post, that of superintendent 
of the Hoy taker's department, responsible for vessels hired
p
by the Board, was always filled by a captain. But the 
origins of most commissioners and the reasons for their 
appointment are generally obscure. Some of them had naval 
connections. William Boscawen was the nephew of one famous 
admiral, the Hon.John Rodney, the son of another. George
(icLoL conne-t-îicms
Cherry, chairman of the Board, 1786 to 1799, by
the marriage of his eldest daughter to the Rev.Charles Proby, 
eldest son of the naval commissioner at Chatham, W  another 
branch of the administration, while Rodney's place at the 
Board was' taken by Rear Admiral Sir Charles Cunningham, married
o
to another of Commissioner Proby's daughters. * There were 
further links with the personnel of the Navy Board. Three of 
the Navy commissioners during these years. Marsh, Bellingham 
and Hartwell all served at the Victualling Board before being 
promoted to the Navy Office. Admiral Rodney's jibe that
1. Pari.Pan., Finance Committee Reports,1798. Select Committee 
Report.No.XXXII.The Victualling Office.p.555, Appendix
M; 1803,xiii. ,
2. Letters of Lord St.Vincent, D.Bonner Smith, ed.,II.210,
St. Vincent to Hon.Mrs.Bouverie, 26,27 Apl.1803.
3. J. and J.B.Burke, A Genealogical and Heraldic Dictionary
of the Peerage and Baronetage of the Landed Gentry of
Great Britain and Ireland, (3 vols.London,1846-1849.), 
1.211-212., J . Burke, A Genealogical and Heraldic Dictionary
of the Peerage and Baronetage of the British Empire,
"(London,1853j ,p.l74.
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'it was the misfortune of sea officers to know little of the
world and to be bred in seaport towns', applied with equal
truth to the higher officials in the civilian administration
who had little in common, socially, with the Admiralty lords.
On the other hand, their relatively obscure origins did not
prevent their children rising in the social scale. George
Towry's daughter married Lord Ellenborough, John Slade's son
became a general in the Peninsular war^^and Cherry's grandson 
became deputy lieutenant for Berkshire.2.
Like commissioners in other government departments the
Victualling commissioners supplemented their basic salaries of
£400 p.a. with the traditional allowances of rent, coal and
candles and enjoyed other sinecures and emoluments. They
attended four days a week in peace, daily in war, from 10.0.a.m.
to 4.0.p.m. The war prevented the implementation of the
reforms suggested by the Commission of 1788, but in 1800 the
Admiralty issued their own report on the work of the previous
investigating committees, combined with their own proposals
for the office. Once more they proposed salaries be increased
to a more realistic level in order to finally tackle the problem
of fees, they suggested a pension scheme similar to that
introduced in the yards, and, in accordance with the Government's
economic policy of that time, a slight increase in clerical
salaries, though with suitable cuts in pay and numbers of
1. Ibid.. (1828) ,p.210.,
2. J. and J.B.Burke, The Landed Gentry. 1.211.
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clerical staff once overdue accounts were made up and fees 
abolished.^* Unfortunately before all these ideas could be 
carried out a new Admiralty Board took over.
St. Vincent's reforming Admiralty found much to criticise 
in its inspection of the victualling departments at the yards. * 
The necessity for some regulations was proved by the third 
and eighth reports of the Commission of Naval Inquiry, the 
one on the Block and Coopers' contract, of June, 1803, the 
other on the embezzelraent of casks at the Plymouth victualling 
yard, published in June, 1804. Everywhere frauds were 
discovered and stopped^"and regulations tightened^' But the 
Board itself remained largely undisturbed in these and the 
following political changes. There were no dismissals like 
that.of Osborne Markham from the Navy Board, as personal revenge 
for St. Vincent's attack on entrenched corruption, and the board 
was left to pursue its uneventful and largely unreformed way 
till 1832.
Mention has already been made of Middleton's idea that a
1. Pari.Pap.. Finance Reports. 1798. Select Committee Report. 
Proceedings of the Admiralty on Finance Reports.H.pp.806- 
815.
2. Letters of Lord St.Vincent. D.Bonner Smith,ed.,11.12.
3. ADIM/G793,Admiralty Commissioners to Victualling Board,
17 Sept.1802.,29 Nov.1802.
4. Ibid., 18 Sept.1802.
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line of communication should be formed between the Admiralty,
Navy and Victualling Boards, by including the Comptroller as
a member of the Admiralty Board, and the chairman of the
Victualling Office as a member of the Navy Board. This idea
was put forward by the Commission investigating fees in the
1780*s. It had great merit, chief being the reduction of 
1
delays, * but it was never effected. The Victualling Board 
was opposed to the idea and to the suggestion that it should 
be split into two committees, one for stores, one for corresp- 
ondence. * Even when Middleton became First Lord he made no 
attempt to introduce the measure. He may have felt that the 
complete re-organisation of an office working reasonably well 
was too great a task to tackle during the war. Also he was 
over eighty and the invasion threat subordinated every interest. 
Yet although not established in theory, in practice the line 
of contact between the three boards was often achieved and, 
once more, depended on personal good will and harmonious 
relations to retain it. Occasionally the Victualling Chairman 
attended the Admiralty and received verbal orders from the First
3
Lord, or Secretary, which were later put into writing. "
1. The Barham Papers. J.K.Laughton, ed., 11.295.
2. Pari.Pap.,Finance Reports,1798. Select Committee Report.
No.XXXII. The Victualling Office.p.555,Appendix M;1803,xiii.
3* ADM/D36, Victualling Commissioners to Admiralty Board,
un-numbered pages at the end of the volume.. A d .111/115.
27,28 May.1789.. Ad.111/152. 8, 16 Aug.1799.
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When Middleton became First Lord he did continue the improve­
ments in victualling which he had introduced as Comptroller 
and former member of the A d m i r a l t y * a n d  which were even more 
vital now that the fleet was stretched to the limit to combat 
Napoleon's invasion force. He saw the chairman of the 
Victualling and Navy Boards about the speedy supply of necessary
stores and provisions to the Channel, Mediterranean and blockading 
2
squadrons "and arranged that one of the sea lords at the Admiralty 
should superintend this business to prevent the slightest delay. 
The Channel fleet and blockading squadrons were supplied >
regularly with food and water to avoid the necessity for leaving 
their stations and a small victualling and stores depot was 
established at Falmouth for Admiral Cornwallis * s easier supply.
But in general, apart from such crises, the contact betv/een 
the Admiralty and Victualling boards was irregular. In peace 
infrequent letters came from the Victualling Board; sixty 
three in 1788, sixty eight a year later. Admiralty replies 
were equally irregular, sometimes they came the next day, 
sometimes a month later. In war the amount of business increased
1. A small but useful improvement in the Board's work,typical 
of Barham's meticulous eye for detail, was the dating of 
each page of the minute book so that it could be seen at
a glance how many pages the day's work occupied. There is 
no evidence that Barham had this done or even knew of it, 
but it reflects his professional attitude to work.
2. The Barham Papers, J.K.Laughton, ed.,III.81, Barham to Pitt, 
22 May,1805.
3. Ibid., III.105-6, Barham to Pitt, 28 Nov.1805.
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but there was still no daily correspondence. In 1796 two
hundred and eight letters came from the Victualling commissioners,
most dealt with routine subjects and were of a conventional kind,
but Admiralty minutes and resulting orders were more frequent,
now within two or three days of receipt of the original letter.
The Board's orders came from three main sources; the Admiralty,
whose orders were formal in tone and relatively few in number,
the Secretary to the Admiralty, whose orders were more numerous
and specific, and those from the Navy Board, forming the most
numerous group. Finance, staff appointments, international
relations, matters involving another department or the alteration
of their mode of business were the Admiralty's concern. Thus
the victualling, in 1795, of an allied Russian squadron under
Admiral Hanikoff, provided the subject of several Admiralty
orders in reply to worried enquiries from the B o a r d . T h e
Navy Board dealt with estimated costs of victualling the fleet,
or with departmental expenses. To make up their estimates the
Victualling Board asked the Admiralty for the number of men to be
2
employed in the coming year. * The Admiralty likewise asked
1. AD/VG791,16 Sept.,9 Oct.,3 Nov.1795., ADV/D40, Victualling
Commissioners to Admiralty Board, 27 Feb., 2 Mar.1795.
See also Mrs. E.H.Turner, 'The Russian Squadron with 
Admiral Duncan's North Sea Fleet, 1795-1800', The Mariner's 
Mirror.xlix.no.3 (August,1963),212-222.
2. ADIVD36, Victualling Commissioners to Admiralty Board,
5 Sept.1787.
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the Victualling Commissioners what money they would need in 
the next naval estimates. Such approval was almost automatic, 
but the Board was severely reprimanded and proposed work 
cancelled if they anticipated Admiralty approval or wrote to 
the Navy Board without first obtaining it.^*
It is difficult to say how much the Admiralty were 
influenced by the Victualling Board in their decisions. Often 
they merely followed the professional advice the Board included
o
in their letter of enquiry, * but not invariably, particularly
3
on appointments. “ The Victualling Board was an office relying 
on tradition, carefully preserving its records^*and quoting 
precedents in its correspondence with the Admiralty, which 
reinforced its recommendations. For example, in a letter of 
27 May, 1788, on the subject of bad meat, they referred to a 
similar correspondence with Admiral Boscawen in 1758, before 
many of the junior Admiralty lords had been born. Many of the 
Victualling Commissioners too, were more permanent than those 
of the Admiralty, which might lead one to suppose them to be
1. Ad.-3/100,pp. 139, 7 Feb.1785.
2. ADi'VD36, Victualling Commissioners to Admiralty Board, 
24 Oct. 1787, 2 Jan., 8 Feb. 1788., ADIv]/D38, Victualling 
Commissioners to Admiralty Board, 25 Oct.1793.
3. ADIV/D36, Victualling Commissioners to Admiralty Board, 
23 Oct.1787.
4. Ibid.,20 Sept.1786.
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in a strong position. Yet though in this case the Admiralty 
followed their advice it was not always so and they frequently 
contradicted orders they themselves had issued.
Certain decisions were effected by the appointment to the 
Admiralty of seamen who took a greater interest in the men's 
welfare than the civilians. Sometimes indeed, the order came 
from an individual admiral, possibly to add greater point and 
emphasis to a general Admiralty o r d e r . A d m i r a l  Philip 
Affleck, who became an Admiralty lord in 1793 was commander 
on the Jamaica station the previous year and attempted to 
persuade the Victualling Board of the benefit of substituting 
local articles for traditional ones, in a warm climate, in 
this case cocoa for butter. Nothing he reminded the Admiralty 
was more unwholesome than butter in the West Indian climate 
or 'more productive of bilious complaints which are the 
harbingers of death'. Cocoa, obtained locally, had kept down 
hospital expenses in previous years and its continued issue 
would justify any trifling expense. *
The Admiralty forwarded this letter to the Victualling 
Board, with a favourable recommendation. Although providing 
reasons for the impracticality of the suggestion, and declaring
1. AD iv'1/G791, Admiral Young to Commissioner Cherry, 7 Aug.1797,
Young to Victualling Commissioners, 19 Aug.1797.
2. A d .1/244. 14 Jan.1792, Affleck to Stephens,
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the expense would be.enormous, the Board discontinued the 
supply of butter and substituted cocoa instead.^' Two years 
later Admiral Jervis commander in the Leeward Islands, wished 
to substitute sugar and cocoa for butter and cheese. This 
re-opened the whole correspondence and led to a re-statement
o
of the Victualling Board's views. ' They asked for instruct- 
tions from an Admiralty of whom Affleck was nov7 a member, and 
whose influence may be detected in the reply, which allowed 
the substitution. All three sea lords then at the Board,
Hood, Affleck and Gardner had served in the West Indies, knew 
the conditions and probably carried the Board on this point.
In a similar case Admiral Jervis had recommended wine be 
substituted for spirits in the West Indies "and the Victualling 
Board requested the Admiralty's order on this. The substit­
ution was immediately allowed, despite the fact that there was 
little wine in store, partly because of the support it received 
from Admiral Gardner, and the two examples illustrate the 
personal and professional influence exerted by seamen at the 
Admiralty.
1. ADivl/D37, Victualling Commissioners to Admiralty Board, 
9 Mar.1792.
2. ADM/D38, Victualling Commissioners to Admiralty Board, 
24 A p 1.1794.
3. ADivl/D38, Victualling Commissioners to Admiralty Board, 
5 Oct.1793.
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It is significant that the main arguments for and against 
the adoption of wine and cocoa turned on financial and practical 
grounds, rather than humanitarian ones. Affleck argued from 
the expense of sickness and the wastage of men, Jervis from 
the impossibility of recruitment in the islands and the 
necessity of ’preserving them (i.e. seamen) by any means ever 
so expensive’.^* Such arguments appealed to those in authority 
grappling with costs and estimates. The Admiralty depended 
on the professional opinion of .the Victualling Board, the view 
of the local commander, possibly the experience of their own 
members, and struck a balance between them. In most tussles 
economy won, except where a humanitarian motive could be 
backed by strong economic reasons, or where it was shown that 
it would be more economic in the long run to disregard 
professional advice.
Closely associated with the Victualling Board was the 
Office for Sick and Hurt Seamen. The provision of a special 
diet for sick seamen was their joint responsibility, and many 
of the innovations in victualling, the introduction of lemon 
juice, portable soup, fresh vegetables etc., began as items 
for the sick, provided by the physicians to the fleets. The 
two boards occasionally used the same contractors, for example, 
Alexander Donaldson and Edward Bayntun in the West Indies, 
where there was some difficulty in getting tenders. They also
1. Ibid.. Admiral Jervis to Victualling Board, 5 Oct.1793.
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shared contractors with the Navy Board; Solly and Son of Danzig 
supplied the Navy Board with timber and the Victualling Board 
with beef in the Mediterranean, on a handsome commission. 
Officials of both boards at Deptford worked closely together,^* 
and occasionally the Chairman of the Victualling Board attended 
the Sick and Hurt Office to discuss matters of common interest 
or to learn the latter*s proposals, concerning victualling,
p
to the Admiralty. "
The Board was never distinguished, and it was not until 
Sir Gilbert Blane became commissioner in 1795 that it made 
innovations on its own initiative and not at the prior suggestion 
of its subordinates. ’Interest* loomed large in Blane*s career; 
he had been Admiral Rodney’s personal physician, and physician 
to the West Indian fleet in 1781, Later his large private, 
aristocratic practice helped his appointment by Lord Spencer. 
Possibly because of this influence Blane*s advent at the board 
was the occasion for quarrels with the first commissioner. Dr. 
Robert Blair. These came to a head in 1796 over Blane*s 
proposals for remodelling the medical department. Blair 
accused him of arrogance and intemperate language and of being 
too absorbed in his private practice to attend the Board 
regularly. Blane complained to Lord Spencer of obstruction
1. Ad.99/50, p.42,16 Oct.1789.
2. Ad.99/51, p.116, 11 Mar.1796,, p.226, 13 Mar.1797.
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and insults^"and eventually got his way over the reforms.
The introduction of lemon juice, of soap, of free drugs to
p
surgeons, were also his work.
The duties of the Sick and Hurt Board were the care of 
sick seamen on commissioned ships, in hospitals or sick quarters, 
the establishment and maintenance of hospitals and hospital 
ships and staffs at home and abroad, the superintendence of 
medicines and other necessities, the examination and appointment 
of surgeons and their mates and the care of prisoners of war.
In 1796 responsibility for healthy-prisoners of war was transferred 
to the Transport Board, the Sick and Hurt Office caring only 
for those prisoners who were ill. Finally ten years later 
the office was abolished and all its duties undertaken by the 
Transport Board.
The enormous amount of work involved in these functions 
was too much for the insufficient staff employed. In 1784 
there were three commissioners, with salaries of £500 p.a. and 
travelling expenses, a secretary, with the usual perquisites, 
all Admiralty appointees and twenty others, mostly clerks, 
appointed by the commissioners. Numbers were slightly increased 
throughout the period. By 1802 there were four commissioners
1. Ibid.,pp.135-142, Blane to Spencer, 25 Sept.1796.,pp.151- 
176, Blair to Spencer, 28 Oct.1796,
2. Medicine and the Navy,1200-1900, ed. by Commander J.J.Keevil, 
G.Lloyd and J.L.S.Coulter (4 vols.Edinburgh,1957-1963),
III.1714-1815. 46.
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and approximately twenty six clerks, but the board complained 
that this was an inadequate staff to deal with current work.
Yet board meetings were infrequent and irregular and did little 
more than formal work. The great arrears in accounts, 
amounting to over £1^,000,000 in 1788 and dating back to 1734, 
were largely untouched, despite the recommendations of several 
commissions of inquiry. When the Admiralty suggested in 1802 
that the working day be extended from 9.0.a.m. till 5.0.p.m. 
the commissioners rejected the proposal on the grounds that, 
’six hours a day is as long a time as official business can 
be prosecuted with alacrity and effect’.^" By 1805 the 
’deplorable state’ of the office led Barham to reform it. By 
then arrears had swelled to £2^,000,000, half of which had 
accumulated since 1793, the commissioners rarely met more than
twice a week and the clerks who dealt with the business were
2
often owed a quarter’s salaries. * Barham abolished this 
’very inefficient establishment’, pensioning off all but the 
medical commissioner and clerks necessary for business, and 
transferring them to the Transport Board in 1806. "
1. Mrs. E.H.Turner, ’Naval Medical Service, 1793-1815’, 
The Mariner’s Mirror, xlvi.no.2.(I960),121.
2. Ad.99/51, pp.123-125,17 June, 1796.
3. The Barham Papers, J.K.Laughton, ed.. III.122-130.
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Thus ended,with few regrets, the career of the Sick and 
Hurt Board, whose organisation, so æverely criticised, was never 
properly organised for its duties. The Sick and Hurt commiss­
ioners saw the medical services as a permanent means of reducing 
sickness in the fleet. The Admiralty and Treasury were 
reluctant to expand a skeleton peace establishment to deal with 
what they hoped would be a short lived emergency, and the 
disparity between these views caused a makeshift policy and an 
atmosphere which encouraged confusion and arrears. Because 
of a constant shortage of money, economies in sick diets, the 
closure of hospitals and the reduction of staff were promptly 
introduced at the end of the war, though this policy was a 
short sighted and uneconomic one.
Apart from the instances already mentioned the Admiralty’s
contact with the office was slight. The routine of granting
or disallowing extra charges incurred by pursers or commanders,
the building or repair of hospitals, the exchange and treatment
of prisoners of war, or the adoption of new remedies reported
1
on by the Board, occupied the irregular correspondence. *
Such was the case with the naval charities of Greenwich 
Hospital, Chatham Chest and the Receiver’s Office. Some of the 
Admiralty were members of one or the other of the governing 
boards, and the Board appointed the higher officials in each
1. Ad.2/613.0 .327. Nepean to Sick and Hurt Commissioners, 
14 Mar.1796.
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department, or occasionally corresponded with these offices, 
through their secretary, but more direct contact was rare. 
Greenwich Hospital, founded in 1694 for old and wounded seamen, 
and housed in Wren’s palace, was administered by a General 
Court Commissioners, of whom the First Lord was the chairman. 
Proposals by the board of directors were forwarded to this 
court, composed of some of the Admiralty and Navy Board 
commissioners, the Admiralty secretaries, the Governor and 
Auditor of the Hospital and other ex officio members.
Occasionally the Admiralty lords would visit the Hospital on 
rare, formal occasions and the pensioners drank their lordships’ 
health on public holidays. Apart from these contacts the 
Admiralty had little to do with the Hospital and no control 
over it as such.
The three commissioners and domestic staff of the Receiver’s
office on Tower Hill, which collected sixpences per man per
all /
month from seamen for Greenwich Hospital, were appointed
by Admiralty warrant. The post of commissioner often provided
a sinecure for former Admiralty employees. John Cleveland,
the Accountant to the office, appointed in 1762, was the son
of a former Admiralty secretary, but rarely attended the Board.
Both this office and the sixteenth century charity of the
Chatham Chest for the relief of seamen maimed and wounded in
the service of their country had become notorious for frauds
by 1801 and were among the first institutions St. Vincent’s
3l0
reforming Admiralty attacked. The Chest was abolished in 
1803 and a smaller establishment created at Greenwich, by an 
act of 43 Geo.III,c.l9,^*of which the First Lord was to be 
head while the number of commissioners in the Receiver’s office 
was reduced to two and a general reform in salaries and numbers
9
of staff was undertaken. *
1. Ad.80/75, 29 May, 1804.
2. Pari.PaP., Commission of Naval Enquiry into Irregularities, 
Frauds and Abuses practised in the Naval Departments and
in the Business of Prize Agency. Reports from Commissioners 
Mo.V. Sixpenny Office.pp.329,411; 1802-3,iv.
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CONCLUSION.
Hobhouse in his biography of Fox wrote,
’Pitt was born to show Fox up ...... The old aristocratic
parties, the old family cabinets, the pensions and 
sinecures, the nepotism, the log rolling, the wire pulling,
were to be swept away ...... (Pitt’s) colleagues might be
young and little known: but they were a breakaway from
all that had gone before.’
This study of the Admiralty has proved that generalisation 
only partially true in some respects and totally false in others. 
An antiquated machinery, gradually being modernised, was still 
dominated by personal relationships, which alone permitted its 
smooth working. Government was still almost a family concern, 
certainly still a small group of the more important people 
directing affairs, and this was inevitable when government rested 
on gentlemen and was regarded as a natural occupation for them. 
The importance of any department still rested on its head’s 
ability and he performed much of the routine work associated 
with it. In the Admiralty he was helped by a semi-permanent 
secretariat which maintained the departmental traditions and 
kept the office running' despite changes at the board. This 
secretarial staff was gradually freeing itself from political 
influences and was acquiring a recognisable nineteenth century 
civil service image. The subordinate naval departments were 
equally conscious of tradition and their staffs had often spent 
a lifetime in the offices.
1. C.Hobhouse, Fox, (London,1934)p.160.
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By the end of the period a change was evident, thanks to 
the increased amount of work, which forced a more regular 
attendance, harder work and closer attention to business. The
change was also the result of the work of commissions of 
inquiry, and the Admiralty’s own attempt to re-organise itself, 
made by Lords Spencer, St. Vincent and Barham. It had never 
been so complacent a board as not to acknowledge that reform 
was necessary. But it insisted on doing the work in its own 
time and in its own way, and jealously guarded its independence 
from central control or encroachment by other departments or 
subordinate naval boards.
Too soon revelations of naval abuses lost their novelty 
and power to shock. Time began to heal old wounds and dull 
the enthusiasm of even the keenest reformer and brought fresh 
scandals and events. After the climax of Trafalgar there 
was a lack of spectacular naval successes for the rest of the 
war. The Navy had been almost too successful in defeating 
its rival so heartily that only the necessary but dull duties 
of convoy, patrol and blockade were left. From being the 
focus of attention during the early war years, the Admiralty 
and the Navy sank into the background, to be superseded by the 
growing popularity of the Army, winning victories in the 
Peninsular War, and by the scandals of the sale of Army places. 
Yet there was not complete stagnation. The moral reformation 
for which the commissions had prepared the way, and the higher
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standard of conduct introduced into the Admiralty’s work by 
Barham and others, was never entirely forgotten and eventually 
bore fruit in the reforms of the nineteenth century.
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Appendix I.
Undated Memorandum, endorsed ’Lord Hugh’s opinion on Admiral 
Christian’s appointment to the West India command’. Seymour 
Papers, CR114A/321. This memorandum has been published in 
The Mariner’s Mirror, l.no.2. (May,1964), 154-5. Words in 
brackets have been crossed out.
On the subject of the W.I. command I continue of my former 
opinion that the harshest treatment that ever was shewn to any 
officer will be the Recall of Sir J.L. after having continued 
him in that command during the equipment of the present 
Expedition which is to be conducted (by ships under the orders 
of) an Officer whom he has always been taught to expect to act 
under his orders. I am the more dispos’d to object to the 
arrangement propos’d by Mr.D. from the mode in which that 
business has been conducted from its first being undertaken, on 
the outset of it, it was pretended by those who proposed(?) 
the Expedition that Admr.C. from his habits of intimacy with 
Mr.D. and having been in the course of doing business with him 
(that he) was the properest person to be joined to the R.A. in 
the expedition against the W.I. The difficulty of charging so 
young an Admr. with such a command appear’d in its full force 
but that was soften’d by Ad.C. appraising those who doubted 
the success of a Junior Officer conducting a business of such 
magnitude to the face of his Comm, in chief that from his’
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knowledge and intimacy with Sr.J.L. that no circumstances 
would arise between them to obstruct the plans which would 
actually have been expected to hail from the Jealousy naturally 
to be expected to arise between any other two human beings 
under similar circumstances - the Expedition is completed as 
far as relates to the Naval part of the Equipment and Adl.C. 
being placed in the situation he before appear’d not even to 
glance at, it is discovered that success cannot be expected to 
arise from the Expedition without he is appointed Commr. in 
chief on the W.India station. I hear he occupies the place 
of one of the Junior Admirals upon the list I think the 98th - 
a circumstance not to be considered as objectionable only on 
the score of Etiquette as lAr, D. terms it but fraught with 
much inconvenience and difficulty to the whole naval service as 
well as the Minister presiding over it, but this seems not to 
have occurr’d to Mr. D. who appears to me dispos’d to render 
the Adml. an appendage to his office by thus indirectly dict­
ating to it in its choice and Selections of Officers to fill the 
first Command and by starting difficulties which I believe only 
to originate in his want of openess in his dealings towards the 
Admy. and his doubts of their being determined to act according 
to their own opinion. He is I have no doubt able to judge of 
the Merit of those which he calls forth in his official Capacity 
to serve the Country in the Army and it would be but fair to 
allow the same power of selection to those (with) to whom
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Responsibility equally attaches itself.
Should L.S. however be prevailed upon to name Adml.Ch.Comm, 
in chief I think that Sir.Jn.L. should go to Jamaica where I 
am however aware that the same difficulties and objections will 
arise to his being employ'd, from his not having been informed 
of the details of the views of Govt, in that our, more than in 
that which he is obliged to quit. There is nothing new in all 
this but the Sec. of State for the War Dept, having been led 
to think that the Adml. Board is merely to enforce orders it 
may receive from him instead of being considered what it always 
has hitherto, the most independent and important Branch in the 
Govt., which has always conducted its own business.
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Appendix II.
A  list of the salaries of the Secretaries and clerks of 
the Admiralty in 1786, 1800 and 1805, showing increases, 
differences in war and peace time rates and any changes in 
staff numbers.
1786 These salaries do not include emoluments from other 
employments to which the staff were then entitled.(Parl.Fan., 
The Taking of Fees and Perquisites in Public Offices etc.. 
Reports from Commissioners.No.III. The Admiralty.pp.126-7,
Appendix 30; 1806, vii. )
Philip Stephens First Secretary £2146/8/8 Admiralty lord,l"
John Ibbetson;, Second Secretary £1197/8/6 Resigned 1795.
Sir Harry Parker Chief Clerk £804/2/8 ti I
Thomas Fearne Second clerk £271/6/3 It I
William Bryer Third clerk £307/14/4 Died 1790.
Charles Wright Fourth clerk £431/1/9 Chief clerk 1795
Joseph Belson Fifth clerk £150/4/- Died 1799.
Simon Devereux 
Barkham Sixth clerk £131/19/1 Discharged 1790.
Robert Robinson Seventh clerk £113/8/3 Resigned 1804.
William Gmmber First extra clerk £57. Resigned 1804.
Thomas Kite Second extra
clerk £57
William G ^ oigne Third extra clerk £77/10/- Died 1601.
James Freshfield Fourth extra
clerk £62/5/- Resigned 1795.
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William Pearce
Mitchell
Hollingsworth
Robert iMaxwell
Edward Barnes
Basil Maxwell
Thomas King
Arthur Mills
Raymond
James Madden
George Coombe
William Millman
John Man
John Hill
Elizabeth Bell
Elizabeth Butler 
Richard Hutchinson 
John Maryan(?) 
Thomas Scott
Fifth extra
clerk
Sixth extra
clerk
Seventh extra
clerk and
translator
Eighth extra
clerk
Ninth extra
clerk
Tenth extra
clerk
Eleventh extra 
clerk
First Marine
clerk
Second Marine 
clerk
Head doorkeeper
and Messenger
Assistant
Me ssenger
Housekeeper
Necessary Woman
Porter
Watchman
£62/5/-
£57/5/-
£145/15/- Died 1802.
£57
£57 Resigned 1799
£57
£57
£245/19/6
£97/17/-
£97/17/6
£42/2/-
£32/2/-
£40
£20
£57/12/-
£36/12/8
£24/8/8
Died 1788.
Porter at Sheer­
ness yard,1792.
Granted a pension 
1799.
Died 1791.
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Charles Winchester Watchman 
John Tucker Gardner
James Arrow Inspector of 
Repairs
£24/8/8
£30
£30
Basic salaries of the Secretaries and clerks for 1800, showing 
the different rates in war and peace. (A^.22/8,pp.174-8, Lady 
Quarter,1800,p p .195-7,Midsummer quarter,1800,p.245, Christmas 
quarter,1800.)
War. Peace
First secretary - Evan Nepean £4000 £3000
Second secretary - William Marsden £2000 £1500
Chief clerk - Charles Wright £950 £800
Senior established clerks
Robert Robinson £600 £500
William Gimber £540 £450
Thomas Kite £480 £400
William Gascoigne £480 £400
William Pearce £420 £350
Mitchell Hollingsworth £360 £300
Robert Maxwell £300 + £100 
as translator
£200
Edward Barnes £240 £200
Junior Established Clerks
Arthur Mills Raymond £240 £200
Henry Wright £210 £200
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Junior established clerks 
William Reynolds 
John Dyer
James Cutforth(Reading clerk to the
Board.)
Thomas Hollingsworth 
Richard Riley 
Charles Sayer
George Coombe - first marine clerk 
Samuel Moss - assistant
Extra Clerks 
Samuel Thurtle
Charles Sedgewick (Keeper of the
Board minutes)
James Douglas Barker
Richard Martin
Henry Frederick Amedroz
War.
£210
£160
£180
£180
£180
£180
£360
£180
£100
£100
£100
£100
Peace.
£175
£175
£175
£150
£150
£150
£360
£180
£100 + £100 as 
translator in 
R.Maxwell's place.
William Pollock Cowcher £90
John Fisher £90
John Harrison - secretary to the
First Lord £300
£150 (promoted to 
established clerk, 
11 Apl.1800.)
£100
£90
£90
£90
£80
£80
£300
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New establishments
Alexander Dalrymple-Hydrographer
J. Walker - assistant
George Roebuck - Inspector of
Telegraphs
Samuel Bentham - Inspector General
of Naval Works
Samuel Bunce - architect in the
above office
Wa r . 
£500 
£100
£300
£750
£400
£400
£400
£300
£200
£100
£10
Simon Goodrick - mechanist 
James Sadler - chemist 
John Peake - secretary 
James Burr - draughtsman 
Richard Upsal "
John Fetter - messenger
Domestics (Salaries constant in war and peace) 
William Millman - Head doorkeeper and messenger 
John Eastwood - Assistant 
James Cline
John Winchester - extra messenger 
George Houssen - porter 
Thomas Sandford - extra porter 
Elizabeth Bell - Housekeeper 
Elizabeth Hill - necessary woman 
John Crockford - Watchman 
Thomas Sandford - assistant
Peace . 
£500 
£100
£300
£750
£400
£400
£400
£300
£200
£100
£10
£120
£60
£50
£40
£50
£40
£40 Died 1803
£100
£25
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Domestics
Charles Winchester - assistant 
Davis Coombe - gardener
Samuel Pepys Cockerell - Inspector of Repairs
£25 Died 1800. 
£30
£30 Office abol­
ished 1800.
Salaries for the Christmas Quarter, 1805. (Ad.22/10,pp.187-190.)
First Secretary - William Marsden 
Second Secretary - John Barrow 
Chief Clerk - Charles Wright
Senior estab lished clerks 
Thomas Kite 
William Pearce 
Mitchell Hollingsworth 
Edward Barnes 
Arthur M. Raymond 
Henry Wright
Junior established clerks
William Reynolds
James Dyer
Richard Riley
Charles Sayer
Samuel Thurtle
Richard Martin
£4000
£2000
£950
£600
£540
£480
£480
£420
£360
£300
£240
£240
£210
£210
£210
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Junior established clerks 
Henry F. Amedroz 
John Fisher 
John Darch 
James Evans.
Extra clerks 
George Shepherd 
Henry Bedford 
Francis Wilder 
Moses Barnes 
John Innes 
Robert Randall 
Jo Barker 
Alex. Brodie 
J. Spence 
Marshall Clifton
George Coombe - First Marine clerk 
Sam. Moss - Second Marine clerk 
Alexander Dalrymple - Hydrographer 
J. Walker - assistant
George Roebuck - Inspector of Telegraphs
Samuel Bentham - Inspector General of Naval
Works
Edward Hall - architect
S. Goodrick - mechanist
£180 + £100 as translator 
£180 
£180 
£180
£100
£100
£90
£90
£90
£90
£90
£90
£90
£90
£360
£180
£500
£100
£300
£750
£400
£400
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Extra clerks
J. Sadler - chemist £400
John Peake - secretary £300
Ho Rogers - clerk £150
Eo Sheffield - metal worker £200
William Howard - messenger £40
Domestics
William Millman - Head messenger and doorkeeper £120 
John Eastwood - assistant £80
James Cline - assistant £65
Joseph Wooley - assistant £50
Joseph Nye - assistant £50
John Morris - porter £50
James Smith - assistant £40
First Lord's messenger £40
Elizabeth Hill - necessary woman £100
John Crockford - watchman £25
James Smith - watchman (see also as porter) £25
John Leggatt - watchman £25
Davis Coombe - gardener £60
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Manuscript Sources.
Ao Private Collections.
Warwick County Record Office: Seymour of Raqlev Mss. The Papers
of Admiral Lord Hugh Seymour, 
1759-1801.
This is an extensive collection, containing much interesting 
material. Seymour was one of the Admiralty commissioners and 
his papers throw some interesting side-lights on Admiralty 
affairs. The papers are divided into Naval Records and Private 
Papers. In the first group I have particularly examined 
CR114A/299, 329, and 325, this last a bundle of 33 letters from 
Lord Spencer, which as far as I know, have never been used 
before. In the Private papers I read CR114A/348, 349, 365, 366. 
These are bundles of letters from naval friends and his wife, 
often containing references to naval affairs.
Bury and West Suffolk Record Office: Grafton Mss. The Corresp­
ondence of Augustus Henry, Third Duke of Grafton, 1735-1811.
Many of the letters have been printed in Autobiography and 
Political Correspondence of Augustus Henry, Third Duke of 
Grafton, ed. by Sir W. Anson,(London, 1 8 9 8 ) . Those I found 
useful were in correspondence with Richard Hopkins, an Admiralty 
commissioner, William Pitt and Lord Camden. Camden's son,
J.J. Pratt, and Grafton's son Lord Euston were close friends 
and the letters give some indication of the behaviour of the 
young civilian Admiralty commissioners.
Gloucester County Record Office: The Ducie. Moreton and Reynolds
Papers. Reynolds Family Correspondence, 1761-1804,D340a7C32.
73 letters to and from Captain Francis Reynolds, later third 
Lord Ducie, mainly concerning promotions, requests for places 
or occasional naval events. The Bragge Bathurst Papers.
Charles Bragge Bathurst was Treasurer of the Navy,1801-3. These 
papers do not contain his official correspondence, but the two 
bundles consulted are concerned with appointments and contain 
items of naval interest. They were D421x6 - 34 letters of 1796, 
D421x/17 - 1 bundle of original letters, 1796-1828.
B . British Museum. Additional Manuscripts.
Bridport Papers. Add.Mss. 35202,vol.xii.Private and Family 
Correspondence,1755-1800,
Correspondence of George Chalmers,1787-1824.3 vols .Add.Mss.22900,
vol.i. 
Add.Mss.22901, 
vol.ii.
(These contain letters from.William Boscawen, one of the 
Victualling Commissioners.)
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Holland Papers. Add.Mss. 51724,vol.civil.no.9. Contains 
letters to Lord Spencer.
Original Letters to Thomas Hill,1785-1820.vol.i. Add.Mss.20081, 
Contains a letter from William Boscawen.
Martin Papers. Series 3. Correspondence and papers of Sir Thomas 
Byam Martin. Add.Mss.41364,vol.xix.1752-1799. Contains some of 
his father's papers when Comptroller.
Add.Mss. 41365,vol.XX. 1800-1811. 
xwm Add .Ms s. 41378,vol.^ Miscellaneous memoranda, historical and 
political notes on contemporaries etc.
Melville Papers. Add.Mss.40102,vol.iii. Drafts, memoranda etc. 
of Cabinet decisions, letters between ministers.
Add.Mss.41079,vol.i. Letters and Memoranda of 
Sir Charles Middleton to Henry Dundas,1788-1806.
Correspondence of Sir Thomas Thompson, 1st.Bart. Add.Mss.46119.
A series of letters mainly to Lord Spencer, but involving other 
Admiralty lords, about employment.
The Letters Books of Sir Evan Nepean,1795-1301. 2 vols. Add.Mss. 
31171. Add.Mss.31172. These contain letters from Admiral Sir 
John Jervis, commenting on Admiralty and naval affairs, and 
personalities.
Letters and Papers relating to campaigns of the First French 
Republic,1796-1804. Add.Mss.41192. Contains some papers of 
British naval commanders in the Mediterranean, notably Sir John 
Jervis, one letter of his criticises the conduct of Admirals 
Hyde Parker and Robert Man.
Miscellaneous original letters and papers, Fifteenth to Nine­
teenth Century (D2) Add.M s s .38510.
Miscellaneous Autograph Letters.A-Y. Add.Mss.29300.
Stowe M s s .813. Transcript of the Royal Charter granted to 
Saltash and signed by Nicholas Nepean.
374. Minutes of the Committee of the House of Commons 
appointed to draw up articles of impeachment 
against Henry Dundas Lord Viscount Melville,
5-12 July. The proceedings are reported verbatim 
and contain evidence of Trotter's transactions 
in public funds.
C . National Maritime Museum, Greenwich.
Private Papers.
The Papers of Admiral Richard Viscount Howe. Of little 
value. Only HOW/4 was used.
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The Papers of Admiral John Jervis, later Earl St.Vincent, 
1735-1823.
Those used were the letters to Evan Nepean,1797-1802, 
JHR/21-26, when Jervis was commander in the Mediterranean 
and the Channel. JER/21, JER/22, JER/24 were especially 
useful for the pungent opinions on later Admiralty lords 
or Navy Board officials. .
The Papers of Sir Evan Nepean. NEP/1 and I\IEP/2 were briefly 
consulted. They were reports from secret agents to the 
secretary of the Admiralty.
Official Records.
Admiralty Board. In Letters from the Victualling Board. ADMi/d .
These letters are usually quite full, often containing enclosures 
and having the answering Admiralty minute on them. They were 
useful for the workings of the Victualling Board and its relations 
with the Admiralty.
Those consulted were:-
ADM/D 36 July,1787 - December,1789.
ADiW/D 37 January, 1790 - December,1792.
ADi//D 38 January, 1793 - June, 1794,
ADIVd  40 January,1796 - December,1797.
Also consulted for the relations between the Admiralty and 
Victualling and Navy Boards, were the Abstracts of Admiralty 
orders to the Victualling Board. ADM/G. Those most useful were; 
ADIvi/G 789 August, 1783 - December,1789.
ADM/G 791 August,1794 - July,1798.
ADiv/G 793 January, 1802 - August, 1805.
Admiralty Board. In Letters from the Navy Board. ADiV/B, ADM/B.P.
The series 3.P. are unbound and supplement series B. They also
supplement gaps in the series Ad,106, Navy Board In Letters at
the P.R.O. Like the Victualling Board letters they contain 
enclosures and are useful for the workings of the two boards.
Those consulted were;
ADM/B vol.207 January - February,1803.
ADiv/B.P. 6B. January - December, 1786.
ADiV/B.P. 153. July - December, 1795.
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D. Public Record Office.
Private Papers.
The Dacres Adams Papers. P.R.O. 30/58.
William Dacres Adams was private secretary to Pitt,1804-6. The 
papers used contain letters between Cabinet ministers and between 
Pitt and Barham especially the letter's invasion plans, appoint­
ment to the Admiralty, lists of naval appointments and of the 
numbers of seamen, marines and ships available. Those used 
were:-
P.R.0.30/58/2 1797-1799.
30/58/4 1801-1803.
30/58/6 1805.
The Chatham Papers. P.R.O.30/8. Second Series.
Correspondence of John Second Early of Chatham. These letters 
were written largely when Chatham v;as at the Admiralty and 
contain advice and information from Hood and Middleton and naval 
officers. Those used:-
P.R.0.30/8/364, Section 1.Letters of the Earl.
" 2.49 Letters from George III, mainly
about naval appointments and 
dispositions.
" 4.Notes, memoranda etc.
P.R.O.30/8/365. 1 Section. 51 Letters and memoranda from
Middleton and others,1788-1794,
P.R.O.30/8/366.
P.R.O.30/8/367. Includes a series of 34 letters and
enclosures from Lord Hood in the 
Mediterranean,1793-4,
P.R.O.30/8/368, 1 section, miscellaneous letters.
P.R.O.30/8/369. Ditto,
Correspondence of William Pitt the Younger,
P.R.O.30/8/157. Letters of Henry Dundas,Viscount Melville,
1784-1804,
P.R.O,30/8/241, Army Papers. Ordnance Papers. Nothing of
importance.
P.R.O.30/8/246. Papers relating to the Admiralty and Navy
Commissioners and Navy Board, sent by 
Middleton.
P.R.O.30/8/250, Admiralty Papers:-
Part i. Essays, propositions etc. on 
manning the Navy, Has merchants' suggestions 
among others. Insurance rates etc.
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Part iii. Cases and depositions. Has sugges­
tions for convoys, examples of 
treasonable talk among seamen, 
experiments etc.
P.R.O.30/8/255,256. Port of London Papers,1783-1805.
Gives examples of frauds relative to 
naval victualling stores.
Official Records•
Admiralty 1 Series. Secretary's Department In Letters.Ad.1. 
Admirals Despatches.
These often contain enclosures from merchants, consuls or 
captains with much useful information on enemy or neutral 
conditions. Though listed as Admirals despatches they also 
contain despatches from Commodores. I have selected despatches 
from each station where possible, at a time when events there 
were especially important, e.g. in 1790 during the Spanish 
crisis the Mediterranean and West Indian despatches were used. 
These despatches give much information on local difficulties 
of commanders and the Admiralty's attitude to them. Those 
consulted were:-
Ad.l/54 Cape of Good Hope
Ad.1/98 Channel Fleet
Ad.1/166 East Indiea 
Ad.1/244 Jamaica 
Ad.1/315 Leeward Isles 
Ad.1/389 Mediterranean 
Ad.1/390 Mediterranean 
Ad.1/472 Newfoundland 
Ad.1/492 North America 
Ad.1/524 North Sea 
Ad.1/578 Unemployed 
Letters from Admirals at Naval Stations.
Ad.1/724 Nore and Sheerness 1791-1794.
1758-1786
1790-1793
1783-1787
1789-1792
1787-1792
1788-1790
1790-1792 
1782-1792
1789-1795 
1797
1743-1790.
Commodore R. King. 
Admiral Elliott. 
Admiral Sir.E.Hughes. 
Admiral P.Affleck. 
Admiral J.Laforey. 
Admiral Peyton. 
Admiral Goodall. 
Admiral Sir R.King. 
Admiral Sir R.Hughes. 
Admiral Duncan.
Secretaries of State's Letters.
These contain original letters from the Secretaries of State or 
their under secretaries. They are often supplemented by the 
out-letters from the respective departments and form a consid­
erable correspondence. They give day to day details of inter­
departmental relations and often have informal letters between 
departmental secretaries in addition to the more formal corres­
pondence between departmental heads. Those consulted were:- 
Ad.1/4151 January,1784 - December,1785.
Ad.1/4152 January,1786 - December,1787.
Ad.1/4157 January - April,1793.
Ad.1/4164 April - June,1795.
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Ad.1/4163 January - March,1795.
Ad.1/4165 July - September,1795.
Ad.1/4166 October - December, 1795.
Ad.1/4198 January - April, 1805.
Ad.1/4199 May - July,1805.
Ad.1/4200 August - December, 1805.
Letters from the Ordnance Office.
Ad.1/4014 1784-1797.
Ad.1/4015 1798-1803.
Letters from the Post Office.
A d .1/4072 1776-1798.
Ad,1/4073 1799-1812.
These also contain some intercepted letters from suspected 
mutineers or deserters and give pathetic glimpses of lower 
deck feelings.
Letters from the Treasury.
Ad.1/4289 January,1783 - December,1789.
Ad.1/4290 April,1790 - December,1795.
Ad.1/4291 1796-1799.
Ad.1/4293 1804-1805.
Letters from the War Office.
Ad.1/4330 1782-1794.
Ad.1/4331 1795-1796.
Ad.1/4332 1797-1798.
Ad.1/4333 1799-1801.
Ad.1/4335 1804-1807.
Often containing enclosures from army officers or others with 
complaints, news etc.
Secret Letters. Ad.1/4352 1756-1800. Contains reports on
suspected traitors, information, often in 
French, of enemy movements.
Nothing of value.
Letters from Lloyds. Ad.1/3992 1793-1804, Often has enclosures
sometimes of colonial newspapers, from members 
with information about enemy ship movements, 
or news of convoys etc.
Letters relating to the Colonies - Governors of Plantations.
A d .1/ 3 821 1791-1814. This includes the Channel islands
and Malta and Gibraltar and has requests for convoys, 
protections against French privateers etc.
Letters from the East India House.
Ad7I73914' 1752-1795.'
Ad.1/3915 1796-1804.
Letters -from the Transport Department.
A^r 1/373%) August,I7"^ - December 1795. This contains the 
Board's establishment.
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Ad.1/3731 January - June, 1796.
Ad.1/3773 Supplementary Letters - 1795-1800.
Letters from the Board of Green Cloth. A d .1/3921 1722-1789.
Admiralty 2 Series. Secretary's Department Out Letters.Ad.2.
These letters are often merely a precis of the original letters. 
They can be supplemented by Ad.l or by consulting the In letters 
of the department concerned. There are three main sub-divisions,
I - Secretary's Letters to Public Offices and Admirals, Il-Orders 
and Instructions - these are usually quite brief. III - Secretary's 
Common Letters.
Orders and Instructions. For this period they extend from 
A d .2/115 to Ad.2/ 1 5 0 . Those most frequently consulted were:- 
Ad.2/115 July,1783 - June,1784.
Ad.2/ll6 June,1784 - April,1786,
Ad, 2 / 1 1 7  April,1786 - September,1787,
Ad.2 / 1 1 8  September,1787 - January, 1789.
Ad.2/119 February,1789 - May,1790.
Ad.2 / 1 2 0  May,1790 - November,1790.
Ad.2 / 1 2 8 March - August,1795.
Ad.2 / 1 3 3  March to August, 1797,
Ad.2 / 1 3 4 August,1797 - February,1798.
Ad. 2 / 1 4 0  June,1800 - January,1801.
Ad.2/142 July,1801 - March,1802.
Ad,2/146 September,1803 - January,1804.
Ad. 2/148 July,1804 - January,1805.
A d .2 / 1 4 9  January,1805 - August,1805.
Secretary's Letters to Public Office and Admirals. These extend 
from Ad.2/581 to Ad.2/646, Those most frequently consulted
were:-
Ad.2/584 November,1784-May,1785.
Ad,2/585 May,1785 - January,1786,
Ad,2 / 6 0 9  January - March,1795.
Ad.2 / 6 1 0  March - June, 1795.
Ad.2 / 6 1 1  June - September,1795.
Ad. 2/ 6 12 September - December,1795.
Ad,2/ 6 13 January - May,1796.
Ad,2/''623 January - May, 1799.
Ad.2 / 6 2 4  May - September,1799.
Ad. 2 / 6 2 5 September,1799 - February,1800.
Ad.2 / 6 4 3  January - June,1805.
Ad.2 / 6 4 4  June - October,1805,
Ad.2/645 October,1805 - February,1806.
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Lords' Letters.
These extend from Ad.2/259 to Ad.2/310, and from Ad.2/333-337. 
Those most frequently consulted were;-
Ad.2/259 September,1783 - March,1754.
A d .2/ 2 6 1 January - December,1755.
Ad.2/267 December,1790 - July,1791.
Ad. 2 / 2 7 5  March,1795 - July,1795.
Ad. 2 / 2 7 6 July - October, 1795.
Ad.2 / 2 7 7  November,1795 - February,1796.
Ad.2/ 2 8 1 January - May,1797.
Lords Letters to Secretaries of State for this period occupy 
three volumes. All were consulted:-
Ad.2 / 3 7 4  January,1783 - January,1797.
Ad.2 / 3 7 5  January,1797 - June,1804.
Ad.2 / 3 7 6  July,1804 - November,1815.
Miscellaneous Letters relating mainly to Office Establishments.
Ad.2/1393 1797-1801.
These letters concern the Navy and Victualling Boards establish­
ments.
Secretary's Department, Indexes and Compilations.Ad.12.
Series 3.
From 1793 there is a 2 volume Index and Digest of In Letters, 
arranged alphabetically for each year, after 1801 there are 
three volumes of each. There is also a Digest of In Letters 
from 1763-1792 in 4 volumes, arranged numerically - Ind.4806- 
4809. These do not go into details which can be gathered 
from the letters themselves, but they do give a general impression 
of business. Those consulted were:- 
Ind.4809 1777-1792.
Ind.4813 Digest of In Letters,1793.
Ind.4818 Index.
Digests of In Letters.
Ind.4809 1777-1792.
Ind.4813 1793.
Ind.4820 1795.
Ind.4821 1795.
Index of In Letters.
Ind.4818 1795.
Ind.4819 1795.
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Admiralty 3 Series. Mânutes. Ad.3,
These are divided into Board and Rough minutes. They are not 
indexed, there are occasional gaps and they were used to 
confirm specific points or read generally and briefly. For 
this period they extend from Ad.3/98 to Ad.3/l27 and the Rough 
minutes from A d .3/128 - Ad.3/156. Those most generally used 
were:-
Ad.3/100 October,1784 - July,1785.
Ad.3/104 January - August,1788.
Ad.3/107 January - December,1790,
Ad.3/115 January - April,1795.
Ad.3/132 January - June,1795 - Rough minutes.
Ad.3/152 January - April, 1805.
Ad.3/155 October - December, 1805,
Navy Board. In Letters. Ad.106.
There are none from the Admiralty for this period. See Ad.2 
and N.M.M. records.
Navy Board Minutes. Ad.106.
These were only used to confirm specific points already noticed 
in letters to the Admiralty.
Ad.106/2617 January - April,1785.
Ad.106/2668 January - December,1805.
Transport Department. Ad.108.
The only In Letters of this period are from the Treasury, but 
the Admiralty's orders can be obtained from Ad.2.The Cut letters 
proved more useful and were consulted for relations with the 
War Office and subordinate naval boards.
Letters to Secretaries of State and others.
A d .108/19 December,1795 - March,1799.
General Out Letters. 
Ad.dÔ8/28 1795-1800.
Sir Rupert George's Letter Book.
A d .108/30 1796-1806.
George was chairman of the Transport 
Board and his letters reveal some 
of the problems with which the Board 
had to deal.
Transport Board Minutes.
These extend from Ad.108/31 to Ad.108/60. Those consulted in 
detail were:-
Ad.108/31 August - September,1794.
Ad.108/32 September - November,1794.
A d .108/33 November - December,1794.
Ad.108/34 December,1794 - January,1795.
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From 1800 there is an Index of minutes. Those used were:- 
Ad.108/7800 1800 Index for volumes 60 - 68.
Ad.108/7803 1803-4 Index for volumes 74-77.
Victualling Department.
The Victualling Board Out Letters - Ad.110 are similar to those 
at Greenwich. Ad.110/32 to Ad.110/54 cover this period.
The Victualling Board minutes - Ad.Ill are extensive, Ad.111/97 
to Ad.111/179 cover this period. Those consulted were : - 
Ad.111/115 January - June,1789.
Ad.111/116 July - December,1789.
Ad.111/150 January - March,1799.
Ad.111/152 July - September,1799.
Ad.111/166 January - March,1803,
Ad.111/177 October - December,1805.
Medical Department.
Ad.98/15 Out Letters to the Admiralty 1785-1793.
Ad.98/107 '» " »' 1796-1797.These
letters mainly relate to prisoners of war.
Ad.99/50 Medical Department Minutes-General. 1783-1792. 
Ad. 99/51 " " '* '» 1793-1797.
Greenwich Hospital Minutes. Ad.67.
Ad.67/151 Minutes of the Council of Greenwich Hospital
1783-1785.
Ad.67/35 Minutes of the Directors of Greenwich Hospital
1786.
Miscellanea-Various.
Ad.80/74 Papers relating to the management of Greenwich 
Hospital 1703-1810.
Ad,80/75 Papers relating to the affairs of Chatham Chest 
and Greenwich Chest 1712-1813.
Accountant General's Department. Accounts Various. Ad.17.
Ad.17/1 House of the First Lord of the Admiralty,1786-1791 
Ad.17/7 Admiralty Office Contingent Account 1759-1795.
Ad. 17/8 " " " ’» 1800-1814.
There is an appropriate bundle of accounts for 
each year.
Ad.17/222 Accounts of Money received from the Exchequer, 
1742-1823.
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Accountant General's Department. Registers of Salaries 
and Pensions.Ado22.
Ad.2 2 / 4  Register of Salaries and Pensions 1786-1789.
Ad.2 2 / 5  " " ‘ " 1790-1793.
Ad.2 2 / 6  Register of Salaries 1793-1796.
Ad.22/8 " » " 1798-1801.
Ad.2 2 / 9  ” " '• 1801-1804.
Ad.2 2 / 1 0  » '» " 1804-1806.
Ad.22/17 Register of Pensions 1793-1896.
Ad. 2 2 / 1 9  ’• '• ” 1801-1804.
All these records proved most useful in ascertaining sums 
spent, numbers employed etc.
Home Office Records. H.O.
These were used to discover details not given in Admiralty 
correspondence with the Home Office.
H.O.28/5 Departmental - Admiralty Correspondence - Lords 
of the Admiraltyl785-1787.
H.O.28/25 Departmental - Admiralty Correspondence - Lords 
of the AdmiraJLyl799.
H.O.28/33 Departmental - Naval-All Departments 1805.
H.O.2 9 / 2  Departmental - Admiralty Entry Book General 1784-
1793.
H.O. 29/3 " •' »» ” » 1793-
1796.
Treasury Records. T.
These were used to confirm details of Admiralty estimates and 
business concerning them between the Admiralty and Treasury.
T.27/36 Out Letter Book 1784.
T.27/37 Out Letter Book 1784-5.
Treasury Indexes. T.2.
Those used were:- 
Ind.8540 (T.2(5)) 1785.
Ind.8559 (t .2 24)) 1795.
Ind.8579 (T.2(64)) 1805.
War Office Records. W.O.
Secretary of State Out Letters, Letters to Public Departments: 
The Admiralty. W.O.6.
W.O.6/147 1794-1797.
W.O.6/148 1798-1801.
336
Stationery Office Records. Stat.
In Letters from the Treasury. Indexed. Stat.l.
Stat.1/1 14 February,1798-10 July, 1802.
Stat.1/2 22 July,1802 - 24 October,1807.
Cut Letters - Treasury-Entry Book. Indexed.Stat.3.
Stat.3/1 5 August,1785 - 17 April,1798. This contains
some letters from other departments, including 
the Admiralty and some in letters.
Stat.3/2 15 January,1798 - 29 July,1802.
Out Letters-Miscellaneous: Entry Books. Indexed. Stat.3.
Stat.3/56 4 August,1802 - 17 December,1822.
Stat.3/57 August,1802 - December,1810.
Includes letters from contractors etc.
Primary Sources - Printed.
A . Parliamentary Papers.
1. The Taking of Fees and Perquisites in Public Offices etc. 
Reports from Commissioners. 1806,vii.
No.III. The Admiralty.
No.IV. The Treasurer of the Navy.
No.V. The Navy Board.
No.VI. The Dockyards.
No.VII. The Sick and Hurt Board.
No.VIII. The Victualling Board.
No.IX. The Naval and Victualling Departments at
Foreign or Distant Ports.
Nos.III,V I ,VII were particularly useful. All contain 
very full accounts of working conditions, pay, staff 
numbers etc.
2. House of Commons Reports. Miscellaneous.1783-4,xxxvi.
No.55 Portsmouth Borough.
3. Select Committee of Finance Reports. 1797-1798.
No.XVII. The Admiralty, the Navy Board, the Navy Pay 
Office, the Marine Pay Office.1803,xii.
No.XVIII.The Transport Office. 1803,xii.
No.XXII. Auditing the Accounts of the Public Receipt 
and Expenditure. The Exchequer.1803,xii.
No.XXIV. Public Debt and Expenditure for 1797. 1803,xiii. 
No.XXXI. The Admiralty, Dockyards and Transports.1803,xiii
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Mo.XXXII.The Victualling Office. 1803,xiii.
No.XXXIII. The Office for Sick and Wounded Seamen.1803,
xiii.
No.XXXIV.Chatham Chest, Greenwich and Chelsea Hospitals,
1803,xiii.
Nos.XVIII,XXXI were especially useful. At the end of 
vol.xiii are Admiralty Proceedings on the Finance 
Reports,1798-1803.
Nos. G.H.I.K. All were read, but G . and H. were 
especially useful.
4. Select Committee Report• 1800,xv.
The State of Public Records of the Kingdom, pts.i,ii.
5. The Commission of Naval Enquiry for inquiring into 
Irregularities. Frauds and Abuses practised in the 
Naval Departments and in the business of Prize Agency. 
Reports from Commissioners. 1803-1806.
No.I. Naval Storekeepers at Jamaica.1802-3,iv.
No.II. Chest at Chatham. 1802-3,iv.
No.Ill, Block Contract. Coopers' Contract.1802-3,iv. 
No.V. Sixpenny Office. 1802-3,iv.
No.VI. Plymouth Yard. Woolwich Yard. 1803-4,iii.
No.IX. Receipt and Issue of Stores in Plymouth Yard.
1805,ii.
No.X. The Office of the Treasurer of His Majesty's 
Navy.1805,ii.
No.XII. Purchases of Hemp, Masts and Fir Timber.
Observations by way of supplement to the First 
Report on the Memorial of the Principal Officers 
and Commissioners of His Majesty's Navy in 
answer to that report.1806,iv.
6. Accounts and Papers.
Accounts relating to Public Expenditure,1688-1801.
1868-9,XXXV.pt.ii.
B . Parliamentary Journals, Histories etc.
Journals of the House of Commons,
Volumes XL,XLI,XLII,XLIII,XLIV,XLVI,LVII,LIX,LX.
The Parliamentary History of England,1066-1803,ed.Cobbett 
and Wright. Volumes xxv,xxvi,xxxi,xxxii,xxxiii were 
especially used.
The Debates and Proceedings of the House of Commons. Printed 
for J.Stockdale.Volume viii.pt.ii.
The Parliamentary Register (1743-1802). Various volumes were 
consulted to supplement gaps in The Parliamentary History.
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Parliamentary Debates, ed.by W.Cobbett, Volumes i,ii,iii,iv,v. 
A Complete Collection of State Trials and Proceedings for 
High Treason and other crimes and misdemeanours. T •B .Howe11. 
33 volSoLondon,1816-26. Vol.29. 1804-6. Used for Lord 
Melville's trial.
C . Contemporary Newspapers and Periodicals.
The Times. 1803-1804, 1805.
The True Briton. 1797.
The London Chronicle. 1797,
The World. 1788.
The Morning Post. 1788, 1805.
The Morning Chronicle. 1788,1797.
The London Gazette. 1785.
The Sun. 1802-4.
The Annual Register, xxviii,x1v ,x1v i ,xIvii,1i . 
The Naval Chronicle. i,ii,iii,iv, xxv.
D . Historical Manuscripts Commission Reports.
Bathurst Mss. Report on the Mss. of Earl Bathurst at
Cirencester Park. (London,1923). Contains 
references to Cabinet changes in 1804-6.
Dartmouth Mss. Eleventh Report, Appendix.Part V. The Mss.
of the Earl of Dartmouth.(London,1887)♦
Used for several references to naval promotions 
by Lord Chatham, illustrating the use of 
'interest' .
Dropmore Mss. Report on Official Mss. of J.B.Fortescue
preserved at Dropmore. 10 Volumes.(London,
1892 etc.) They contain the private papers 
of Lord Grenville as Home and Foreign 
Secretary, between 1789-1801. Vols.I-VII were 
used.
Mss.of Robert Graham Esq.of Fintry. Supplementary Report,
pt.ll [London,1924j , Has some reference to 
co-operation between navy and army officers.
Lothian Mss. Report on the Mss. of the Marquess of Lothian
preserved at Blickling Hall.(London,1905).
Used for several references to John Modyford 
Heywood.
Rutland Mss. Fourteenth Report, Appendix,pt.I.The Mss. of
His Grace the Duke of Rutland preserved at 
Belvoir Castle. 4 vols. (London,1888-1905).
Vol.Ill was used for examples of patronage 
and 'interest' and relations between the 
Admiralty and Ordnance after Richmond and 
Chatham had quarreled.
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Report on the Mss. in Various Collections.Vol.VI. Cornwallis
Wykeham-Martin Mss. Mainly letters to and 
from Admiral William Cornwallis and his 
family, on naval and political affairs. Useful 
for personal accounts of changes at the 
Admiralty•
The Mss, of Captain H.V.Knox. (London,1909). 
Has a few references to Admiralty commission­
ers circa 1768.
Contemporary Pamphlets, Autobiographies and Published Corresp­
ondence etc.
Navy Records Society Publications.
Barnes,G.R, and CX'ven, Commander J.H.(ed.) The Private Papers of
John Earl of Sandwich. V o l .ÏVT{London,1938)7 
Used for.Middleton's work as Comptroller.
Bonner Smith,D.(ed) Letters of A dmiral of the Fleet the Earl of
St. Vincent,1801-1804. 2 vols.(London,1921,
1926)J St7 Vincent’s papers as First Lord, 
useful for his naval reforms. The Appendix 
to Vol.II is a copy of Memoirs of the Admin­
istration of the Board of Admiralty under the 
presidency of the Earl of St.Vincent, and 
contains much useful information on frauds 
and their political connections found in the 
dockyards.
Bullocke,J.G.(ed.) The Tomlinson Papers.(London.1935).Used for
references to various Admiralty lords.
Corbett,J.S. and Richmond, Rear-Admiral H.W.(ed.) The Private
Papers of George. Second Earl Spencer.1794-1801.
'4 vols. TLondon 1913-4,1923-4), Spencer's 
papers while First Lord.
Hamilton,^fr R .V .(ed.} Letters and Papers of Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Thomas Byam Martin.3 vols.(London,1898-1902) 
Vols.I,III. Martin's father was Comptroller 
of the Navy Board,1790-1794. These volumes 
contain recollections of him and of Admiralty 
lords and naval events.
Hamilton,Sir.R.V. and Laughton,Sir J.K.(ed.) Recollections of
James Anthony Gardner,1775-1814) (l ondon,1906). 
Contains character sketches of some Admiralty 
lords, notably Leveson-Gower and Seymour.
Hughes,E. (ed.) The Private Correspondence of Admiral Lord
Collingwood7 [London,1957). The early pages 
show how 'interest' and patronage could be 
brought to bear on the First Lord.
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Lewis,M.A.(ed,)
Leyland, J .■ (ed.) 
Lloyd,C. (ed.)
Laughton, Sir J.K.(ed.) The Naval Miscellany,I. (London,1901).
Contains some of Admiral Samuel Hood's papers 
from the Mediterranean, circa 1794 and letters 
concerning his removal from office.
The Letters and Papers of Charles, Lord Barham. 
3 vols.(London,1906-1910).Vols.II,III. Barham's 
papers while an Admiralty lord and later 
First Lord.
Sir William Dillon's Narrative of Professional 
Adventures,1790-1839.2 vols.(London,1953-56j.
I.1790-1802. Used for general naval background, 
and sketches of Admiralty lords, especially 
Seymour.
Dispatches and Letters relating to the Blockade 
of Brest,1803-1805. 2 vols.(London,1898,190lT.
The Naval Miscellany,IV. (London,1952).Contains 
a section on the use of rockets to destroy the 
invasion fleet at Boulogne. Useful for the 
inter-relations of Admiralty,Ordnance and 
Cabinet.
The Keith Papers, selected from the letters 
and papers of Admiral Viscount Keith. Vols.
II,IIll/London,1950,1955). Used for relations 
between the services, events in the Mediterr­
anean and Near East, the interference of the 
Foreign Office in Admiralty affairs etc.
Lloyd,C. and Anderson,Pt.C. (ed. ) A Memoir of James Trevenen.
(London,1959). Contains some references to 
Admiral Young, an Admiralty lord.
Markham,Sir C . (ed.) The C orrespondence of Admiral John Markham,
1801-18077 (London,Ï904), Markham was one of 
St. Vincent's reforming Admiralty and his 
papers contain information about the reforms 
and the people concerned.
Perrin,VV,G . (ed. ) The Keith Paper, selectsd from the letters
and papers of Admiral Viscount Keith. Vol.i. 
(London,192677
Thursfield,Rear-Admiral H.G. (ed.) Five Naval Journals,1789-1817.
(London,1951). Used for general naval back­
ground.
Other Publications.
Anson, Sîr~w7Ted.) Autobiography and Political Correspondenee of
Augustus Henry, Third Duke of Grafton.T l ondon, 
189877 Contains letters to and from Richard 
Hopkins, one of the Admiralty lords about the 
formation of Pitt's first Cabinet.
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Âspinall, A.(ed.) The Later Correspondence of George 111,1783-
1797. 2 vols. (Cambridge,1962-3}. Contains 
naval references and shows the interest George 
III took in naval affairs. It also has Cabinet 
decisions regarding Admiralty or naval affairs, 
letters from Earl Howe and Earl Spencer etc.
The Correspondence of George, Prince of Wales, 
1770-1812. 2 vols.(London,1963-4). Contains
occasional references, especially to Seymour 
who was a close friend of the Prince.
AspinalljA. and Smith,E.A.(eds*) English Historical Documents.
X I .1783-1832. (London,1959).
Bourchier, Lady (ed.) Memoir of the Life of Admiral Sir Edward
Codrinqton. 2 vols."TLondon,18737. Vol.i.
Browning,0, (ed.) The Polidcal Memoranda of Francis Godolphln
Osborne Fifth Duke of Leeds. Camden Society 
Publications, New Series,XXV.1884. Has infor­
mation on Cabinet quarrels, decisions and 
methods of business. Useful only to 1791 when 
Leeds, former Foreign Secretary, left the 
Cabinet.
Buckingham and Chandos, Second Duke of.(ed.) Memoirs of the
Court and Cabinets of George III. 4 vols, 
TLondon,1853-5j.
Chatterton, Georgiana Lady (ed.) Memorials, personal and histor­
ical of Admiral Gambler. 2 vols.(London,1861). 
Gambler was an Admiralty lord and relative of 
Middleton. This book had limited use but 
throws light on the evangelical circle with 
which Gambler and Middleton were associated.
Colchester, Lord.(ed.) The Diary and Correspondence of Charles
Abbott, Lord Colchester. 3 vols.(London,1861) , 
Abbott was Speaker of the House of Commons 
for most of this period and his diary contains 
useful information on topical events.
Greig, J.(ed.) The Farinqton Diary by Joseph Farington,R.A.
Second ed. 8 vol’s. (London, 1922-1928; . Vol.i. 
Only of slight use, contains occasional 
references to Admiralty lords.
Harcourt, Rev.L.V.(ed.) The Diaries and Correspondence of the R t .
Hon. George Rose, 1744-1818. 2 vols .TLondon,
1860). Rose was secretary to the Treasury and 
a trusted friend and confidant of Pitt. His 
diaries contain some naval references but are 
generally useful for the background of political 
events.
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Hardy, C.F. (ed.) The Benenden Letters, 1753-1821.(London,1901).
Letters between Richard Cox, a clerk in the |
Sick and Hurt Office and cousin to the naval 
storekeeper at Harwick, and William Benenden. 
Though mostly concerned with events and people |
before 1783 they give some idea of the life !
of humbler naval officials, which is all too 
rare,
Londonderry,The Marquess of,(ed.) The Memoirs and Correspondence
of Viscount C astlereaqh. 4 vols. TLondon,
1848;, Vols.I,II. Mainly dealing with affairs 
in Ireland and used for the contacts between 
the Home Office, Admiralty and Lord Lieutenant.
A Brief Memoir of the Life and Writings of the late William Marsden
by himseIfl (London,1838;. Marsden was 
Admiralty secretary and witness to the inner 
workings of the Board. Marsden approved of 
Lord Spencer's board and was critical of St. 
Vincent's methods. He particularly disliked 
the harsh methods of Markham and Troubridge 
and criticised the treatment of the Navy Board, 
and the behaviour of the Commission of Naval 
Enquiry.
Maxi^mll, Sir.H. (ed.) The Creevey Papers. A Selection from the
Correspondence and Diaries of the late Thomas 
Creevey, M.P. 2 vols. TLondon,1904).Vol.I.
Used for the events of 1805-6.
Newnham, Rev.G.L .(ed .) A Selection from the Public and Private
Correspondence of Lord Collingwood. 2 vols. 
(London,1837;. Vol.i.
Nicolas, Sir N.H.(ed.) The Dispatches and Letters of Vice Admiral
Lord Viscount Nelson. 7 vols. TLondon,1844-1846] 
Contains much diplomatic material, the problems 
of a commander in the Mediterranean, dealing 
with difficult allies, the co-operation between 
naval officers and Foreign Office appointees 
etc.
Letters to the Right Honourable Earl of Chatham by an Old Sailor.
(London,179^i.
Paget, Sir Augustus.(ed.) The Paget Papers: diplomatic and other
correspondence of the Rt.Hon.Sir Arthur Paget, 
1794-1807. 2 volsTTLondon,lS96yr Vol.I.Used
for relations between Paget, while consul at 
Constantinople and Admiral Keith and generally 
for naval-diplomatic relations.
Pellew, Hon.G.(ed.) The Life and Correspondence of the Rt.Hon.
Henry A d dington, First Viscount Sidmouth. 2 vols, 
Thondon, 1847). Vol.i. Used for events after 
1801.
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RoseberryjEarl of (ed.) The Life and Correspondence of the Rt,
Hon.VVilliam Windham, 1750-181Q. 2 voIs . (London, 
19137. Contains much useful information on 
relations between Spencer,Windham,Grenville 
and Dundas. Also has many references to 
naval affairs, chiefly in connection with 
expeditions to La Vendée and Quiberon Bay.
Wraxall, Nathaniel.Historical Memoirs. 4 vols.(London,1818) .
General period background.
Cockayne,G.E.
Secondary Sources.
General Reference Works.
Betham,W. The Baronetage of England. 5 vols.(Ipswich,1801-
377
Burke,John. A Genealogical and Heraldic Dictionary of the
Peerage and Baronetage of the British Empire. 
(London,1828,1853),
A Genealogical and Heraldic History of the 
Commoners of Great Britain and Ireland. 4 vols. 
TLondon,1835-1838).
Burke,Sir John Bernard and John, History of the Extinct and
Dormant Baronetcies. Second Edition7(London, 
1844).
A Genealogical and Hera1die Dictionary of the 
Landed Gentry. 3 volsTTLondon,1846-1849). 
Complete Baronetage,1611-1800. 5 vols.(Exeter, 
1900-1906).
The Complete Peerage of England, Scotland, 
Ireland, Great Britain and the United Kingdom:
A History of the House of Lords and all its
members from the earliest times. New ed. by
the Hon.V.Gibbs, H.A.Doubleday, D.Warrand,
Lord H. de Walden, G.H.White and R.S.Lea.
13 vols.(London,1910-1959).
Ford, P. and G . A Guide to Parliamentary Papers. (Oxford,1956),
Dictionary of National Biography, ed. by S.Lee and L.Stephen.
(London,1885-1900).
Judd, G.P. Members of Parliament,1734-1832.(New Haven,1955),
Manwaring,G.E. A Bibliography of British Naval History. A
Bibliographical and Historical Guide to Printed 
and Manuscript Sources. (London,1930).
Marshall,J. Royal Naval Biography. 12 vols,(London,1823-
1830).i,iii,
Namier,Sir Lewis and Brooke,J, The History of Parliament: The
House of Commons,1754-1790. 3 vols.(London,
1964).
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0*Byrne,W.R. 
Ralfe, J.
Steven Watson,J.
Naval Biographical Dictionary. 3 vols.
(London,1849)7
The Naval Biography of Great Britain. 4 vols.
TL53d3R7l8287.
The Reign of George 111,1765-1815.(Oxford,1960).
Detailed Reference Works.
Adams, E.D. 
Albion,R.G.
The Influence of Grenville on Pitt's Foreign 
Policy,1787-1798. Carnegie Institute of 
Washington Publications,no.13.1904.
Forests and Sea Power: The Timber Problem of 
the Roval Navv.1652-1862, Harvard Economic 
Studies,vol.xxxix. (Cambridge ,U.S.A. 1926).
Used for the Navy's Board's difficulties and 
their relations with the timber contractors.
Clowes,Sir W.Laird. The Royal Navy, a History from the earliest.
times to the present. 7 vols.(London,1897- 
1903). Vols.IV,V, were used. They contain 
lists of office holders and accounts of 
administrative developments as well as naval 
battles.
The Life of Richard, Earl Howe, (London,1838). 
and others. Prices and Wages in England from the 
Twelfth to the Nineteenth Century.I . ^London, 
1939). Used for prices of naval and victua­
lling stores and for details of the Navy Debt, 
methods of.paying Navy bills etc.
British Public Finance and Administration, 
1774-1792^ (Oxford,1958). Used for the chapter 
on Admiralty and Naval finance, it contains 
a clear account of how estimates were drawn 
up and the relations between financial problems 
and administrative ones. . .
The Growth of the British Civil Service,1780- 
1939. (London,1941). A survey,of the whole
Barrow,Sir.J. 
Beveridge,Sir W
Binney, J.E.D.
Cohen,Emmeline W,
civil service, with some references to the 
Admiralty and other naval boards.
Cornwallis West,G. The Life and Letters of Admiral C ornwallis.
(London, 1927). Cornwallis belonged to a 
politically powerful family, was naval 
commander in chief in the East Indies and later 
in the Channel. He played an important part 
in naval affairs until 1796. His quarrel with 
Lord Spencer over the Duke of York's regula­
tions, the problems of a commander, disputes 
with the Admiralty Board were all used.
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Derrick, G
Eliott-Drake,Lady. 
Fay,C.R.
i/le moi r s of the Rise and Progress of the Roval 
Navy. (London,1805J• Derrick was a clerk in 
the Navy Office. His book contains useful 
lists of ships built and repaired together 
with approximate costs for the period.
The Family and Heirs of Sir Francis Drake.
2 vois. (London,1911J .Vol.II.'
Huskisson and his Age. (London,1951). This 
unusual and interesting book gives some idea 
of the background of under-secretaries’ lives. 
Used for Huskisson’s relations with Nepean 
and his work at the 'War Office.
Fortescue,Sir J.W. British Statesmen of the Great War,1793-1814.
Oxford,1911). The Ford Lectures of 1911, 
lectures II,III,IV,V were used. Fortescue 
considered Dundas a bungler but praised the 
Duke of York’s work as Commander in Chief.
George, M.Dorothy. English Political Caricature: A Study in
Opinion and Propaganda. 2 vois.(Oxford,1959). 
Vol.II. Describes cartoons issued on famous 
political or other events. Used for the naval 
cartoons and for those issued during Lord
Fayle,C.E.
Furber, Holden. 
Gill, Co
Melville’s trial.
’Shipowning and Marine Insurance'. In C.N. 
Parkinson (ed.), The Trade Winds: A Study of 
British Overseas Trade during the French Wars, 
1793-18157 (London,1948},pp.25-48,
'The Employment of British Shipping'. In C.N. 
Parkinson (ed.), The Trade Winds.pp.72-86.
Henry Dundas, First Viscount Melville,1742-1811.
Tô^ ford'rm^ i)': ----------- ------------
The Naval Mutinies of_________________________1797.(Manchester,1913).
Used for the attitude of the Admiralty to the 
mutineers and of the mutineers to the Admiralty. 
Harlow, Vincent T. The Founding of the Second British Empire,
1763-1793. Vol.II.TLondon,1964). Chapter IV 
was used for relations between Pitt and his 
closest colleagues.
The Empire of the North Atlantic: the Maritime 
Struggle for North America, (t oronto,Canada. 
19501 Chapter XI was used.
Fox. (London,1934).
'The West Indian Trade'. In C.N.Parkinson(ed.), 
The Trade Winds. (London,1948),pp.157-193. 
Nelson's Band of Brothers.(London,1951). This 
gives an account of events in the Mediterranean 
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